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Responses beyond Anschluss and Reichkristallnact 1938-1939. (First…
Responses beyond Anschluss and Reichkristallnact 1938-1939.
First responses to Nazi takeover:
Foreign reaction in 1933 to the Nazi takeover was largely negative (including plenty of reports on the mistreatment of minority groups and political opponents). Publicly, the Nazis took little notice but privately there were concerns about what the international community was thinking.
Goering gathered the foreign correspondents in his office at the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and denied allegations that Jews were being attacked in Nazi Germany.
The Volkischer Beobachter (the Nazi-ran national paper) began printing articles blaming the Jews for defaming Germany's name.
Hitler told an American journalist that 'the campaign against the Jews may be at an end' and that 'there would only be further action if the Jews stirred up trouble'.
Jewish response appeared limited, although some organisations continued to try and preserve the rights and safety of German Jews e.g. The Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith lobbied to stop the retraction of Jewish rights in Germany.
The Zionist Union of Germany stepped up their help for Jews to emigrate to Palestine after 1933.
Terrorising political opponents and beating up unfortunate Jews 'had become part of the SA's daily routine' during the so-called Kampfzeit, but now this terror had to be carefully controlled. (Schleunes)
All of these organisations were merged under the 'Reich Federation of the Jews', which was never formally recognised by the Nazi government. Under this name Jews continued to fight back through lobbying and emigration help until this became impossible in the late 1930s.
The days after 1933 were due to be a revolutionary period for the Nazi party and for Germany- but instead set about 'courting' big businesses and military organisations. (Schleunes)
The almost immediate impact of Reichkristallnacht
Decree for the Elimination of Jews from Economy- aimed at completely destroying the Jewish presence within the German economy
The Jewish community were forced to clear up the damage that had been inflicted upon their property themselves following the Decree for the Restoration of the Appearance of the Streets Around Jewish Enterprises.
Problems with insurance:
To refuse to allow insurance companies to pay compensation to the Jewish businesses after Kristallnacht, it would have caused an immediate crisis in the German insurance and economy
A solution needed to be found- this was done in the form of not allowing the Jewish compensation claimants to access their compensation and fining the Jewish community for the murder of vom Rath.
Loewenberg's argument: Humiliation
At the 12th November conference, more time was spent plotting ways to humiliate the Jews in the public sphere than dealing with the arguably more pressing issue of how to get around the insurance problem.
All of this however, more than just removing Jews from the economy and allowing the Reich to make financial gains, was designed to totally humiliate the Jewish population and strip them of any notions surrounding their acceptance within Germany or as Germans.
Practical problems of Jewish emigration after 1938
Jewish Community retreats within itself: the regime wanted to heighten the idea of Jewishness and Germanness being separate in order to force the Jews to leave Germany
After the humiliation of Kristallnacht and its aftermath, the initial response of the Jewish community was to retreat within itself with an increase in cultural activities to strengthen Jewish identity. (Bauer)
Many Jews within Germany were very attached to the Fatherland, seeing themselves as German and could not face the idea of leaving. (Schleunes)
Following Kristallnacht, it became apparent that a watershed had been passed- life was no longer unpleasant in Germany for the Jewish community, it was virtually impossible.
Many now believed their only option was to leave Germany via organisations such as the Reich Representation of German Jews, these had previously been aimed at helping Jews live in the circumstances Nazi Germany presented them with.
Bauer- the opinion of high ranking Nazis was that 'if the West seriously wanted the Jews, it could have them... But the plan failed basically because the West didn't want the Jews'.
Role of Goebbels
Main driving force but role is weak as Jewish emigration not high enough.
10th November- his order that mobilises the party
4 year plan- ready for war by 1940 but racial aspect not met and so, Kristallnacht attempt at getting back into Hitler's good books and to prompt more Jewish emigration.
His idea to portray Kristallnacht as an act of public outrage.