A schools that fails to meet state performance targets for two consecutive years must be given technical assistance from the district to help it improve. pg. 42

Schools began as very decentralized organizations, however, school was accessible to fewer people and varied in quality. When the system was intentionally providing different qualities of education to different students, in this case, based upon race, the federal government stepped in and tried to establish standards for schools in the 50s and 60s.

The Evolution of Federal Education Policy

The first attempt at a national standards based education plan failed because of both parties

“Though there were several important differences, Bush's and Gore's education proposals during the 2000 campaign were remarkably similar. Both advocated a stronger federal role in education and school improvement through higher academic standards, increased federal funding, expanded support for charter schools, and tests to allow the federal government to hold schools accountable for student achievement.” (McGuinn, 2005, p. 56)

Democrats supported federal standardization because it's in congruence with their views on federalism

“NCLB differs from past [state and federal] initiatives in two important ways. First, it represents a more systemic approach to achieving reform and improvement, tying together a variety of requirements and incentives in areas ranging from student testing, school safety and reading instruction, to professional development for teachers to technical assistance for low-performing schools. Second, it significantly raises the stakes-for states, districts, and schools-for failure to make steady, demonstrable progress toward improving student achievement.” (McGuinn, 2005, p. 45)

The effect of local autonomous decision making is moderated by national policies that place the locus of control at the center. In all cases, the three measures of central authority are jointly significant, although not individually significant in the shortage regression.

While studies suggest that decentralized authority can alter resource allocations and improve targeting to the needy, there is less evidence that desired outcomes are enhanced by local control.

o “To investigate the impact of local school management on school outcomes, we use a multicounty survey carried out in 1997 over eight Latin American countries by the Latin American Laboratory of Quality of Education (LLECE). Our sample includes third and fourth graders in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Peru.7 The samples were constructed to include public and private schools, and schools in metropolitan, urban, and rural areas. The samples are not strictly proportional, noticeably under sampling rural children in Brazil and Chile and under sampling urban/metro children in the Dominican Republic.8 We include only the public schools in this analysis, as the private schools would not face the same constraints on local school control.” (Gunnarsson, V., Orazem, P., Sánchez, M., & Verdisco, A. (2009), P 32-33)

“There is strong evidence that local school managerial effort is enhanced when the students have more educated parents (Gunnarsson, 2009, p. 40).”

“We concentrate instead on the degree to which two types of local authority are employed to run the school. The first, school autonomy, is taken as the power accorded the local school administration to make school- management decisions.” (Gunnarsson 28)

i. “However, the relationship between more autonomy and better learning remains far from universal (Coleman 1990; Hannaway and Carnoy 1993; Savedoff 1998; Finn, Manno, and Vanourek 2001; Reinikka and Svensson 2004). For any of the reasons suggested by Bardhan (2002), local school managers may fail to manage schools as effectively as would central management. However, even in the above-cited studies that report positive average impacts of decentralization on student outcomes, the improved results are not found in all schools. In the EDUCO schools, the positive results are concentrated among the schools with the most active community participation and with better school inputs.” (Gunnarsson, 2009, p. 30)

b. “In this study, we abstract from the particular mechanism used to affect decentralization. We concentrate instead on the degree to which two types of local authority are employed to run the school. The first, school autonomy, is taken as the power accorded the local school administration to make schoolmanagement decisions. The second, community participation, is taken as the power accorded the local parents and/or community members to affect those same decisions. Our aim is to measure the impact of these two loci of control on student outcomes.” (Gunnarsson, 2009, p. 28)

a. “To investigate the impact of local school management on school outcomes, we use a multicountry survey carried out in 1997 over eight Latin American countries by the Latin American Laboratory of Quality of Education (LLECE). Our sample includes third and fourth graders in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Peru.7 The samples were constructed to include public and private schools, and schools in metropolitan, urban, and rural areas. The samples are not strictly proportional, noticeably undersampling rural children in Brazil and Chile and undersampling urban/metro children in the Dominican Republic.8 We include only the public schools in this analysis, as the private schools would not face the same constraints on local school control.” (Gunnarsson, 2009, p. 33)

b. “In addition to collecting test scores on sampled children in each school, self-applied questionnaires were given to the school principal, to the teachers, to parents (or legal guardians) of the tested children, and to the children themselves. Table A1 reports the variable definitions and information sources, and table A2 reports the sample statistics for those variables. For apparently random causes, the number of observations for children taking the mathematics and language exams differed, but sample statistics did not differ much between the groups of students taking the two exams.” (Gunnarsson, 2009, p. 33)

i. “In the top section of table 3, we report the average weighted autonomy score by country. It is useful to see how the practice of school autonomy compares to the legal mandates summarized in table 1. Across these countries, the greatest self-reported autonomy is in Brazil and Colombia, countries with relatively decentralized systems in table 1. The least self-reported autonomy is found in Honduras and the Dominican Republic, two of the more centralized systems.” (Gunnarsson, 2009, p. 34)

“Finally, these findings suggest that board members promoted centrally determined instructional and administrative practices—practices grounded in values of standardization and managerial efficiency over issues of local adaptation or diverse educational philosophies” (Trujillo, 2013, p. 352).

“Policy making that does not account for powerful contextual differences across more and less privileged districts leaves urban school boards disproportionately vulnerable to reduced democratic control and participation” (Trujillo, 2013, p. 354).

“As the preceding section demonstrates, this case study of an urban school board’s experiences under conditions of high-stakes accountability uncovered three main findings” (351-2).

“This rapidly growing field considers, among other things, the relationship between different district governance structures and student performance, usually measured by standardized test scores (Trujillo, in press). In what fol- lows, I highlight select work—not the full body of literature—to illustrate the general characteristics of this field, not to comprehensively review it.”

“Some scholars argue in favor of more decentralized district governance (e.g., Doyle & Finn, 1984; Hill, 1999). These arguments are supported by studies that find higher scores to be correlated with greater school autonomy and less bureaucratic district environments (Chubb & Moe, 1990). Other studies suggest that districts in which principals have control over budgets and staffing demonstrate higher scores than more centralized ones (Ouchi, 2003, 2009).”

“These studies show that more centralized districts, that is, districts that create policies for standards-aligned curricula, assessments, and training; standardized instructional routines; and test-centered monitoring and evalua- tion, typically experience test growth.”

“It uses in-depth, qualitative case study data to show how high-stakes pressures coincided with board members’ individualized goals for teaching and learning; autocratic decision making and participation; and standardized curricular and instructional practices” (Trujillo, 2013, p. 336).

“The major research questions that guided this study were: What were board members’ goals for teaching and learning? How did board members approach decision making and opportunities for local participation? and What types of instructional and administrative practices did board members promote” (Trujillo, 2013, p. 336). :

“Policy analysts have found either weak or inconclusive evidence of high- stakes policies’ effectiveness in boosting test scores” (335).

“For more than 200 years, the public has relied on elected boards to govern public education and to, presumably, serve as sites of democratic deliberation”

At the heart of the dispute is the question of whether boards of education play an essential role in ensuring an educated citizenry and preserving local, democratic control of public education” (Trujillo, 2013, p. 337).

“Yet researchers have paid little attention to the role of testing, standards, and high-stakes accountability in the daily work of school boards” (338).

“For these board members, the weight of high-stakes testing appeared to create not just school- and district-level pressures to produce results, but also individual-level pressures when board members interpreted test scores as singular indications of employees’ worth” (347).

“Every board member recalled their aim at the time: to hire a strong leader who would help them avoid federal sanctions by rapidly, dramatically changing the district’s standardized test performance” (Trujillo, 2013, p. 344).

“In doing so, the board members promoted centrally determined, standardized curricular and instructional practices that were in line with more privatized educational philosophies and approaches to teaching” (Trujillo, 2013, p. 349).

“Twenty-one schools comprised the roughly 20,000-student district. Its students were 91% Latino and 1% African American. Forty percent were English Learners and 80% qualified for Free or Reduced-Price Lunch (CDE, 2007)” (Trujillo, 2013, p. 343).

“These two purposes—socialization and governance—reinforce one another because the ways schools are governed ‘determines how students are socialized, for it is in this area that decisions are made about what should be taught and who is entitled to educational benefits’” (340).

“Yet schools’ potential to fulfill democratic purposes may be threatened “by the ascendancy of the private, individual goals of schooling over its col- lective, public purposes” (McDonnell, 2000, p. 5). While both—private goals intended to give individuals skills and knowledge for economic and social attainment, and public goals for preparing citizens to participate in and improve one’s community—are part of public education, many scholars cau- tion that high-stakes testing and competition-driven accountability amplify private aims for teaching and learning to the detriment of public ones (Howell, 2005; Labaree, 2007; McDonnell, 2000; McNeil, 2002). Thus I looked for evidence of private, individualized educational goals or public, collective goals held by board members and their superintendent as one aspect of the district’s potential democratic governance.”

o“Using these three conceptual lenses—collective educational goals, delib- erative participation and decision making, and locally determined practices— I analyzed how, if at all, high-stakes accountability policies were related to an urban board’s potential for local, democratic control.”

“Indeed, evidence about which forms of school governance effectively improve teaching and learning outcomes—more local, democratic controls or more centralized ones—is decidedly mixed” (Trujillo, 2013, p. 339).