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Substance Dualism (Issues facing interactionist Dualism (. (Conceptual…

- - - - 2
        
        P1. The movement of a physical object is initiated by some physical force extended at some point in space
        
        C3. Therefore, dualism is false
      - 1
        
        C1. Therefore, the mind cannot move the body
        
        P1. Physical things only move if they are pushed
        
        Descartes- this isn't an accurate understanding of how things are moved- e.g. weight
  - - - .
        
        P1. If the mind as a non-physical substance moved the body, then the total amount of energy in the universe would increase
        
        C2. Therefore, because the mind which is not itself, physical, changes -physical energy of the universe, physics cannot give us the complete, correct account of physical energy in the universe
        
        We have no evidence of the mind changing the brain
- - - - E.g. mental illnesses- split personality disorder
      - Bodies = spatially divisible, Minds = functionally divisible
    - - E.g. force fields
      - We can still conceive of them having half the size
      - Still may not be an essential or defining property of every physical substance that it is divisible
        
        The fact that the mine is not divisible does not entail that it is not physical
    - - True that these are not divisible but properties in general are not divisible
      - Could only be mental properties
- - - - Argue for philosophical behaviourism - without a body something can't exhibit behaviour
      - Descartes- we can make mistakes over what is conceivable, but we can't make mistakes over clear and distinct ideas
        
        Attack Descartes' theory of clear and distinct ideas
    - - P1. WATER and H20 are distinct concepts
      - C3. Therefore, what is conceivable is not always metaphysically possible
      - We cannot generally infer what is metaphysically possible from what we think but in the case of clear and distinct ideas we can
    - - Simply knowing what is metaphysically possible does not tell us which possibility correctly describes reality
- - - - We experience causal connections between mental states and behaviour
        
        Experience is misleading
      - Epiphenomenalism makes it hard to understand how we have knowledge of our own mental states
    - - Analogy 1
        
        P1. I have a mind
        
        C2. Therefore, other people have minds
        
        Can't generalise from one case- could be a special case
      - Analogy 2
        
        C3. Therefore, other people have minds
        
        P1. This behaviour has a mental cause
        
        Not all my behaviours have mental causes
        
        Relies on the claim that similar effects have similar causes
      - The existence of other minds = best hypothesis
        
        Mental states = "inner states" of an organism that respond to the environment and cause behaviour
        
        Depends on functionalism being the correct account of how things are
        
        If we understand the mind in terms of its causal relations to behaviour, then we need to solve the problem of how minds can cause physical events
        
        To solve the problem of other minds, we only need the claim that behaviour is caused by mental states and not an explanation of how
        
        The belief that other people have minds is not a hypothesis