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Policy Making During the Kennedy Era (1991-1992) (Before the August 21…
Policy Making During the Kennedy Era (1991-1992)
After the election
After the election, Jagan was slated to meet President Kennedy on october 21st 1961
Jagans's meeting with President Kennedy
According to Daniels(2000) even wile Jagan was in the US the covert action plan was taking shape
Schlesinger (A thousand days) recounts his meeting with Jagan and claims that Jagan started talking about Harold Laski, then claimed that he was a Bevanite. Claims that Kennedy was not happy about the meeting, and typed a strongly worded letter- Kennedy also said that there was a 50 percent chance of him going communist if we did give aid and 90 percent percent chance if we didn't
Jagan however left the US dissapointed with only a vague hope of aid (Rabe pg 87)
Jagan's (biolgraphy) recollects the meeting in a negative light. Claims that Kennedy's Harvard Brain trust attacked him for his trade with cuba- he then justifies his position
Jagan made a terrible showing at meet the press
Spinner (1984) talks about how Jagan was grilled by fervent anti communist Laurence Spivak-Apparently, Kennedy tuned into the last part of the show
Spinner (1994) talks about how Jagan started talking about his admiration to marxsist journals like the monthly review edited by paul sweezy
Just a week before Jagan's meeting with Kennedy the INR sent out a memo (FRUS 258)
British Guyana is going the way of Castro, claims that strong and direct tiles will emerge as British Guyana achieves independence. Claims that as long as Britain is willing to get alon with Jagan, the US is in a dilemma. Claims that US should try to convert UK's views about Jagan. Claims that if the US really wants to offer jagan the carrot option of offering aid, then the 5 million offered is not enough. Instead a lot more should be offered. States that the next few weeks (this was a few weeks prior to Jagan's arrival) we should test how Jagan reacts. If his economic expectiations are too high and unsjakable, then the US should disregard the UKUS working group agreement annd work towards Jagan's downfall. This is an intel estimate that essentially put JAgan in a negative light compared to the CIA intel estimate
Covert Action plot
When the covert Action plot was well underway NSC advisor Mcbundy questioned whether CIA knew how to manipulate elections?
1962 august 16th John Mcone briefs Kennedy about the meeting between the CIA and the state dept with 4 other UK officials and says that they were able to convince the Britihs that Jagan was undesirable
in 1962 a large scale riot would break out
Rabe bok pg 91 and 92 claims that the CIA directly was involved in this rioting, and also say during the same time the US consulate in Guyana was upgraded to a consulate general so that more CIA officers can work under cover
The cia seemed to have don extensive reporting on this period with PDB's pertaining how things were unfolding-see PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 26 FEBRUARY 1962 and PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 11 AUGUST 1962
FRUS 264
This document essentially informs the UK, that the US has come to the conclusion that Jagan must go
FRUS documents
247
telegram from rusk to Alec- Bascially Rusk tells Alec that we have attached more emphasize on the covert side
248
memo from Schlesinger to Kennedy. Bascially he tells Kennedy, that everett Melby, who is the consul general in Guyana thinks that we should be friendly to Jagan, and get him to be party of the Alliance for progress
This idea of giving aid and luring Jagan into the alliance for progress fits with Daniels (2000) claim that Walter Rostow a key advisor to the Kennedy administration talked about how underdeveloped countries can be immunized against communism
249
Memo from Schlesinger to Kennedy. Bascially the later outlines that state dept has proposed a dual prong approach of luring Jagan while simultaneously developing a covert action program
This indicates, that even though the US, though he was a communist, they were not hell bent on getting rid of him, There seemed to have been a genuine effort to get him to the other side
250
This is a memo from schlesinger to Kennedy that he informed the state dept. that Kennedy's desired to learn more about the covert action plan.He also tells Kennedy he thinks the covert action plan is still pretty feeble
253
From Dean Rusk to David (not sure he is). the letter says that the Kennedy admin has completed a review of there policy towards Guyana. Accepted the UK plan which is about educating Jagan. But he says that the talks with the British should achieve 3 goals 1) A brief, agreed intelligence assessment; (2) British acceptance of the general concept of our action program; (3) Agreement ad referendum on a coordinated aid program (4) A covert action program (source classified (5) and agreement of tactics for the covert action program;
Again this is evidence about the dual prong approach carried out by the US
254
Rusk states that we should keep in mind that Jagan is a communist controlled sleeper. This again shows his very strong convictions against Jagan. Specifically asks to down play the covert action plan being planned out by the US
This letter is strong evidence that Rusk was in fact super convinced that Jagan was a communist, and input to policy making would have certainly sealed its fate
255
this is extremely interesting since essentially, Schlesinger claims that Rusk may have overplayed Jagan communist facet. He suggests several revisions to what Rusk sent out.
This could be an indication that not everyone within the Kennedy administration though Jagan was a communist
Other Intel Reports
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN-December 18, 1961-
Claims that Jagan is preparing to seek aid from the soviet bloc
THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 3 APRIL 1962
claims that Jagan has set to order over 600,000 worth of agricultural equipment from east germany one of the bloc countries
Before the August 21 1961 Election
There seemed to have been extensive political covert action activities in Guyana during the 1961 election
Jagan (biography) claims that US information services engaged in a smear campaign against him
also it was during this period that Thomas Dodd made a speech in congress saying that Jagan's victory in this election is even more dangerous than castro. Also claims that Dodd was directly associated with the cristian anti communist crusade that was intervening in Guyana's election during this period (Lippman 2011)
a SNIE in 1961 accurately predicted Jagan's victory during this election
This SNIE was drafted in march 21 1961 to estimate the political situation in Guyana and assess the communist potential in Guyana
One the one hand this document claims that although Jagan has not said he is a communist, his actions speak louder and also claims that both Jagans have visted cuba and they identify with Castro's cause
This document also summarizes in one like that Burnham was an ineffectual leader
this document predicts Jagan's victory with pinpoint accuracy by claiming "Jagan is almost certain to win in most of the pivotal districts. Accordingly, we believe that Jagan’s PPP will probably succeed in winning the right to form the next government."
In section 12 of the document claims that it is unlikely that Jagan would move towards, communim, but instead it would portray itself as an instrument of reformist nationalism which would gradually move in the direction of Castro’s Cuba
say that we can divide the Kennedy admins policy making on Guyana into two periods, the first took place before the 1961 election, and say that during this period, the admin was set on preventing Jagan from coming to power.
FRUS files
244
this document claims that the "British have not been willing to undertake any operation or permit us undertake operation to prevent Jagan victory and generally take view that Jagan is probably salvagable" .
It is interesting however, there seems to be evidece, that the US engaged in some covert action regardless of the British advice
245
This is a letter from Dean Rusk to Lord Home. Claims that the US is not willing to give people like Jagan the same benifit of the doubt given to castro. Rusk basically asks Home to see if there is anything they can do to mess with the results
246
Bascially tells Rusk that there is nothing the UK can do to mess with the elections. Also tells Rusk that, Jagan is a muddled thinker and a confused marxists. Also notes that we the west should give him aid
FOIA documents
august 11 1961 foia document
accurately predicts PPP winning by a small majority, Claims that Jagan's wife is a more doctrinaire socialist than Jagan. talks about putting young communists in safe seats, example of Ranji chadsign who was connected with Russian news agency TASS
17th July 1961 memo Foial document titled situation and prospect in Guiana
bascially says that if the PPP is elected jagan's victory could lead to the first communist regime in south america
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 18 JULY 1961
Claims that the communist-led party will probably win British Guiana. Also claims that Jagan is becmoing more open about his communist views
THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 17 AUGUST 1961
talks about JAgan being injured due to an attack from an opposition party member just one week before the election
Potential Factors that influenced the Kennedy administration
[This should be at the final section of the history section] a sort of a summary of factors that influenced
Thomas Dodd
(congressional infuence)
He was the chief congressional cheerleader for US intervention in Guyana. Apparently the only that challenged him was his congressional counterpart Goerge Aiken (Lippman 2011)
Lippman (2011) claims that Dodd aparently passed information was forged by D' aguiar to the Kennedy administration
Missteps by Jagan Himself
His terrible PR disaster during the visit especially his vascilation during meet the press-This is in fact confirmed by Rabe pg 87 who notes that this gave Kennedy an excluse to reject Jagan
Events that transpired in Cuba
Rable book chapter pg 83 says that the Kennedy admin saw so many historical parellels between Jagan and castro
Intelligence products
Rabe book chapter (84) says that the intelligence community did not share the same disposition about Jagan as the leadership did
See SNIE 242
INR intelligence estimate FRUS 258
August 11 Foia Document
CIA memo on feb 17 1962