Please enable JavaScript.

Coggle requires JavaScript to display documents.

Philosophy of Language: (Essay: Mackie vs Passmore & Berkeley Example:…

- - - - Passmore sees this as only pragmatic self-refuation.
      - Mackie however sees it as operationally self-refuting because there is no way that it can be coherently asserted without it conflicting with the way in which it is asserted.
        
        However it is not absolutely self-refuting because the statement may actually be true. One may actually not be thinking at any given moment.
        
        Mackie holds Descartes as wrong here because he has argued as if "I am not thinking" was absolutely self-refuting because "I think that" is not strictly prefixable.
        
        Similarly I think that I am not thinking is not absolutely self-refuting because "I think that" is not a truth entailing operator.
        
        Why does it seem so strong? According to Mackie it is the logical feature of operational self-refutation and the direct empirical awareness of one's own thinking that makes it appear indubitable.
        
        Mackie thinks Descartes is wrong about the Cogito being absolutely self-refuting and Passmore is wrong about it being only pragmatically self-refuting - it's actually operationally self-refuting.
  - - - Must be careful not to be too explicit about naming the truths that we do not know. If we are too explicit about the truths we do not know it becomes operationally self-refuting as we are calling out the truth that we do not know.
        
        Indicating an item less explicitly does not pose such problems.
        
        I can refer to, say, the binomial theorem as a truth which I do not know, for I may have reason to believe that something called the binomial theorem is a truth of mathematics without being able to state it and therefore without knowing this truth or being even implicitly committed to claiming that I know it.
  - - - Whereas Mackie believes that what could be called a condition of discourse sets limits only to what can be coherently asserted.
        
        It is concerned with the way in which saying one thing implicitly commits us to being prepared to say something else as well, and it therefore gives rise only to what we have called operational self-refutation.
        
        Lack of operational self-refutation has led Passmore into mistakes in classification: seeing that Descartes's argument yields something less than absolute self-refutation, he has set it down as a merely pragmatic case, but in some other examples which are really similar to this he has seen something more than pragmatic self-refutation, and so has classified them as " absolute”.
- - - - Second strongest form. The way the proposition is expressed is incompatible with the proposition but there is no other way of expressing the proposition.
        
        eg. "I'm not thinking something" You have no choice in thinking it in the same way as you have a choice of saying “I am not saying anything”
        
        Another interesting example here is to say "I know nothing". There is no other way that this proposition can be said or thought by me without being self-refuting (operationally) but this does not mean it is untrue.
        
        Someone else could make this same claim about me and it could be absolutely true.
      - Pragmatic vs Operational:
        
        In pragmatic self-refutation the way in which an item happens to be presented conflicts with the item itself. But where we find operational self-refutation there is no other way in which this precise item can be presented. The only possible way of presenting the item is to " coherently assert " it, and since this involves asserting some- thing that conflicts with the item itself, this precise item cannot be presented at all.
        
        However what is in a sense an equivalent item can be presented (by another speaker or in formal logic for example) and can be true.
        
        Operationally self-refuting propositions undermine themselves in their being presented.
        
        The only possible way of presenting the item is to ‘coherently assert’ it, and since this involves asserting something that conflicts with the item itself, this precise item cannot be presented at all”
      - INtro: Pragmatic self refutation arises when a proposition conflicts with the particular mode in which that proposition is expressed, although such propositions can be expressed in a different way and not be self-refuting; I can truly write “I am not saying anything” even though to say it would be self-refuting. There are, however, other propositions that, although they have a clear sense in which they could be true, cannot be coherently asserted.
        
        Examples: for example, “I believe nothing” and “I don’t have language”. Although these propositions are evidently not absolutely self-refuting, their selfrefutation equally does not rely on the particular way in which they are presented.
      - OSR: if p cannot be coherently asserted or presented without simultaneously asserting not-p then p is operationally self-refuting
    - - Weakest form. The act of expressing a proposition is incompatible with the proposition that is expressed.
        
        eg. I am not saying anything
        
        Asserting this is not necessarily equivalent to asserting both p and not-p. However, it does seem to be selfrefuting to say “I am not saying anything”.
        
        PSR: if asserting p in a particular way is equivalent to asserting both p and ot-p then p is pragmatically self-refuting
      - It is not the proposition symbolised that we should call self-refuting but rather the actual action it describes such as writing that I am not writing or saying that I am not saying anything or saying that I believe I believe nothing.
    - - Strongest form. The proposition simply can't be true. Regardless of how its formulated the proposition is false.
        
        Eg. If X is true then X is false…./ ' It can be proved that nothing
        can be proved.
        
        “The proposition p is absolutely self-refuting, if to assert p is equivalent to asserting both p and not-p”
        
        ASR: if asserting p is equivalent to affirming both p and not-p then p is absolutely self-refuting
  - - - Systematised Anderson's theory of self-refutation: View is that there are rules to how we act and how we speak - there are preconditions of discourse.
        
        View is that there are rules to how we act and how we speak - there are preconditions of discourse.
        
        It's a propositional account of reality. All there are is propositions. We can never mean more than we say.
        
        What we can and cannot say has conclusions for what can and cannot exist
        
        If something violates the conditions of discourse then it can be concluded that it's self-refuting.
        
        Essentially he believes that absolute self-refutation is equal to pragmatic self-refutation in following on from Anderson.
  - - - Mackie & Passmore were both students of Anderson. Mackie ended up disagreeing with Anderson while Passmore stayed faithful.
        
        Certain statements are absolute presuppositions of discourse. When he talks about the conditions of discourse he says there are no other ways around it. What's pragmatically or operationally self-refuting is absolutely self-refuting and there is no way around this.
        
        What can be expressed in language is what can be true.
    - - Distinction between self-contradiction and a self-contradictory statement:
        
        Self-contradictory statement involves one asserting p and not-p at the same time.
        
        Contradiction involves asserting P and not-p at different times. In this situation one can reply in defence that between the assertions they changes their mind.
      - Relativism, Global Skepticism and Verificationism.,
  - - - Mackie's View:
        
        When we say something is operationally self-refuting, Mackie says, we are saying that it cannot be coherently asserted or presented by us. This does not, however, establish that it cannot be the case, or that its contrary must be the case.
      - Passmore's View:
        
        Passmore, on the other hand, thinks that metaphysical conclusions can be drawn from such self-refutation arguments, that we can draw conclusions about what can and does exist based on what we can and cannot express in our language.
        
        operational self-refutation involves an attempt to say what is unsayable, and hence what cannot be. Self-refutation arguments thus indicate what can and cannot exist in the world, and can therefore be used to establish positive philosophical conclusions.
        
        His position is essentially that self-refutation is an attempt to violate the conditions of discourse. A position is self-refuting when it is incompatible with the invariant conditions of discourse.
        
        Mackie Allows for Invariant Conditions of Discourse:
        
        The results of such arguments will be purely linguistic. Not metaphysical according to M.
        
        Operational self-refutation only demonstrates what we cannot say in our language, it does not have any implications for what can actually be the case in the world. Passmore, Mackie says, is mistaken in thinking he can draw any metaphysical conclusions from these cases.
      - The Principle of Unspeakability:
        
        For Passmore, which is unable to be said is unable to exist, since it does violates the conditions of discourse. A proposition that is (operationally) self-refuting violates these conditions; it cannot be about anything that exists.
        
        Mackie says “We must admit that something 'unspeakable' might nevertheless be real, though of course we should never be in a position to argue for it or even to assert it”
        
        Passmore wants to say that the conditions of discourse preclude the possibility of even supposing that there could be existing things that cannot be put into propositional form. He wants to drop talk of things existing outside of the conditions of discourse altogether
        
        What Passmore must establish to defeat Mackie:
        
        This final step, the step that shows because we cannot speak about something it therefore cannot exist, is the crucial one that Passmore must establish if he is to resist Mackie’s criticism.
  - - - According to Mackie Berkeley thinks his argument is both stating p and not p at the same time but in actuality it is just stating that one cannot be both thought and true and thus is just operationally self-refuting.
        
        Mackie: "Berkeley, in his argument, ‘has confused operational self-refutation with outright logical impossibility’ (1964: 201)."
        
        No metaphysical conclusion is thus established as it is only operationally self-refuting.
        
        If OSR did have this power it would result in us having to accept such propositions as "I know somtthing" "material objects exist unconceived" but given that the items which oppose them are at most operationally self-refuting we do not have to accept such conclusions.
        
        Passmore fails: Passmore’s appeal to the conditions of discourse failed to avoid Mackie’s operational self-refutation criticism; he fails to show why we can’t go from not being able to give an example (not being able to conceive of something unconceived) of something to supposing that the thing cannot exist.
        
        However Passmore may stand a chance along with Berkeley's argument if it rests upon intutionistic logic which relies on proof rather than truth. This is because we would have to be able to prove that something could exist without the mind, this of course would be impossible and so under the rules of intutionistic logic P is correct.
    - - Hylas gives the example of a tree existing
        without anyone around to consider it.
        
        Philonous points out by giving the
        example of a tree existing unconceived Hylas himself is conceiving of it.
        
        Upshot: Hylas cannot give an example of a thing that is unconceived, as any
        example he gives would be rendered false by the fact that he conceives it.