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RENO (Rulers to weak states learn how to manipulate the very programs that…
RENO
Rulers to weak states learn how to manipulate the very programs that are meant to control their behaviour. Thus, economic reforms programs can provide ways to garner money, especially when they suggest that state expenditures for health and education are cut
Over time, conventional institutions become unable to function and the state retreats into key reporting functions that can convince the outside world that they are working
Security, intelligence, surveillance and private militaries become all important
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The state attempts to make use of natural resources-- gold, diamonds, rubber, uranium, oil to bolster their coffers quickly
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In order to pursue these interests rulers often bolster their support and patronage capabilities with aid from money from the West.
This meant that African leaders were judged effective or not, based on their relationships and ties to countries outside (notably Russian and the US) and their creditworthiness, not the weak state's creditworthiness
This meant that by "imposing their own domestic priorities on those interactions, rulers of weak states redefined patronage from strong states during the Cold War to meet internal threats"
Reno cites Jackson, who argues that Cold War alliances allowed African leaders to play dominant countries off against each other, trading support for assistance
Identity is an important issue in considering how weak state rulers rule. Strongmen (and rivals) of the leader still hold considerable sway through clan, ethnic and religious loyalities. This makes establishing a national loyalty difficult especially when services and political goods are few.
Thus, if they are facing challenges agains their rule, leaders will intentionally disable the arms of the state. This makes outside intervention tricky because if state institutions are not working, who do you work with?
A common tactic is to also create private militias and armies for the leader that are distinct from the state army
Rulers try to handle the loyalty issue by patronage as stated earlier, but this doesn't always work
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Following Byart's work Reno says that a key logic of African states is elite accommodation. That is to say "in order to sustain a meaningful semblance of sovereignty over territory and people, rulers need to cut informal deals with individuals who exercise power in their own right"
Reno calls this a "shadow state". It becomes a system of patronage or clientelism, that is often financed with money from elsewhere. This patronage binds potential adversaries to the rulers, thereby protecting them from challenge.
There can be purely pursuit of interests where rulers jettison any pretense that they are helping the society. There can be a privatisation of a state assets into the hands of rulers and their private commercial networks