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180601 Ops 2 Korea Land: final (legacy of the Chinese Civil War on the…
180601 Ops 2 Korea Land: final
Li Chien, “From Civil War Victor to Cold War Guard: Positional Warfare in Korea and the Transformation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 1951–1953”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, Nos. 1-2 (2015), 183-214.
conclusion
PLA
Pre Korean War
inward looking
preoccupied with liberating Taiwan
desired Soviet air and sea support to do so
end of 1950
civil tactics to drive UN out of North Korea
but by summer 1951
could not longer fight as it was used to
defensive so changes
doctrine
equipment
personnel
external engagement
more outward looking
eg Soviets (weapons)
war time promotes learning and adaptation
but is is vulnerable to peacetime political, social, and economic development.
Peng Dehuai, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People’s Volunteer
(CPV) Army, after July 1951,
military operations supported armistice negotiations
legacy of the Chinese Civil War on the PLA’s performance
pre 1945
Chinese mindset: battle of annihilation
guerrilla to conventional
resources
captured from Japanese or Nationalist forces
recruitment of pesants
but still developing as a conventional force
UN defeat in 1950
result of
PLA manourve
defensive would not work superior fire power
so Civil War tactics
divide enemy
lure enemy
encircle
destroy with superior concentration
feigned withdrawal to draw forces north
UN intel failures
did not detect elite PLA moving south to cut
build up of material foundations and logistics support
development of combined operation
impact of the last two
years of fighting on the PLA