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LTW7 - Pesticide Regulation: The Stockholm Convention (The Stockholm…
LTW7 - Pesticide Regulation: The Stockholm Convention
Kohler, 2006
Science, PIC and POPs: Negotiating the Membership of Chemical Review Committees under the Stockholm and Rotterdam Conventions
MEA (Multilateral Environmental Agreements) often have close relations with scientists/technical advisors - SABs (scientific advisory bodies) form a part of most MEA designs
This paper looks at how policy makers have sought to
achieve representative membership
by ensuring that the limited number of experts on a SAB reflect the national, economic and geographic diversity of stakeholders (capturing interests of those benefiting and suffering from the problem or its solution), while also maintaining an institutional and disciplinary diversity suitable to the nature ofthe problem
In negotiating the establishment of a science advisorymechanism, policy makers are faced with severaloptions
some MEAs have relied on independ-ent large-scale science assessments (most notably theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) inthe context of the UN Framework Convention onClimate Change), it is most common for MEAs to turnto subsidiary science bodies, which again can vary insize, membership and organization
Policy makers willhave to decide on whether to convene one large body,or several more specialized bodies; will need to deter-mine who will select experts to provide this advice,and whether they will be expected to serve in theirpersonal capacity or as representatives of theirgovernment’s position; and will have to consider howmuch authority the SAB should be granted
Decision makers are often keen to cap the size of science bodies, with a variety of justifications
The first of these justifications is grounded in negotia-tion research – a larger group is certain to becomeunruly in trying to negotiate a consensus on matters ofscience. In addition, larger panels can precludebenefits arising from less structured dialogues
Logistical freedom is also highlighted as the justification for keeping such deliberations to a
single language and avoiding the necessary structure and formality of simultaneous translation
. While manydeveloping countries have called for providing suchinterpretation, opponents have underscored not onlythe logistical concerns of such a measure but also its budgetary implications <-- example of how they can be massively exclusionary
Experts’ potential conflicts of interests can also complic-ate any discussions of diversity, as it can significantlydecrease the pool of available experts – this is particu-larly relevant for SABs of MEAs where decisions haveimplications especially for the industrial sector <<-- Conflict of interest means there's a smaller pool of experts to pick from - may then not get the best advice due to politics
This is perhaps linked to the theory that the
best indicator of the scientific consensus
and its legitimacy relates to the buy-in by the science community. In Protecting the Ozone Layer ,
Edward Parson
introduced the notion of
critical mass
, while in Saving the Mediterranean , Peter Haas used the notion of
epistemic communities
to explain the impetus arising from consensus from a broad scientific community. <<-- I.e. the more scientists involved, the greater the indicator of scientific consensus
Limits to the size of SABs also arise out of delegates’political concerns. From a strategic perspective, if theSAB produces an output which counters a party’s or acoalition’s interests, it is much easier to oppose theoutcome if it is possible to blame the lack of represen-tation on the SAB
The growing awareness of the social construction of science has drawn increasing attention to the indi-viduals involved in providing science advice for policymaking. This marks a significant shift from the long-standing norms of the science community, which in practice encourages the decoupling of the scientist fromher output – most clearly evidenced by the process of blind peer-review
In addition,...
...the use of publication in prestigiouspeer-reviewed publications as a metric for successconstitutes a bias towards English language outputand against interdisciplinary scholarship, which maynot be as readily accepted by well-established (andoften discipline-specific) journals <<-- I.e. where the science is displayed impacts its legitimacy
Representativeness guidelines is limited by the fact that each expert willexhibit different combinations of criteria (for examplea male expert from an arid African developing coun-try, working for an industrial organization, specializ-ing in the use of DDT). Even if agreement is reachedon what would be the ideal make-up, the nominationprocess is often not designed to achieve the desiredoutcome in the best way. Indeed, how is one nominat-ing party or coalition putting forth candidates for onlyone or a few slots expected to achieve ‘representation’on so many levels? <<-- i.e. on a limited panel size, how are you supposed to even theoretically achieve representativeness?
Indeed, every time an SAB is put in place, its creatorsface the challenge of ensuring that such a small com-mittee represents the whole world – or at least is con-stituted in such a way that the whole world recognizesthe legitimacy of the SAB’s output.
Conclusion:
Astwo of the newest SABs among MEAs, the emphasison membership diversity in the negotiations sur-rounding their establishment indicates that parties arenow emphasizing diversity as a means of facilitatinglegitimacy in the long run. However, while nationaland economic diversity have now been accepted asnecessary concerns in establishing a representativecommittee, more attention needs to still be paid tobuilding up diversity in other criteria, such as institu-tional affiliation, regional origin and personal diver-sity. And, indeed, increased diversity has been anoften relied upon tactic in attempts to bolster the legit-imacy of these science advice processes. For instance,under the Montreal Protocol on Substances thatDeplete the Ozone Layer, following growing discon-tent with recommendations for exemptions producedby the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee,at the Sixteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol(MOP-16), parties agreed on a redesign of the commit-tee’s working procedures, which, inter alia, emphasizesgreater participation by developing country experts
I.e. diversity in the panel creation means that more people feel represented, thus more people are willing to accept the outcome of the panel as legitimate, thus you can see the subjectivity in choosing the panel if you want to get the scientific knowledge recognised.
What are POPs?
There are 4 Properties that a chemical must display to be categorised as a POP (Persistent Organic Pollutant), noted in Annex D of the Convention. These are socially-constructed requirements - properties we've decided are important:
Persistence
The half-life of the chemical must be greater than 2 months in water, >6 months in soil or sediment, or is otherwise sufficiently persistent to justify its consideration within the scope of this Convention
I.e. they must break down slowly in the environment or not at all
Bio-Accumulation
Bio-accumulation factor in aquatic species must be greater than 5,000, or must show evidence of bio-accumulation in other species, or high toxicity, or eco-toxicity
Bio-accumulation occurs within trophic levels and leads to the process of bio-magnification whereby the chemicals are stored within the fatty tissues of animals - each step up the food chain sees the concentration of these chemicals increase
Is particularly an issue for humans are we're at the top of the food chain, thus experience highest concentration levels e.g. when eating fish
Some POPs have been linked to cancers such as breast cancer, hence very problematic (
Solomon et al, 2007
)
Most POPs are 'fat-loving' and are thus described as '
Lipophilic
'
Potential for Long-Range Transportation
Must be evidence of measured levels of the chemicals, distant from their sources
Can occur via air, water or migratory species
For chemicals that migrate through the air, their half life should be greater than 2 days
This exemplifies why global coordination is necessary
Many of the chemicals listed are found in Arctic samples - arrive via ocean currents, river discharges, air, precipitation etc. (
AMAP, 2002)
Thus POPs are described as
pervasive
- can't really avoid them; 98% of people sampled around the globe have these chemicals in their blood stream, even in babies before they're born
Adverse Effects/High Toxicity
Evidence of adverse effects to human health, or to the environment
Must have toxicity or eco-toxicity data that includes the potential damage to human health or environment
Observed health effects include cancer, endocrine disruption, birth defects, reproductive issues, population decline
Pathways to exposure include inhalation, touch (eyes, nose, mouth - often in lint found on clothes) and ingestion of POPs-contaminated foods e.g. meat, fish
Categorisation of POPs
(i.e. once they're identified as a POP, this is what type of POP they are:
Industrial Chemicals
E.g. PCBs: Are used as fridge coolants - many fridges that contain them are just reaching the end of their lives, breaking down and releasing these chemicals
E.g. PFOS:
Applications: IV drips, fire-fighting foam, leather and textiles manufacture, etc.
Doesn't undergo any form of chemical, microbial or photolytic degradation, i.e. it
never breaks down
It's
not lipophilic
, instead it binds to proteins in the blood; they then undergo enterohepatic cycling, where they're removed by the liver, excreted into the intestine and then reabsorbed etc.
Found in almost every blood sample of US citizens - concentrations rising in China
E.g. SCCPs (Short-chained chlorinated paraffins):
Application: Lubricants, coolants, flame retardants in paint, plastics etc.
There are non-POP alternatives for all its applications
Produced in Brazil, Russia and China for export to Australia, Croatia, Mexico etc.
Present in Arctic marine biota, i.e. in the food of indigenous people there; SCCPs biomagnify in the food chains
Despite overwhelming evidence of danger, it remains a controversial issue - hinting at the political issues
Pesticides
E.g. Aldrin, Endosulphan
E.g. DDT:
One of the first synthetic insecticides
Former applications: combatting malaria, agricultural insecticide, household pesticide
Current applications: malaria vector control in Asia, SSA, and South America
Recently linked to Alzheimers, cancer, premature births etc.
But it's inexpensive, accessible and effective
The
2016 WHO report on malaria
found 91 countries have ongoing malaria transmission, there were 212 million NEW cases in 2015, and over 400K deaths - 303,000 of which were children under the age of 5
E.g. Dicofol:
Pesticide used to protect crops from mites e.g. apple, strawberries, beans, peppers etc.
Produced in China and used world-wide
Linked to eggshell thinning in birds --> reduced chance of survival
Highly toxic to aquatic life
Not thought to be a significant threat to human health although some links to autism suggested - may be more of an issue for farmers who spray it with minimal protective gear/exposed skin
Unintentional Byproducts
E.g. Dioxins and furans
The Stockholm Convention
Role of Science
Ideally, treaties should be objective/neutral - we'd like a linear information from scientists to policy-makers
The Precautionary Principal:
Used to justify discretionary decisions in situations where there is the possibility of harm from making a certain decision (e.g. taking a particular course of action) when extensive scientific knowledge on the matter is lacking
Implies a social responsibility to protect the public from exposure to harm, when scientific investigation has found a plausible risk
For example, the European Council's ban on US beef produced with growth hormones is an example of enacting the PP - some argue that recourse to the precautionary principle can be a disguised form of
protectionism
, with this EC decision being one such example
(Maguire and Clarke, 2003)
Business representatives have claimed that the principle is generating an undesirable climate of uncertainty and that it stifles innovation - use GM crops as an example (IBID)
Proponents argue that application can provide significant benefits to firms, e.g. better risk management, improved stakeholder relations, and more innovation through the development of safer/cleaner products (IBID)
Using the Stockholm Convention on POPs as an example,
Maguire & Ellis (2003
) demonstrate how the precautionary principle is compatible with and can be – indeed, is being – reconciled with risk management as traditionally practised. Invoking the precautionary principle can be seen as simply making more work for those charged with risk management decision-making in society. In other words, because it lowers the threshold of evidence of serious or irreversible damage to human health or the environment necessary to trigger precautionary deliberations, the precautionary principle challenges and generates work for policy-makers
The Stockholm Convention has adopted the PP which means they don't wait for complete certainty from science - they act when there's reasonable evidence to suggest banning or changing a regulation
In negotiations leading to the Convention, the EU and NGOs, advocacy groups etc. wanted the PP more explicitly mentioned in the key clauses of the convention - the US and business interests, on the other hand, wanted only a general mention of precaution in the Convention's preamble (
Maguire and Clarke, 2003
)
Outcome: In Article 8, discussing the listing of Annex A B or C chemicals: 'The Conference of the Parties, taking due account of the recommendations of the Committee, including any scientific uncertainty, shall decide, in a precautionary manner, whether to list the chemical, and specify its related control measures' (
Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention
)
Key Actors
POPRC Members
:
It's a rotating membership of 31
Government-designated
experts in chemical assessment/management, drawn from:
African States
Asian and Pacific States
Central and Eastern European States
Latin American and Caribbean States
Western European and other States
COP confirms their appointment, based on equitable geographic distribution, gender, and the need for a balance of expertise types
Each member serves for 4 years, with a maximum of 2 terms
They don't all speak the same 'scientific language' which can make working together difficult
You then have
Observers
Industry
associates also come to these meetings - it's a full-time job for these people to come to the conventions and represent industry interests
E.g. World Chlorine Council, CropLife International
Have a lot of knowledge of the alternatives available, dangers etc.
Have often got close relationships/ties to the POPRC members
Industry isn't one homogenous group - some may work together, some may be in competition, etc.
Advocacy Groups
are present - often less well-resourced than others; can call attention to studies and data to give a voice to those who otherwise don't have it
Whereas technical groups try and at least appear a-political, advocacy groups take an explicit position
Lack of technical expertise can make it harder for them to participate effectively
They often push against industry - highlight selective uses of evidence for example
An important role for them is to take key information back to civil society and report it
NGOs originally attempted emotive speeches, but found the rest of the crowd weren't receptive to this - thus changed strategy and brought in
experts
, e.g. child health expert brought in to outline the effects of chemicals on children
Mixed response to how much influence they have: .e.g The Environmental NGOs have no influence whatsoever, they are invisible -
Former member of the Stockholm Convention Secretariat
, e.g. 'The environmental and public health groups service as a visual reminder of why we are here' (POPRC member)
Overview and Core Strategies
Aim: To reduce or eliminate those POPs which pose a significant threat to human health and the environment
Opened for signatures: 2001
Entered into force: 2004
181 parties in the convention
3 not signed are
Israel, Malaysia and the US
- can come to events but only treated as observers - interestingly, US was a leading developer of the treaty, and significant source of funding, but post-9/11, politics changed --> looking inward therefore less global engagement --> Issue as a lot of the EPA etc. would like to actually be in it - arguably good for the ROTW
Was originally 12 banned substances, the 'dirty dozen'
These are now all out of production, however, assistance is needed for some countries to dispose of stockpiles
18 have since been added, with 4 more under review at the moment
If industry wants to develop a new chemical, there's now a huge amount of testing needed for them to prove it won't be a POP - no one will invest in something they think could be subsequently banned
But NOTE that there's much more regulation on POPs in agriculture than POPs in industry
Core Strategies:
Eliminate the production and use of specific POPs
Eliminate the trade of specific POPs
Minimise emissions of POPs that can't be eliminated
Avoid production and use of any new POPs
When a chemical is nominated, it must undergo a 3-stage review process by POPRC (POP Review Committee - GO WITH 5 STEPS AS IN CLASS), a panel of 31 experts nominated by parties from the five United Nations regional groups:
Does the chemical fulfil the Annex D criteria for a POP?
Almost always 'yes' as only those that fulfil the criteria are submitted
If yes, POPRC drafts a 'risk profile' according to Annex E, as to whether the POP is likely to pose a risk to human or environmental health as a result of its LRTB status, and thus requires global action
This is a science-based assessment of the chemical, will typically be a year after stage 1, will look at evidence, where the evidence is from etc., this is
politically the most important stage
: If you are pro-that chemical, and want it to continue to be produced, you don't want it getting through this stage
If yes, POPRC develops a risk-management evaluation, according to Annex F - here they look at socioeconomic considerations of the possible control measures - based on this, POPRC decides whether to list the chemical under one or more of the Annexes A, B and C
They'll send out information to industry/stakeholders/countries at this point, to say what implications the listing will have for them
This allows the COP to make a final decision on it - often, Annex B is used to house chemicals people don't want to fully give up
Annex A: 'Elimination'
Requires each party to Prohibit and/or eliminate the production and use, as well as the import and export of the chemical
Allows for the registration of
specific exemptions
for the production or use of listed POPs
Annex B: 'Restriction'
Parties required to restrict the production and use, as well as the import and export
Allows for the registration of acceptable purposes for the production and use
Annex C: 'Unintentional Production'
Requires parties to reduce or eliminate releases from unintentionally produced POPs
Promotes the use of best available techniques and best environmental practices for preventing releases of POPs into the environment
Note on the Rotterdam Convention:
Established to establish a global prior informed consent procedure
I.e. Countries that are exporting chemicals that the Stockholm convention is seeking to ban must inform the country they're exporting to that the chemicals are coming
Once a chemical ends up on the Rotterdam List, it's often the case that countries just ban trade of it anyway
Thus, many industries work hard to lobby against certain chemicals they produce or use being put on this list
Shows the difference between theory and reality of the convention
Role of Science 2: The POPRC
They're the gatekeepers of the convention - they consider the science and the socio-economic implications
They don't make any policy decisions - just pull together evidence and research, and then share with the COP who make the decisions
Role of Scientific Knowledge in Decision Making
Dimitrov (2003) and Knowledge
Argues that most theories looking at international cooperation see knowledge as a single variable - they just lump it together as 'knowledge about the problem'
Instead, we need to split knowledge into:
Knowledge of the problem's extent
Knowledge of the underlying causes of an issue
Knowledge of the transboundary consequences of an issue
Argues the third is the most important for dictating whether an environmental regime will form or not
Uses two contrasting global environmental issues to show why:
Ozone Depletion
Largely successful address with the Montreal Protocol
Was a lot of uncertainty even when the treaty was being signed about the extent of the issue - for example, satellite technology at the time wasn't very sophisticated and it was still very difficult to create a picture of the extent of the damage
More importantly, there was clear evidence on the transboundary consequences of it
Effects of excessive UV exposure on skin cancers result from a well-known mechanism through which UV-B solar radiation incurs damage to the DNA that becomes irreversible beyond certain critical threshold
extensive documentation of this by 1990
Transboundary nature of these effects was hugely popularised with the stylised imagery of the ozone hole
Created a shared global imperative to fix the issue - availability of alternatives plus a potentially life-threatening cost of inaction made cost-benefit analysis of the situation easily favour taking action
Deforestation
Scientists very aware of the unsustainable rate of deforestation, with potentially huge numbers of people affected, they've not yet moved beyond meetings and conferences into a form of a global treaty
Multilateral assessments of forest resources produce solid information about the extent and causes of forest degradation, but there are gaps in knowledge about its transboundary effects
Even those most in favour of a treaty, such as Canada, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland, readily acknowledged the significant scientific uncertainty about the cross-border consequences of deforestation
As long as the benefits of cooperating at an international scale remain unclear, there's unlikely to be a regime formed
Why was knowledge present for one issue and not the other?
Dimitrov highlights that many believe that the reason is a political one: they argue that knowledge is
epiphenomenal
: which means it is constructed by powerful political actors who generate and mold information to support their agendas. In this context, for example, it was thought that the US, who led much of the research into Ozone and supported the introduction of an international treaty would 'produce' information that supported their agenda
But, his observations are that this was not the case. In fact, there was very little evidence that US policymakers and scientists attempted to interfere or obscure the uncertainties, for example the uncertainties around the extent of ozone depletion
He does, however, concede that we can't altogether dismiss the political manipulation of science: powerful political actors can and do affect which scientific projects are funded, who conducts them, and how the results are used, but in this case, it was perhaps not as much as people assumed
Framing
Jessica Templeton took reports, minutes, recordings of meetings of the POPRC members, and analysed a number of different frames used, splitting them into the following categories:
Evidence of harm
Often used to push for regulation - relying on information on the dangers of the chemicals
Uncertainty and knowledge gaps
Most often correlated with economic interests
I.e. highlight gaps in knowledge to underpin the decision to not ban a substance until the gaps are filled
Sometimes used by scientists want to slow process down to re-review
Sometimes by taking a year out, there can be a huge knock-on consequence in terms of the time it then takes to ban the substance
3.
Critical Body Burden
I.e. there's a critical limit we can tolerate chemicals in our body, which should not be passed
Procedural
Moves away from the chemicals criteria
They voiced concerns about the process of regulation
On surface, looks like people are trying to do something positive to improve the procedures
Found that often it was done as a stalling effort
Poverty and Hardship
Again, another reason for anti-regulation
Flags concerns about the economic issues associated with banning the chemicals
Graphic Description
Mostly attempts from NGOs to create emotive descriptions of consequences
Didn't fly at all
Framing Example 1: Endosulphan
Main Producers: India and China
In India (
Li & MacDonald 2005
), Endosulphan production done by state-owned Hindusthan Insecticides Ltd (70% exported, 30% used)
India Government chose their POPRC member as someone who was actually a representative from HIL
Was quite an overt demonstration of the selection process's politicisation
India did
not
want Endosulphan listed - huge economic importance and they also widely use it too
Thus, India and China objected using a
PROCEDURAL
frame:
POPRC voted to overrule China and India's claims that Endosulphan shouldn't be considered
India argued there wasn't enough scientific evidence to advance proposal to next stage (going against PP rule)
They called for new data, saying non of the screening conditions had been met, they questioned the data collection process, and accused fellow members of conflict-of-interest
India called for legal advice, legal advice went against India's wishes, India then questioned authority of legal advisor
India POPRC member called for a vote then recused himself from voting - so did Chinese member and Sierra Leone member
OUTCOME:
POPRC-4 took its first ever non-procedural VOTE on whether Endosulphan meets the screening criteria (unanimously YES)
Ultimately listed in Annex A in 2011
In the end POPRC got it through by saying that they could not represent economic interests on the committee
Importance of Case
Said to be death knell for Panel - politics was ruining objectivity
When politics are more subtle, it's much more tolerated
This case was hugely overt - actions of India's POPRC member were unavoidably damaging
A vote over whether to list a chemical set a negative president for their methods - if you've got to vote, you've got uncertainty --> undermines credibility of scientific community
Observations on Framing
Technical frames often most successful, implying members generally do strive for positivist approach
This explains why NGOs are only recently getting a better input as they're moving to technical framings
POPRC can be halted by use of
issue framing
We can begin to query whether this is a living convention, or whether the shift to prioritise economic concerns has halted its use
Conclusion on Science and the Stockholm Convention
Scientific knowledge critical in early stages (and used to support agendas where possible, which is not good)
The convention design affords a lot of opportunities for politics to intervene
What it needs is more people committed to science-based decision-making
It then needs people with skills at chairing meetings and bringing people together - we currently only send members to the panel based on their technical skills - surely a recipe for inefficiency - need some management in the mix
Van den Bilcke, 2002
argues that the convention is ultimately one where
science is subordinate to political interests
The Stockholm convention provides multiple opportunities for science-based decision-making and politically motivated intervention
DDT example - why has there not been a phase-out date agreed for DDT?
Developed as synthetic insecticide in 1940s to combat malaria, typhus, etc.
Also used for crop and livestock insect control
1945: Available in stores for public purchase in places like the US
Opposition to DDT centred around the book, Silent Spring (
Carson, 1962
)
Concerns were around threat to wildlife, possible carcinogenic effects, bioaccumulation, and dealing effectiveness as resistance increased
Result: In 1972, the EPA issued a cancellation order on DDT production
In 2004, DDT was banned under the Stockholm Convention, with the exemption for use as a disease vector control
BUT no phase out date has yet been agreed - why?
Banned in many industrialised countries since the 1970s, and all developed countries in 2004
Hindustan Insecticide Limited is the only producer of DDT - public sector company - economic self interest
Geneva meeting led to a non committed resolution with aim of producing alternatives to ban DDT
Robert Gwadz
- National Institute of Health - “the ban on DDT may have killed 20 million people”
Debate centred around whether deaths from Malaria outweigh the deaths caused by not banning DDT
Mozambique Malaria outbreak in 2002 - lack of DDT as 80% of donors to health budget requested their donations were not used on DDT
USAID and the World Health Organisation refuse to fund DDT
even stronger efforts have to be made to decrease morbidity and mortality linked with this disease while simultaneously eliminating DDT. As time passes, the continued use of DDT becomes an ever increasing violation of the spirit and wording of the Stockholm Convention.
Knowledge and the Stockholm Convention
POPs must be evaluated individually - really technically complex - may know extent of the problem - may know causes - but consequences are often unclear as they tend to be long term - hard to link and trace health issues e.g. cancer back to them - we're extremely bad at understanding how chemicals interact and what they do to health when they do -Introduces level of uncertainty that's quite unique.
Uncertainty is a weakness - don't want people to avoid action because we're not sure. May be - whilst in our position of privilege, we may not have to worry about what happens when the chemicals are banned, but people working the fields who are then maybe only left with a very expensive alternative could have their whole livelihood destroyed. There's socioeconomic considerations. Even if we're fairly certain that chemical is bad, we need to stack this against the serious economic implications - people use the
uncertainty to thus block action
One of criticisms of StocC is that it's reactive - only takes action once the danger is very clear. This is also a good thing as it decreases uncertainty. But only captures worst of the worse - i.e. it doesn't rely enough on the precautionary principle
Knowledge and Power
Dimitrov also argues that powerful actors will counter uncertainty by producing knowledge to support their agendas - this is an idea that seems to make sense but isn't actually witnessed in reality very often - so then how is knowledge used in decision making?
Assume everyone in process has a goal - rational approach. Can look also at the interests of the scientists - she thought scientists would understand problems differently depending on their background of science, but in fact, most scientists appointed by gov. do in fact by and large represent the interests of their government - one way in which all stakeholders represent their goals is through
strategic issue framing
- emphasise key aspects of an issue by de-emphasising other aspects
E.g. might thing that organic food is good - industry says but actually organic food means we can't produce enough food - need more procedures to allow us to feed the world. Can then steer dialogue to avoid stuff you don't want to talk about it - allows you to win support to get to the outcome you want to be at.
Van Den Bilcke (2002)
Persistent organic pollutants (POPs) are chemical sub-stances, produced intentionally, such as certain pesti-cides, or unintentionally, such as dioxins, which arepersistent, bio-accumulative and pose a risk of causingadverse effects to human health and the environment
If mentioning a definition in exam, define using the 4 criteria (toxicity, long range, bio-accumulative, long-lasting)
This article analyses different aspects of this new global Treaty,including its long-term goals, its precautionaryapproach, its finance mechanisms, its regimes forreduction of industrial POPs and of POPs as by-products, its waste aspects, its criteria to add POPs tothe Convention, its amendment procedures, and finallyits trade aspects
POPRC imbued with politicisation from the off
- just deciding to only focus on the original dirty dozen was highly politicised
Decision 18/32 by the UNEP had a footnote saying a list of the relevant POPs to ban - Van Den Bilcke argues this footnote was WRONG --> the UN-ECE was actually working on a large list of possible substances --> ' In reality, this footnote reflects the
political judgement of only a small group
of industrializedcountries that wanted to limit the number of sub-stances included in the Convention.'
This restrictive interpretation was then carried forward and finally, decision 19/13C from the UNEP in 1997 put the nail in the coffin, noting specifically that POPRC was only focussed on the 12 listed in the footnote - the dirty dozen --> 'The limited scope of the future convention to only 12POPs was sealed from that moment.'
It's also noted by VDB that decision 19/13C opened up diametrically opposed views on the actual long-term objective of the convention:
USA suggested it was reduction, and where feasible, elimination
EU suggested it was to protect human and environment health
It's surprising that in the final hours of negotiations there was little discussion of the vague definition, but mostly this was due to being overshadowed by the intense debate on the PP
Precautionary Principle
The final solution [of how much to abide by the PP] was very much the result of intens-ive bilateral discussions between the EU and theJUSCANZ countries (Japan, USA, Canada, Australia,New Zealand). In the final text, there were a numberof compromises
USA pushed for a relatively strong preamble paragraph mentioning PP, but the EU wanted the objectives to refer to the PP specifically, which they did not
Again, this is basically showing how different nations push for the shaping of the convention before it's even in action to ensure their best interests
Conclusions
The current limitation of the Convention to only 12POPs was not the result of a transparent negotiationprocess, but the result of an early political judgement by a small group of northern countries as long ago 1994 <-- pretty strong statement
UNEP Governing Council Decision 18/32 of1995, which mentioned only 12 POPs,
cleverly narrowed the scope
of the Convention 2 years beforethe official negotiation mandate UNEP GC 19/13C of1997.
A very positive feature of the Convention is the inclusion of the
precautionary approach
in an operational manner. Although the text on precaution of the Con-vention itself seems in some regards weaker than theCartagena Protocol on Biosafety, it is stronger in otherways, such as having very good preambular language,and in practice will very much govern the inclusion ofnew substances in the Convention - i.e. PP will allow more substances to be listed that otherwise would have happened
Unfortunately, the procedure for
adding a POP to theTreaty is so cumbersome
that it will take 3–4 years foreach new substance to be adopted and added underthe Convention.
The influence of the G-77,the stronger lobbying by indigenous peoples withintheir respective governments, the maturing of sci-entific thinking itself, and the i