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The natural philosophy of agency - how to define sense of agency - Coggle…
The natural philosophy of agency - how to define sense of agency
There is no consensus about what exactly is SoA
defined by bodily movement of motor control (movement, control)
intentional aspect of action
product of high order cognitive function
feature of first person experience
Ownership of movement - I'm moving (as an object) therefor I own this movement in some sense
this is different from agency in two levels
first person experience (FPE)
high conscious awareness - the ability to reflect and say that x,y,z
the experiments are troubling and interesting
troubling - what exactly are we measuring
intersting - what is sense of agency
afferent signals generate the sense of ownership
efferent signals generate the soa
just that? if nothing happened could we have agency of nothing? we need to have afferent knowledge
Chaminade and Decety experiment
leader and follower icon
the idea is that we expect to have a difference between the intentional leader to the "passive" follower
but in some way the follower is also intentional
and, maybe the focus is in the motor level
a lot of experiments try to distinguish between the sense of agency to sense of ownership - therefor they try to made experiments on different environment then the body
haggard objection - if the experiment include moving so the subject of the experiment will have agency at list for this movement
applied to chamunade and to farrer and frith
Ferrer & Frith
moving point on the screen, sometimes your joystick, sometimes the experimenter
the idea is that the point on the screen is not part of the body - so the fact that the subject move his hand doesn't matter
nevertheless, in the discussion they explain that the insula is involved because body modulations
haggard objection is applied
agency - anterior insula
not agency - right inferior parietal cortex
conclusion: three types of SoA
SA as first-order experience linked to intentional aspect - not merely the body
SA as first-order experience linked to bodily movement
SA as second-order, reflective attribution
reflective in what sense