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Week 7 The Russian Presidency: From Yeltsin to Putin - Coggle Diagram
Week 7
The Russian Presidency: From Yeltsin to Putin
Democratic Transition Theory
assumption that historical experience of the passage from authoritarian rule to democracy provides generalisable lessons and an analytical framework for understanding similar processes of change in different countries
strong normative and teleological elements
an assumption that the whole world was heading to a liberal democracy
the old ideologies e.g. communism and fascism is dead
teleological: a series of events leading to a prescribed end goal e.g. consolidating a democracy
values, political institutions and procedures of advanced western democracies is the end goal
derived from the study of democratising change in a range of diverse authoritarian regimes in latin America and Southern Europe
Stages of Democratic Transition
opening: breakdown of old regime involving a loss of established legitimacy and availability of an alternative
Breakthrough: collapse of old regime and emergence of a new system and establishment of democratic institutions, holding of founding elections
Consolidation phase: potential reversal becomes costly, democratic 'rules of the game' established for future negotiations
Democratic transition in Spain
increasingly apparent that regime would not survive after Franco's death 1975
recognition that demands for reform could no longer be answered by repression
need to foster political change recognised by social and economic elites
self interest: Francoist political class wanted to preserve their status, Suarez emerges as leader of reform and becomes Spain's first democratic PM
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Factors facilitating transition in Spain
lack of deep economic crisis
strong Spanish economy
existence of vibrant civil society
existence of political parties
old regime not obstructive- 'civilianised-authoritarian'
promise of economic aid
EEC membership
role of Suarez
Institutional choice in Russia
Parliamentarism
one directly elected agent of the electorate: parliament
parliament is responsible for the formation of government
2 main models: depending on the type of electoral system:
Westminister model: majority (one party) government
Proportional representation (PR) model: coalition of parties
principle of mutual dependence of government and legislature: gov has to be supported by a majority in parliament and gov tends to have some power to dissolve parliament (usually the consent of the head of state is needed)
head of state (presidents, monarchs etc) perform mainly representative, ceremonial and symbolic functions
Semi-Presidential Systems
co-existence of 2 directly elected organs of the electorate: parliament and president
terms of presidency and parliament fixed and tend not to be contingent on mutual confidence
separation of parliament and executive (no-overlapping membership e.g. either MP or minister)
no fusion of head of state and head of government
executive is split (bifurcated): president and prime minister
parliament provides checks and balances on executive power
president has law making authority
Semi-Presidential systems: powers of president
political powers:
formation of cabinet of ministers
dismissal of cabinet of ministers
appointment of other executive agencies
legislative powers:
right to issue decrees
right to initiate legislation
right to veto legislation
Dissolution of the parliament
Presidential-Parliamentary conflict in Russia: 1991-1993
Yeltsin elected president of RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic) June 1991
Ruslan Khasbulatov - elected chairman/speaker of Russian Supreme Soviet October 1991
Compliant Parliament (Congress of People's deputies): recognised need for strong Russian presidency to counter Gorbachev and fear of Russian federation splitting
President vs Parliament 1992-93
Khasbulatov intent on redressing marginalisation of CPD and bringing power back to parliament
Yeltsin ignores advice to call fresh elections and for political party, focuses on 'shock therapy' economic reforms
parliament (CPD) blocking constitutional and economic reform, (CPD still largely made up of communists and nationalists)
Yeltsin calls for referendum, CPD refuse = stalemate
Constitutional referendum: April 1993
Confidence in president of Russian Federation (RF) = 58% yes and 39% no
Approve of socio-economic policies = 53% yes and 45% no
early presidential elections: 50% yes and 48% no
early parliamentary elections: 67% yes and 30% no
October 1993: Showdown
21st September: Yeltsin issues decree #1400 - dissolving CPD and SS - powers to be transferred to new federal assembly: federation council (upper chamber) and state Duma (lower chamber)
constitutional court rules Yeltsin's decree in violation of constitution
SS declares Rutskoi acting president
Yeltsin orders army to shell the white house (the congress of people's deputies)
Khasbulatov and supporters arrested
Constitutional Referendum: December 1993
58% yes and 41% no
constitution required support of 50% to be adopted
later report indicated falsification of 9 million votes and turn out short of required 50%
Constitutional powers of Russian president
head of state, commander in chief of armed forces, directly elected max 2x4 year terms (now 6 years)
president determines guidelines for domestic and foreign policies
The president can:
declare a state of emergency
dissolve duma (parliament)
issue decrees without reference to duma
appoints PM, deputy PM, federal ministers, security council members, chair of central bank
power to dismiss government
nominate top federal officials - e.g. chairman of state bank, members of constitutional court, supreme court, security council
initiate legislation
Checks and balances on presidential power
possible to impeach but difficult
requires agreement of supreme and constitutional courts, evidence of high treason and 2/3 majority in both chambers of federal assembly
accountable to the electorate?
Defining Federalism
sharing of power with constitutional guarantees between levels of government
some powers of decision making granted to regional, sub national level and other remain with central government
degree of independence may vary
citizens of federal system are subject to authority of both central and regional governments
e.g. USA, Russia, Brazil, India, Australia , Germany etc
Russia's Regions
3 levels of federation
Republics (22) e.g. Chechnya, Tatarstan etc
Oblasts (46) and krais (9) e.g. Novosibirsk and then Altai etc
Autonomous districts: okrugs (4)
federal cities e.g. Moscow, st Petersburg
Autonomous oblasts
'Asymmetrical federalism' under Yeltsin
inequalities enshrined in federative agreements 1992:
republics declared subjects of federation
oblasts and krais territorial administrative units
republics given greater control of property rights/ constitution/ president/ official language
republics tend to be net recipients of federal subsidies- oblasts and krais net doners - despite the fact that some republics wealthier and more potential to generate wealth from natural resources
1995: new system of revenue sharing introduced - unevenly distributed due to trend towards bilateral agreements - republics favboured
declarations of sovereignty, threats of unrest tended to increase federal government subsidy to republics - loyal regions punished by becoming net donors
What did the regions want and what did they get?
What they wanted:
greater degree of political and economic control over decisions affecting their regions
more favourable treatment in regard to taxation and allocation of resources
what about sovereignty?
no great demand - for vast majority of regions no option but to stay with centre
What did they get?
bi-lateral treaties: Yeltsin's response to republics asserting sovereinty - starts with Tatarstan 1994 - 'take as much sovereignty as you can swallow'
treaties varied but usually for fixed terms of 5 years - budgetary, tax and personal matters
1994-98: 46/89 subjects of RF had negotiated bi-lateral agreements with central government
Problems with Bi-Lateral Treaties
practice of overriding centre-periphery arrangements which had been established by constitution: how important is constitution if it can effectively be by-passed by bi-lateral treaty?
unclear where treaties placed in hierarchy of laws established by constitution - never ratified by federal or regional legislatures
negotiations involved a good deal of brinkmanship on part of regions: how far could they push the centre? how long dare they withhold taxes? a good way to conduct relations in a federatoin?
republics and regions adopting their own constitutions that often contradicted federal constitution
August 1998 Economic Crash - boost to regional assertion
serious danger that our country will split into separate parts
measures adopted by regional leaders: governor of Kaliningrad declares state of emergency, introduction of price controls on basic foodstuffs, insulation of banks from financial collapse by preventing transfer of funds to Moscow
strengthening of regional power: withholding taxes, involvement in business and increased control of media
Putin comes to Power
Centre-regional relations under Putin
key policy aim: reversal of weakening of state power- 'dictatorship of law' - quite Leninist
May 2002: creation of 7 new federal districts each headed by presidential representative that he chose
responsible for ultimate control of republic and regional economies in their districts
did this because he wants to marginalise governors and exercise centralised control of budgets and of tax collection
Putin clamping down on the region
Centre Regional relations under Putin: A programme of re-centralisation
Reform of federation council August 2000
regional governors and republican presidents/ heads of regional legislatures replaced by representatives appointed by governors etc for 4 year term
Sorting out Yeltsin's bi-lateral treaties:
tackles Tatarstan and Bashkortstan first - making a statement - 2 most powerful republics - have to give back some of privileges gained under Yeltsin - same tax revenue as other regoins
Post-Beslan reforms
governors and heads of regional executives no longer to be directly elected but to be proposed/nominated by president and approved by regional legislatures
Problems of Centralisation
potential for conflict between ethnic Russian and non-Russian regions - if some of non-Russian, resource rich regions lose benefits gained in Yeltsin years - grievances against centre - succession movement?
centre -periphery relations more rigid, formalised and less scope for bargaining - difficult to resolve grievances of regions
centralisation may discourage regional political and economic innovations - some regions in past have been test-beds for political and economic reform - most famously Nizhnii Novgorod under Nemtsov (up to 1997)
suggestions that federation council might be abolished - but does provide some checks and balances to both executive and Duma
too much reliance on centralised 'vertical management' - what effect on civil society - less need for public support for regional leaders - more incentive for pleasing central government officials
Summary 1
state of centre-regional relations under Yeltsin unsustainable but has Putin gone too far in opposite direction? Does Putin's recentralisation project threaten Russian federalism?
-Yeltsin relied on compromise and negotiation to achieve settlements - economic and political weakness of centre prevented Yeltsin from asserting central power
Easier for Putin to exert pressure on regions due to loyal parliament, the role of United Russia extending into the regions, huge public support and much more favourable economic conditions
Summary 2
dangers of recentralisation - excessive centralisation a major weakness of the Soviet Union
Implications of Putin's centre-regional policy for democracy in Russia:
regional governors and republican presidents built up power bases in 1990s, many regions ruled as personal fiefdoms
under Putin, centre could use its power to bolster democracy in regions - instead, decision making taken out of region's hands
has state strengthening project served to weaken local democracy in Russia?
Yeltsin's family
Tatyana Dyachenko was his daughter and was his image advisor
'Tatyana did not play in politics, she actively engaged in them' - Shevtsova
someone unelected, very close to the heart of power
The Family - Yeltsin's power base
Boris Berezovsky: head of logo Vaz business empire, Aeroflot
Anatoly Chubais: former deputy PM, shock therapy reforms, head of united energy systems
Roman Abramovich: head of Sibneft oil
The Family under threat?
1999: PM Primakov, launched anti-corruption drive, aimed at Yeltsin's family
General Prosecutor, Skuratov, investigates Berezovsky's business empire
the family's response:
Berezovsky elected to Duma - immunity from prosecution
Skuratov forced to resign over compromising video footage
Important for Yeltsin to secure immunity for himself and family: step forward Vladimir Putin!
Yelstin arranges for Putin to take over as long as he leaves Yeltsin and the family alone
Who are the Oligarchs?
2 groups:
former members of Soviet nomenklatura who stayed in charge of organisations in the soviet days that were no longer in state ownership e.g. Gazprom, Chernomyrdin, Medvedev etc
Young business men who grew rich during process of market reforms - many new businesses had roots in enterprises formed by CPSU or its youth branch Komsomol in late Gorbachev period
Putin wanted to liquidate the Oligarchs
Putin: Liquidating the Oligarchs
he does so very selectively:
Vladimir Gusinsky: NTV critical of Putin, backed Primakov's party 1999 and in 2000 he was arrested, flees country, business empire dismantled, NTV taken over by Gazprom
Boris Berezovsky (very close to Yeltsin, in the family): 2000 denounces Putin's reforms, he was forced to relinquish stakes in ORT (TV station) and went into political asylum in London and remained fierce critic of Putin and died in mysterious circumstances 2013
Khodorkovsky: 2003 estimated to be the richest man in Russia - $15 billion, October 2003, he was arrested and charged with tax evasion, corporation since been broken up and now in hands of state, may 2005 he was sentenced to 9 years in prison, pardoned by Putin and released 2013 and now lives in exile
he was critical of the regime
The State DUMA: From Thorn in Yeltsin's side to Putin's toothless pet
able to occasionally constrain Yeltsin e.g. choice of PM 1989
parties in Duma able to mobilise popular protest
forum for debate
but under Putin, inbuilt pro-presidential majority and marginalised opposition - a rubber stamping chamber
United Russia: the 'Party of Power'
formed 1999 as unity - supported then PM, Putin
merged with fatherland -all Russia in 2000 to become United Russia
not ruling or dominant party
vehicle for putin to reassert his central power
party of the power rather than party of power
crucial to putin's reassertion of central power - extending Kremlin's authority to regions
regional business elites expected to support the party
local political elites encourage, coerce support for party
2007: all but 5 regional governors United Russia members
Declining support for United Russia 2011
party of swindlers and thieves - campaign led by anti-corruption blogger and non-systematic opposition leader, Alexey Navalny
public concern at corruption
-reflective of decline in support for Putin at the time
Putin's pet parliament
united Russia: 338 seats
communist party of the Russian federation: 43 seats
liberal democratic party of russia(far right party) : 40 seats
a just Russia: 43 seats
Summary
Yeltsin:
centre regional relations unsustainable, power leaching from the centre to the peripheries
oligarchs in control
parliament providing checks and balances on presidential power and existence of genuine opposition parties
Putin:
Huge recentralisation project - recreating the USSR?
Oligarchs tamed (if not liquidated)
parliament a rubber stamping chamber filled with obedient parties
real opposition forced onto the streets