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Moral Naturalism (Utilitarianism and naturalism (Reductive moral…
Moral Naturalism
Utilitarianism and naturalism
Reductive moral naturalism
Happiness and goodness are both natural
Maximising happiness is natural
Rightness is natural
Bentham
Pleasure and pain determine what we shall do
Psychological claim
Motivated by pleasure and pain
Recognising natural fact
Mill must be thinking goodness is a natural property of what is desired
Mill
Desire is evidence of what is desirable
Natural psychological property
Evidence of reductive naturalism
For something to be good it must be desirable
Similar to Bentham
Solves some problems of cognitivism
Experience for right or wrong
Reductive v non - reductive
Reductive
Reduced moral properties
Identical with another domain
Non - reductive
Expression of natural capacities
Rejects supernatural explanations
Cannot be reduced to another type of property
Naturalism in virtue ethics
Reduction of good to natural
Function
Facts about human nature are the basis of moral truths
Psychological fact of character traits
Annas rejects this
Non - reductive moral naturalism
Based on natural facts about human nature
Natural facts = rational beings
Virtue ethics can be reduced to claims about moral facts
Moral properties are natural properties
Identify through sense or experience