[G1]-PR11-Policy
How Platforms Should (and Should Not) Be Regulated

The regulatory challenge

Reworking old rule for a new world

an increasingly important social challenge

the need to design balancee internal governance system

external regulatory regimes to ensure operate fairly

platforms play a growing role

in the economy

in the social

political spheres

issue about

the right of partcipants

on society as a whole

the impact of platform businesses on other sectors

applied today's rapidly evoling platform markets

many observers are beginning to recognize much we "know" about regulatory policy is wrong

it's time for

policymakers

legal scholars

business advocate

to reexamine old assumptions about regulation

the platform revolution

many benefits that the explosive growth of network platforms in providing

the spread of platforms will not usher in some kind of new-economy nirvana

the rise of platforms has the potential for harm

it's not hard to understand

dosen't mean that there are no legitimate complaints to be rasie about the impact of platform business

some complains come from the rise of platforms reflect the disruptive impact of platform business on traditional industries

when criticism comes from this

it should be taken with a grain of salt

the dark side

externalities

when the cost of negative externalties is brone not by the people or companies that created them but not by "innocent bystanders"

who are stuck wiht the problem

a positive or negative consequence of an economic activity experienced by unrelated third parties.

i.e

MonkeyParking

Airbnb

Lack of consistent insurance coverage has been one of the most serous externality questions

the qusetion is how the social harm of privatizing a public resource outweighs the benefits of providing planned access to a scarce resource

the impacts of Airbnb on third parties uninvolved in the arrangement

Labor platform

the freelance/ 1099 economy

raise the social impact and equity

the caes against regulation

Roland Coase / George Stigler

regulatory capture

basic premise is that market participants will act to influence regulation in their own interests

often making the underlying market problems worse rather than better

market failures are best addressed by market mechanisms themself

by encouraging the free growth of competitors who provide goods and services

that produce greater social benefits than their rivals

the evidence of history suggests

government regulators tend to be incompetent or corrupt

fails to solve the problems it is intended to address

where the free market fails to resolve

can be addressed by private litigation in the courts

Laffont / Tirole

government rules are often used to block competition and thwart innovation rather than to protect consumerss and benefit society

it would be possible for firms to benefit from regulatory capture

if the principals involved had more complete information about

control over the behavior of their agents

the phenomenon of regulatory capture sharply undercuts the claim to legitimancy of most economic regulation by governmnet

Regulation to prevent anti-competitive practices goes back at least as far as ancient Greece and Rome

the question is not whether,but precisely how

platform businesses should be covered by regulatory regimes

most vibrant economics have typicallly employed some intermediate level of

govenment regulation via oversight agencies

judicial review

or some combination of the two

Diankov

private orderings(private gonernence)

state ownership(socialism)

social losses due to state expropriation

Regulatory issues

National control of information assets

Tax policy

Data privacy and security

Labor regulation

Fair pricing

Potential manipulation of cunsumers and markets

Platform access

exclusion

Who benefits

play a role in platform campatibility

whether it's fair and what its long-term impact on the overall marketplace is likely to be

especially significant when network effects are strong

excess inertia

the power of network effects to slow or prevent the adoption of new,perhaps better techonogies

Platform access

exclusivity

platform compatibility

predatory pricing

data

data-driven marketing

data ownership

local content requirements regulations

Amazon

refusing to collect taxes

main street fairness act

marketplace fairness act

classify full-time, permanent employees as contract labor

highly popular platforms can use their market power and their access to vast amounts of data to mislead people and manipulate their behavior without their knowledge or consent

Regulation 2.0

common goal

Regulation 1.0

gatekeeping

certification processes

prescriptive rules

accountability

goverrnment

consumer

hold people and platforms accountable for their behaviors after the fact

hold people and platforms accountable for their behaviors after the fact

platform

open innovation tempered by data-driven transparency

pick the safe and comfortable place for a night's stay

if platform's activities violate public expectations of safety and fair dealing, regulators can sanction or shout down these platform

platform like Uber can be granted freedom to operate in exchange for access to their data

consumer

government

platform

make wiser choices

establish and enforce requirements for after-the-fact transparency

develop new systems for monitoring and regulating economic activity

encourage companies to improve the quality of their products

enforce high community standards of behavior

Improve the quality of government agencies and amendments to existing statutory regulations

common goal

foster fairness, security and safety

create trust

Advice for Regulator

Private governance

Government regulation

Protect the interest of companies

Not to maximize public wealth

Safeguarding the interests of the general public

regulators are subject to capture

None be counted

Heli Koski and Tobias Kretschmer,

David S. Evans

Strong network effects generate market inefficiencies

public policy should be to minimize those

three-step process to test for the desirability of government regulatory action

whether the governance system is mostly being used to reduce negative externalities

whether the anticompetitive behavior outweighs the positive benefits of the governance system.

examine whether has a functioning internal governance system

Low regulation in startup

penalize those that comply with the law

Regulators have a light touch in order to encourage innovation.