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Indirect Realism (Russell- Indirect Realism leads to scepticism about the…
Indirect Realism
Locke Primary and Secondary Quality Distinction
.
Primary Qualities- MENSS
C1. Therefore, primary qualities must exist mind-independently
P1. If you continually divide an object, the parts must retain the primary qualities, even when they are too small to be perceived
Secondary Qualities- TTSSC
P1. When we pound an almond, we merely change the shape of its parts
C1. Therefore, the change in colour and taste (secondary qualities) is caused by the change in shape of the almonds parts (primary qualities)
Mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects
Locke- primary qualities= essential to an object
Berekeley- we are equally incapable of conceiving of an object without secondary qualities and therefore too must be essential to our idea of it
Argument from perceptual variation- shows an objects primary qualities can change depending on the conditions under which we are looking at it
Physical objects themselves are not experienced directly
Russell- Indirect Realism leads to scepticism about the existence of Mind-Independent objects
.
P1. If indirect realism is true, then we only perceive sense-data and not physical objects directly
C4. Therefore, indirect realism entails that we cannot prove that indirect realism is true
Existence of external world = best hypothesis
C1. Therefore, physical objects exist
P1. The fact that sense-data are private means that no two people can perceive the same thing: unless there are physical objects causing their perceptions
This argument assumes that we know that there are other people, that they have sense-data and that their sense-data are similar to mine
Reformulate the argument
P1. Either physical objects exist and are the cause of my sense-data or physical objects do not exist and are not the cause of my sense-data
C2. Therefore, physical objects exist and cause my sense-data
Justification for (P3)- Russell's cat
Locke
Involuntary nature of experience
P1. My perceptual experience, unlike imagination or memory, is involuntary
C4. Therefore, physical objects exist and cause my sense-data
Coherence of various kinds of experience
P1. Information from one sense confirms information from another sense
C4. Therefore, physical objects exist and cause my sense-data
The existence of physical objects remains a hypothesis
Counter-intuitive to think that perception doesn't put us in direct touch of physical objects
Locke- representation + resemblance
.
Locke- Physical objects "resemble our sense data - have size +shape etc.
Obj- we cannot know what physical objects are really like if we only experience sense-data
Locke- secondary qualities= nothing like the object BUT physical objects have primary qualities which we experience
We cannot know that physical objects resemble our experience of them- we cannot tell what a cause is like from its effects
.
Berkeley 2x arguments against indirect realism
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Perceptual variation
C1. Therefore, we cannot say that sense-data resemble physical objects
P1. Our sense-data change depending on the conditions of perception of the physical object
Do not directly perceive physical objects
P1. We do not directly experience physical objects, only sense-data
C4. Therefore, we cannot say that sense-data resemble physical objects
Locke- can still argue that sense- data
represent
physical objects
Obj- we stil won't know what mind-independent objects are like in themselves