Please enable JavaScript.

Coggle requires JavaScript to display documents.

Political Violence: State's monopoly of violence or force over a…

- - - - Large areas no longer under sovereign control after Arab Spring, which had sparked a peaceful movement for change against the rule of al-Assad but turned to revolution, conflict, guerilla warfare and terrorism.
        
        Syria was authoritarian and highly patrimonial, a system that distributes political and economic power to a small group pf regime supporters. Top ranks dominated by Assad family's own Alawite Muslim sect (less than 15% of population).
        
        Conflict radicalised some Syrians who rejected call for secular democracy, in favour of a theocratic regime. They were joined by fighters outside who wanted to create a new Islamic state.
    - - After 9/11, US invaded Iraq - precisely the sort of error Osama bin Laden hoped for.
  - - - IS wants to build state - building the rudiments of a genuine state in the controlled territory, e.g. clear lines of authority, tax, and educational systems.
      - Inducement, intimidation, indoctrination to enforce obedience and encourage sacrifices using ideologies that justify extreme methods and convince their followers that their sacrifices will bear fruit.
        
        Portray their opponents as evil, hostile and incapable of reform
        
        Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Mao
        
        Preach that victory is inevitable, provided supporters remain obedient
        
        Lenin: capitalism was doomed
        
        See their model as universally applicable. Promise that the revolution will liberate millions and create a more perfect world.
        
        French radicals in 1790s: crusade for universal liberty
        
        Marxist-Lennists: world revolution would produce a classless, stateless commonwealth of peace
        
        IS: global Islamic community.
      - Capable of providing security and basic services in its territory, spreading message online, fighting on the ground against weak opponents
      - Attract thousands of foreign fighters
        
        Stern and Berger's article
        
        Hijra: departing from a land of fear to a land of safety, including the act of leaving one's land and family to take up jihad in the name of establishing an Islamic state.
        
        Cannot tell how many foreign fighters there are. They make conflict more intractable because they are more ideological than the typical Syrian rebel.
        
        External motives: to do with an indiv's perception of large-scale events like military conflict. Jihadist propaganda characterise participation as an obvious moral obligation. Initially to fight the regime, now to establish Islamic State.
        
        Internal motives: what an indiv wants or needs for himself, in terms of the perceived benefits of membership, such as a feeling of belonging, escape into a new identity, adventure or money. Western volunteers looking for new families or friends. Initially promise of entry into heaven, now to the theme of adventure (put on social media).
        
        Jihadist not invented by ISIS, but it managed to disguise it under the illusion of stability and dignity.
  - - - Efforts to destroy the Islamic State could enhance its prestige, reinforce its narrative of Western hostility to Islam, and bolster its claim to be Islam's staunchest defender.
    - - Better to rely on local actors to contain the group (Huntington would agree!). ME countries to do more to improve governance and insulate themselves, but US should resist telling local govts how to run their own countries.
      - Patient containment is the best policy. Over time it will collapse. And if it does survive, it will become a more normal state over time (revolutionaries must moderate their behaviour to survive over the long term, e.g. Stalin, Mao and revolutionary Iran).
      - US should provide aid but keep role small, no ground troops. Airpower to prevent IS from expanding, not to bomb it into submission.
      - Otherwise seems like world's mightiest country views IS as a grave threat - heightens its appeal! Not every foreign tragedy is a threat to US interests.
      - BBC: Does Intervention Work?: Situation in Iraq now worse on every level after intervention. But in Mali, they asked France for intervention and it saved lives. Malian army was not in the position to preserve territorial integrity of the country. Also wished that intl community intervened in Rwanda to stop the genocide, bcos peacekeeping forces did not have the mandate to stop the killing.
    - - Aftermath of most revolutions: protracted struggle.
    - - Surge
        
        Dramatically reduces threat but likely to fail in costly ways.
        
        Large amount of resources. Destroy terrorist organisations and engage in nation building and democracy promotion. Arises from the theory that ME terrorism flows from political illiberalism in the Muslim world, that US must cure it. But might validate jihadist narrative.
      - Disengagement
        
        Dramatically reduces threat but likely to fail in costly ways.
        
        Disengage from ME post-ISIS defeat, confront terrorism through non-military means.
        
        US military involvement in the Muslim world cannot fix the problem of terrorism. It exacerbates it by sowing anger at US meddling. So disengagement will remove US as target, and redirect militant Islamists' anger away from US toward their own repressive govts.
        
        But creates power vacuum in ME. And might deprive it of the tools needed to keep the threat at bay.
      - Middle choices
        
        Less risk, more politically palatable, but they promise far less and would likely leave the US in a protracted conflict.
        
        Light-footprint (after bin Laden's death but before ISIS emerged): limited military force, but not too far bcos outsiders cannot fix deep-seated political problems within the Muslim world. Sustained, preemptive military efforts. Modest deployments of ground forces. Rely on regional partners for most ground work. But might not do enough to keep threat under control. And when it fails, US has to intervene under less favourable circumstances.
        
        Best strategy (counter-ISIS plus): larger US military commitment. Allow troops to operate more assertively, more intensive air campaigns, special ops forces to conduct steady raids, ground operations, US troops to train and equip partner forces, and accompany them into battle. But not attempt to transform ME societies. This strategy seeks a defeat (not containment) of extremist organisations. But might last indefinitely,
      - Medium-footprint
        
        Current strategy also least worst for Trump. No decisive victory but acceptable degree of security at an acceptable price.
        
        Aggressive airstrikes, drone attacks, special operations raids, and small deployments of regular ground troops in response to specific threats, all to support efforts by regional US partners.
  - - - Not enough troops, not much populated land, not high GDP. Not a great power, given its small population and underdeveloped economy.
      - More powerful neighbours showing growing resistance whenever IS tries to move outside.
      - IS cannot spread via contagion without certain conditions in neighbouring countries. IS only succeeded in overturning weak govt because US foolishly invaded Iraq, Iraqi PM governed in a divisive manner, and Syria fell into civil war.
      - Potential targets have resources and support from others.