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Principles of Mental Funtioning (Early Freud (Two mechanisms of mental…

- - - - economic definition
        translation of
        quantitative changes into qualitative terms
        
        equivalence
        between pleasure
        and the reduction of tension, and between unpleasure and a corresponding
        increase
        
        Problem:
        advantages of an economic interpretation
        clears the way for the formulation of a principle which holds good as much for the unconscious agencies of the personalityas for its conscious aspects. To speak, for example, of unconscious pleasure as being associated with a manifestly distressing symptom is to court criticisms from the point of view of psychological description. Freud takes as his standpoint a psychical apparatus and the modifications which occur within it. He thus has at his disposal a model which enables him to consider each substructure as regulated by the same principle as the apparatus as a whole. He can also put in parenthesis the difficult problem of determining, for each of these substructures,
        the mode and the occasion of an increase in tension becoming an effective motive-force in the form of perceived unpleasure. The problem, however, is not neglected in Freud's work: it is dealt with specifically, apropos of the ego, in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926rf) (the concept of anxiety as a signal* or motive for defence)
        
        Problem:
        constancy principle
        Many of Freud's formulations, assimilating the pleasure principle as they do to the principle of constancy, appear to indicate an option for the first of these two alternatives. But, on the other hand, if we take an overall view of Freud's basic theoretical references (as they emerge, in particular, from works such as the 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1950a [1895]) and Beyond the Pleasure Principle), we find that his tendency is rather to oppose the pleasure principle to the maintenance of constancy
    - - Problem:
        unconscious wishes / self-preservation instinct =/ satisfaction
        In this simplified thesis, it can be seen how the pleasure-reality relation poses a problem which is itself dependent on the meaning psycho-analysis assigns to the term 'pleasure'. If we understand pleasure essentially as the fulfilment of a need, after the fashion of the satisfaction of the self-preservation instincts, then the opposition between the pleasure principle and the reality principle has no radical implications, especially as it will be readily granted that the living organism is naturally endowed with predispositions which treat pleasure as a guiding principle, but that these are subordinated to adaptive behaviour and functions. It is in quite another context, however, that psycho-analysis emphasises the notion of pleasure-a context in which it appears to be connected with processes (experience of satisfaction) and with phenomena (the dream) whose unrealistic character is patent. And from this standpoint the two principles emerge as fundamentally antagonistic, in that the fulfilment of unconscious wishes (Wunscherfullung) is a response to very different requirements, and functions according to very different laws, from the satisfaction (Befriedigung) of the vital needs (see 'Self Preservation Instinct)
- - - - Location
        'lying on the frontierbetween the mental and the physicalconcept of 'representative', by which he means a sort of delegate sentinto the psyche by the soma
        
        The Freudian approach, as even this brief survey shows, tends to overturn the traditional conception of instinct. It does so in two contrasting ways. In the first place, the concept of 'component instinct' underscores the idea that the sexual instinct exists to begin with in a 'polymorphous' state and aims chiefly at the elimination of tension at the level of the somatic source, and that it attaches itself in the course of the subject's history to representatives which determine the object and the mode of satisfaction: initially indeterminate, the internal pressure faces vicissitudes that will stamp it with highly individualised traits. But at the same time, far from postulating-as the instinct theorists so readily do-that behind each type of activity there lies a corresponding biological force, Freud places all instinctual manifestations under the head of a single great basic antagonism. What is more, this antagonism is derived from
        the mythical tradition: first, between Hunger and Love, and later, between Love and Discord.
        
        concept of narcissism: the distinction between two kinds of instincts-the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts-tends to disappear and to be replaced by an explanation in terms of the modalities of the libido
    - - Aim - Reversal into its opposite - activity to passivity
      - Object - Turning round upon the subject’s own self (masochism)
      - Source - Repression
      - Pressure - Sublimation
- - - - Life Drive
        'The tendency of the life instincts is to create and maintain ever greater unities. Known also as 'Eros', they embrace not only the sexual instincts proper but also the instincts of self-preservation.'
      - Death Drive
        strives towards the reduction of tensions to zero-point In other words, their goal is to bring the living being back to the inorganic state.
        The death instincts are to begin with directed inwards and tend towards selfdestruction, but they are subsequently turned towards the outside world in the form of the aggressive or *destructive instinct.
        “instincts” -> originate in the interior of the body vs stimuli -> outside
        (no protective shield)
        
        Destructive instinct: The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct innocuous, and it fulfils the task by diverting that instinct to a great extent outwards-soon with the help of a special organic system, the muscular apparatus-towards objects in the external world.
        
        Sadism:
        A portion of the instinct is placed
        directly in the service of the sexual function, where it has an important part to
        play. This is sadism proper.
        
        Masochism:
        Another part does not share in this transposition outwards; it remains inside the organism and [...] becomes libidinally bound
        there. It is in this portion that we have to recognise the original, erotogenic masochism'
        
        Pathologies:
        
        Mourning and Melancholia
        
        War Neurosis
      - Problems:
        In the case of the life instincts Freud had to admit his inability to show how these could be said to obey what he had described as the basic trait of any instinct-its conservative (or, better, regressive) character.
        --> Same: pleasure principle (and its modified form, the reality
        principle*), which is supposed to represent the demands of the life instincts, is hard to understand in any economic sense, and Freud reformulates it in 'qualitative' terms (see 'Pleasure Principle', 'Principle of Constancy').
        
        Bound:
        It is clear that Freud is taking up once again-even on the instinctual level-a model of conflict which pre-dates Beyond the Pleasure Principle (see 'Ego-Libido/Object-Libido' -> ego + sexual drive); the assumption is simply that each of the two forces in play-the 'ego-instincts' and 'object-instincts' whose confrontation with each other is quite clearly observable-is in fact itself the expression of a fusion between life instincts and death instincts
- - - - Repression:
        the difference between systems correlates with a prescribed
        organisation according to which energy passing from one point to another must follow an order already laid down: the systems may be traversed either in a normal-or 'progressive'-direction, or else in a regressive one. What Freud means by the term 'topographical regression' is illustrated by the phenomenon of dreams, where thoughts can take on a visual character to the point of hallucination, a regression thus occurring to the kinds of images closest to perception, which is located at the point of departure of the excitation
      - Energy / Ideas passing:
        the difference between systems correlates with a prescribed
        organisation according to which energy passing from one point to another must follow an order already laid down: the systems may be traversed either in a normal-or 'progressive'-direction, or else in a regressive one.
      - Dynamic vs Descriptive :
        dynamic = repressed; descriptive = normal
      - Primary Processes:
        
        Models of the Mind
        
        19
        
        Topographical Model
        differentiation of the psychical apparatus into a number of subsystems. Each of these has distinct characteristics or functions and a specific position vis-a-vis the others, so that they may be treated, metaphorically speaking, as points in a psychical space which is susceptible of figurative representation.
        unconscious, preconscious and conscious-each of which has its own
        function, type of process, cathectic energy and specific ideational contents.
        Between each of these systems Freud places censorships* which inhibit and
        control transposition from one to another. The term 'censorship', like other
        images of Freud's ('anterooms', 'frontiers' between systems), points up the
        spatial aspect of the theory of the psychical apparatus.
        
        Unconscious
        separation of Unconscious from Preconscious-Conscious cannot be isolated from the dynamic view ccording to which the systems are in conflict with one another
        The second solution attempts to account for the constitution of an unconscious in terms of the process of repression,and it leads Freud to posit the existence, at a first stage, of a primal repression
        
        Repression:
        the difference between systems correlates with a prescribed
        organisation according to which energy passing from one point to another must follow an order already laid down: the systems may be traversed either in a normal-or 'progressive'-direction, or else in a regressive one. What Freud means by the term 'topographical regression' is illustrated by the phenomenon of dreams, where thoughts can take on a visual character to the point of hallucination, a regression thus occurring to the kinds of images closest to perception, which is located at the point of departure of the excitation
        
        Energy / Ideas passing:
        the difference between systems correlates with a prescribed
        organisation according to which energy passing from one point to another must follow an order already laid down: the systems may be traversed either in a normal-or 'progressive'-direction, or else in a regressive one.
        
        Dynamic vs Descriptive :
        dynamic = repressed; descriptive = normal
        
        Primary Processes:
        
        Preconscious
        As these are not currently present in the field of consciousness, they are unconscious in the 'descriptive' sense of the term (a)
        (see 'Unconscious', definition II), but they differ from the contents of the unconscious system in that they are still in principle accessible to consciousness (e.g. knowledge and memories that are not presently conscious).
        verbal language-to 'word-presentations
        
        Secondary Processes:
        From the metapsydnological point of view, the preconsdous systems is governed by tie secondary process. It is separated from the unconscious system by the censorship, which does not permit unconscious contents and processes to pass into the preconsdous without their undergoing transformations.
        
        1 more item...
        
        Censorships:
        that it distorts less than it selects
        Between each of these systems Freud places censorships which inhibit and control transposition from one to another. The term 'censorship', like other images of Freud's ('anterooms', 'frontiers' between systems), points up the spatial aspect of the theory of the psychical apparatus.
        
        Conscious
        In the descriptive sense: a transient property which distinguishes external and internal perceptions from psychical phenomena as a whole.
        According to Freud's metapsychological theory, consciousness is the function of a system-the perception-consciousness system (Pcpt.-Cs.). From the topographical point of view, the perception-consciousness system lies on the periphery of the psychical apparatus and receives information both from the outside world and from internal sources: this information is composed of sensations, which impress themselves at some point on the pleasure-unpleasure scale, and of revived memories. Freud often ascribes the function of perception-consciousness to the preconscious system, in which case this is referred to as the preconscious conscious system (Pcs.-Cs.).
        From the functional standpoint, the perception-consciousness system stands opposed to the unconscious and preconscious as systems of mnemic traces: here no lasting trace of any excitation remains. From the economic point of view, the system is characterised by the fact that it has at its disposal a freely mobile energy capable of hypercathecting a given element (the mechanism of attention).
        Consciousness plays an important part in the dynamics of the conflict (conscious avoidance of what is disagreeable; a more selective control over the pleasure principle) and of the treatment (function and limitations of the prise de conscience); yet it cannot be defined as one of the poles of the defensive conflict.
        
        Studies on Hysteria (1895rf):
        Psc - Csc together / later divided:
        lt is impossible for one and the same organ to fulfil these two contradictory conditions'-namely, the speediest possible restoration of the status quo ante so that no new perceptions can be received, and the storingup of impressions so that they can be reproduced (4). Later, Freud rounded out this conception in a formulation which attempts to account for the 'inexplicable' emergence of consciousness: it 'arises in the perceptual system instead of the permanent traces"
        
        The first topographical conceptualisation of the psychical apparatus is proposed in Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), but the notion's evolution can be traced in the 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1950a [1895]), where it is still embedded in the neurological framework of a neuronal apparatus, and thence through the letters to Fliess
        
        Structural Model
        
        Trauma-Affect Model Studies on Hysteria (1895)
        
        From the Studies on Hysteria (1895rf) on, the
        conception of the unconscious implies a topographical differentiation of the psychical apparatus: the unconscious itself is organised in strata, and analytic investigation proceeds of necessity via specific paths which presuppose a specific order among the groups of ideas. The organisation of memories, which are arranged in veritable 'files' around a 'pathogenic nucleus', is not only chronological in nature: it also has a logical dimension, since the associations between the various ideas are made in diverse ways. Moreover, the bringing to consciousness and reintegration into the ego of unconscious memories is described in terms of a spatial model, with consciousness defined as a 'defile' which only
        allows one memory at a time to pass through into the 'breadth of the ego*
        
        Lastly, the study of dreams strengthened the hypothesis of a separation between psychical systems by irrefutably imposing the idea of an unconscious domain functioning according to its own laws. On this point Freud drew attention to the value of Fechner's intuitive recognition that the scene of the action in dreams was not an extension, in attenuated form, of waking ideational activity, but rather a genuinely 'other scene'
    - - Secondary Processes:
        From the metapsydnological point of view, the preconsdous systems is governed by tie secondary process. It is separated from the unconscious system by the censorship, which does not permit unconscious contents and processes to pass into the preconsdous without their undergoing transformations.
        
        In the context of the second topography the term ^preconscious9 is used above all adjectivally, to describe what escapes immediate consciousness without being unconscious in the strict sense of the word* As far as systems are concerned, the term qualifies contents and processes associated, mainly, with the ego-hut also, to some extent, with the super-ego.
      - Censorships:
        that it distorts less than it selects
        Between each of these systems Freud places censorships which inhibit and control transposition from one to another. The term 'censorship', like other images of Freud's ('anterooms', 'frontiers' between systems), points up the spatial aspect of the theory of the psychical apparatus.
    - - Studies on Hysteria (1895rf):
        Psc - Csc together / later divided:
        lt is impossible for one and the same organ to fulfil these two contradictory conditions'-namely, the speediest possible restoration of the status quo ante so that no new perceptions can be received, and the storingup of impressions so that they can be reproduced (4). Later, Freud rounded out this conception in a formulation which attempts to account for the 'inexplicable' emergence of consciousness: it 'arises in the perceptual system instead of the permanent traces"