TASTE 23 conclude on the whole it appears to me, that what is called Taste, in its most general acceptation, is not a simple idea, but is partly made of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of the conclusion of the reasoning faculty, concerning the various relations of these, and concerning the human passions, manners and actions. All this is requisite to form Taste, and the ground-work of all these is the same in the human mind; for as the senses are the great originals of all our ideas, and consequently of all our pleasures, if they are not uncertain and arbitrary, the whole ground-work of Taste is common to all, and therefore there is a sufficient foundation for a conclusive reasoning on these matters.
whilst we consider Taste, merely according to its nature and species, we shall find its principles entirely uniform; but the degree in which these principles prevail in the several individuals of mankind, is altogether as different as the principles themselves are similar 23
23 for sensibility and judgment, which are the qualities that compose what we commonly call a Taste, vary exceedingly in various people.
23 from a defect in the former of these qualities, arises a want of Taste; a weakness in the latter, constitutes a wrong or a bad one.
24 These men, though from a different cause, become as stupid and insensible as the former; but whenever either of these happen to be struck with any natural elegance or greatness, or with these qualities in any work of art, they are moved upon the same principle
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