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Property Dualism (Knowledge Argument (. (Mary gains acquaintance knowledge…

- - - - C1. On being released, Mary does not gain knowledge of facts, Mary gains know-how, new abilities
      - P1. Knowledge of what colours look like is not knowledge of facts, but a set of abilities
      - This is not all she learns- you can know what it is like to see red, without being able to imagine red
    - - P1. To be acquainted with colours is for ones brain to undergo the physical processes involved in seeing colour
      - C2. Therefore, on seeing colours for the first time, Mary doesn't gain knowledge of new facts, Mary becomes directly acquainted with colours
      - Acquaintance knowledge involves propositional knowledge
      - The objection misunderstands the argument- is about the fact that Mary doesn't know everything there is to know about other people when they see colour
        
        P1. Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about other people when they see colour
        
        C2. Therefore, phenomenal properties are non-physical and physicalism is false
    - - P1. Phenomenal concepts and physical concepts refer to the same properties
      - C2. Therefore, in the sense relevant to physicalism, upon being released, Mary does not learn any new facts about seeing colours
- - - - C3. Therefore, zombies are inconceivable
      - P1. A zombie is a physical duplicate of a person with phenomenal consciousness but without phenomenal consciousness
    - - P1. It is not an analytic truth that water is H20
      - C4. Therefore, the zombie argument cannot assume that phenomenal properties are not physical/functional properties, in trying to demonstrate that phenomenal properties are not physical/functional properties
      - This is a disanalogy
        
        P1. The essence of phenomenal properties is what it is like to experience them
        
        C3. Therefore, phenomenal properties are not identical to physical/functional properties
    - - Zombie argument shows that property dualism is possible, not that it is true
      - Reply 1- This misunderstands identity
        
        If phenomenal properties are physical properties in this world, then they are physical properties in every possible world
      - Zombie argument argues- there can be 2 possible worlds which are physically identical but with different phenomenal properties
        
        Once the physical properties of a world are done, there is not extra work needed to be done to "add" consciousness
- - - - We don't have enough evidence from neuroscience yet to claim that the causal story of the brain is an entirely physical story
- - - - It is part of our experience of mental states that our mental states cause other mental and physical states and events
      - It is only some mental properties (quail) that are epiphenomenal
        
        We can say that beliefs and desires are not epiphenomenal because we can analyse them in terms of physical properties and functions
      - It seems like mental causes cause physical effects because a brain process causes both
        
        Mental states are correlated with the effect but they don't cause it
    - - .
        
        P1. Traits that evolve over time are ones that causally contribute to the survival and reproduction of the creature
        
        C2. Therefore, epiphenomenalism is false
        
        Reply
        
        P1. Many traits have evolved that do not contribute to survival or reproduction but are by-products of traits that do contribute
        
        C1. Therefore, mental processes that are correlated with brain processes that contribute to survival or reproduction, could be by-products of them
    - - P1. I know I am in pain, because my belief that I am in pain is caused by my pain
      - C3. Therefore, epiphenomenalism is false