8- the comparative analysis of political institutions
majoritarian versus consensual democracies - Lijpart
Veto players - Tsebelis
New institutionalism
varieties of institutionalism
repartition of the powers
Semi-Presidential
Parliamentary
Presidential
organizing the territory
Federal
Unitary
Two kinds of democracy
Majoritarian democracies (Westminster model) - UK
Consensus democracy - Belgium, Netherlands
2D
executives-parties
federal-unitary
nature of the party system
arrangements of the electoral system
executive-legislative relations
arrangement for interest group representation
executive concentrated or not
requirements for constitutional change
control of constitutionality or not
structure of legislative power (uni/bicameral)
indépendance of central banks
unitary/centralized or federal/decentralized
majoritarian party has the control
parliamentary control : fusion of executive and legislative
two main parties
disproportionnée system of elections
Interest group pluralism
unitary and centralized gvt
unicameral / domination of one chamber
constitutionnel flexibilité
No constitutional review
Central bank controlled by the executive
coordinated and corporatist interest group
federal and decentralized
proportionnel system of elections
two equally strong chambers
multiparty
rigid constitution, need strong majorities to change
executive-legislative balance of power
Constitutionnal control
Executive shared by coalitions
Central Bank is independent
political consequences
difference of economic performance is weak
consensus represent diversity
concensus democracies have better policy performances(social, economic...)
gentler and higher quality of democracy
veto player = individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for change in the political status quo
a country with many conflicting veto players has
smaller policy shifts
less variation in the size of policy shifts
policy stability
weaker agenda-setting powers
winset = the alternatives that all the veto players prefer to the status quo --> necessary for change
concepts of the theory
large winset --> many alternatives --> low stability
increasing the nb of veto players = decrease the possibility of agreement
increasing ideological distance btw veto players = decrease the possibility of agreement
size of winset depend on the nb of veto players + ideological distance
small winset --> few alternatives to status quo --> high stability
concretization
federalism, bicameralism, constitutional review --> veto players
countries w/ those institutions have
small policy shifts
little variation of the size of policy shifts
policy stability
weak agenda setting powers
focus
structures
institutions og gvt and politics
organisations
common arguments
product of past political battles --> the winer organize in tis interest
persistant inertia
institutions --> framework where ppl behave, constrain them
Sociological institutionalism
Historical institutionalism
rational choice institutionalism
institutions --> rules and incentives
can change them to match ones interest
institutionnel rules, norms and structures are culturally constructed
institutionnel change depend on culture
institutions are historical legacy
historical constrains, not all changes possible