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LAW (LAW AS INSTITUTION (Instrument for Social Change (Wk 9-12) (Greenberg…
LAW
LAW AS INSTITUTION
Colonial Legacy (Wk 7,8)
Stokes: the indian legal system as a utilitarian experiment -- Macaulay's influence on legislative design & his debt to Bentham -- the link between utility and disciplinary power
Mukherjee: continuities between the British Raj and the Indian Constitution -- the concept of 'justice as equity' as fundamentally monarchical principle -- the claim that in the IC, justice is more important than freedom
Austin: the tight triangle of INC, CA, IG -- representation and decision making inside the CA -- the NPAA oligarchy
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Tool for Development (Wk 13,14)
Sen: legal institutions required in order to build capability/freedom -- even if economic institutions do not require them -- conceptual integrity
Ackerman & Cooter - ROL as necessary for economic development -- institutional requirements: contract law, criminal law, property rights, judicial independence
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LAW AS RULES (Wk 4-6)
Twining & Miers: law can be seen as a system of interconnected rules -- rules can be seen as problem-solving devices -- they cannot be separated from notions of authority and command
Padmavati Order: the interpretation of one rule depends not only on other rules, but also on past judgements/precedents
LAW AS NARRATIVE (Wk 1)
Rober Cover: the interpretation of rules is not exhaustive -- sooner or later judges are bound to run out of legal narratives -- at which point they borrow from larger socio-cultural narratives
Kanhaiya Kumar Bail Order: an example of how the post-JNU 'anti-national' narrative shaped a legal judgment
LAW AS POLITICS (Wk 2)
Waldron Ch. 2: partisan-model (law passed by by a particular political party or with a particular agenda) versus neutral-model (law passed by the state) -- why must laws carry an appearance of neutrality?
Waldron, Ch. 3: 'rule of law' can be seen as a set of formal (i.e. procedural) criteria -- ROL tells us not so much about 'what' the law should say, rather 'how' it should say it -- why must justice 'appear to be done'?