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Lecture 2 : Realism and International Organization (Opposing Opinions : Is…
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Article :Textbok Chp 3
Textbook Ch. 3
hegemonic stability theory
- once there is someone to punish those how follows do not follow (a hegemon)
- to maintain order there must always be a hegemon
Cohen agrees with the 1st point but not he second.
He beliwbees in "Force Actvation" Model
your threat has to credible - flex your muscles
but you cant over play beacuse of backlash (the US with Afghanistan, Iraq etc)
A hedgmon may not want collectively participate in NATO because it is too costly - spreading themselves out to thin (Roman Empire collapse)
Rousseasu "Stag" problem : no one is there to punish those who defect, then it only takes one to defect and everyone will. How to you make collective action the 1st choice ?
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Cohen on Hedgemonic Leadership = Patronal Leadership
ex = the US the Marshall Plan
Using your econic power to better develop EU in term it gave them access to a new market and protection
ex =
balance of payments between countries, balance of payment regimes, instead of being bilaterral, you know square up with EU payments bureau. Wffect = increase EU economy, they needed american funding to have it happen,
p146 Cohen Summary of Hedgmonic Leadership
p180 Chonen on Hedgemonic Stability Theory = Collecticve good = hedgemon will punish those who defeact
Hedgmonic Stability Theory : wha happens when hedgmon pulls out ? Suvh as the TPP where the US pulled out - China took over
it became the CP TPP. A regional hedgemon pull up
Article 2 : Mireshimer
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2 problems of intl cooperation
- Cheating
- relative gains
even if intl org eliminate cheating, intl instutions do not eliminate relative gains between states
Mireshimer says that contrary to liberal thinking intl inst dont do anything alone, tey are extensions of the states. They only do wha the states want them to do
states only care about relative gains and thus intl org are a nother stage for competion. But if you assume that states dont always care about relative gains (they also care about absolute gains such as with trade ?) ---> possibly ? state A may gain 25% and state B 15%, they would still agree because local politics may help them be realected ? ^ this a state being irritional accorfind to Mireshimer (short term gains)
everyine is out to be more powerful than you, offensive realisem yet some states act irratinoally
Critisim of Realism
- The peaceful conclusion of the cold war caught many realist off guard
- regional integration, humatarian interention, the growing importance of non-state actors etc, didnt seem to fit a realism view
- Billard Analogy : intra-state wara are sometime hard to explain for realism
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