Foundations of Social Cognition
Neonatal Imitation
Meltzoff & Moore 1977
classic tongue protusion experiment
claimed that imitation occurs almost immediately based on active intermodal mapping - linking self and other
only in 1st few weeks - why does it disappear?
too much agency given to babies?
is the imitation communicative or automatic reflex?
Oestenbroek et al. 2016 criticism see reading
Rhesus macaques - Ferrari 2006
claimed they found imitation
not clear whether monkeys imitating
not enough controls
Deferred imitation
Meltzoff (1988) – 9 month olds imitate after 24 hrs
Meltzoff (1995) – 14 month olds imitate after 2 months and 4 months using light box
6 month olds defer imitation (Barr et al., 1996)
Important for social learning
Overimitation - Horner & White 2005
copy actions which aren't necessary to end goal
demand characteristics? how to adults act in same experiment?
inferred intentions
joint attention
gaze following
pointing
proto imperative
protodeclarative
Rich vs lean interpretations
Pointing begins at around 11-12 months (Carpenter et al., 1998)
12 – 18 month olds check the adult is looking (Franco & Butterworth, 1996)
12 month olds point to provide information for others (Liszkowski et al., 2006)
12 month olds only follow if eyes are open (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002)
12 month olds will physically try and see what experimenter is looking at (Moll & Tomasello, 2004
Start to follow gaze direction at 6 months old (D’Entremont et al., 1997)
Tomasello and Haberl (2003) – 12 month olds know what is new for other people
Will point to new toy following experimenter’s request
Perner (1991) – gaze following is learnt and pointing is reinforced
Prosocial behaviour
Reading
Essay questions
What does research on joint attention in young
children tell us about social development?
Oostenbroek et al 2016
Lizkowski 2004
Tomasello et al 2006
Warneken & Tomasello 2007
Helping and cooperation at 14 months (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007)
Sharing at 2 years old – but only if adult states their desire (Brownell et al., 2009)
Hamlin et al. (2007)
Because they are rewarded by parents? Or do they get
an intrinsic reward?
Pointing to draw attention to self and get a reaction from parents (Moore & D’Entremont, 2001)
Liszkowski et al. (2004)
experiment tested alternative theories of pointing
Four hypotheses:
- Infants point for themselves
- Infants want adult attention to themselves
- Infants want to direct adults attention to the object
- Infants want to share attention and interest in object
Puppet appears and experimenter ignores puppet, waits for point and acts in line with these four hypotheses
Most pointing happened in the joint attention condition
Infants continue to point to try to get adult to look if adult directed attention to them
Pointed less over time in other conditions
– 6 month olds understand who is helpful and who is not
Warneken & Tomasello (2008): when reward received, less likely to help at 20 months old
Vaish et al. (2009): 18 month olds more prosocial if believe adult was harmed
rationale: neonatal imitation, controversial, studies limited (cross-sectional designs, small samples)
method: 106 babies - different weeks of age, model for 60 different gestures
results: nonsignificant, artifact of significance when analysing limited section of data hence significant results in prior study
conclusions: first emergence of imitation may be 6-8 months as Piaget suggets, publication bias
tongue protusion a target action that has been tested more than any other has given false hope of imitation ➡ babies just stick their tongues out wen excited
rationale: controversy over whether 12mth olds can produce protodeclarative gestures
method: 75 infants adult model acts in diff ways (split attention, face attention, no attention)
sig longer and more frequent points for joint attention
However, when the adult emoted to the infant alone or looked only to the event, infants pointed less across trials and repeated points more within trials – presumably in an attempt to establish joint attention. Results suggest that 12‐month‐olds point declaratively and understand that others have psychological states that can be directed and shared.
rationale: what makes us diff from animals? social cognitive and social motivational skills (shared intentionality)
method: assessed human raised juvenile chimpanzees
results: chimpanzees understand gaze and pointing but don't infer unless objective made clear (bucket w food example)
conclusion: apes mostly concerned w their own goals, human children often concerned w sharing psch states - evolution took existing skills eg gaze following and transformed them into counterparts of JA
14 mth children helped another person who couldn't achive their goal but not institutions with more complex goals
experiment 2: cooperation, children could cooperate on rudimentary tasks but not on ones including timing actions w other chid
chimpanzees help more than co-operate - are we more hardwired to help than co-operate?
Is prosocial beh evolutionary?
Hepach
Previous empirical reviews and theoretical summaries of children’s prosocial behavior have focused very little on the question of why children help others, that is, the underlying motivation. Here, we reviewed three recent studies that addressed this question. The first study demonstrated that children’s instrumental helping behavior is intrinsically motivated given that external material rewards undermine children’s propensity to be helpful to others (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008). The second study demonstrated that children’s sympathetic responses motivate their prosocial behavior (Vaish et al., 2009). The third study showed that children are not motivated to “get credit” for their helping acts but rather want to see the person in need be helped (Hepach et al., in press). From a motivational point of view then, children’s earliest helping behaviors appear intrinsically motivated to benefit others. Children help others out of a concern for the person in need.
One limitation of the measure of pupil dilation is that it can tell us very little about the quality of children’s other‐oriented motivation. That is, what do children feel when they see others needing help and their pupil dilation shows sympathetic arousal? And how do they feel once the situation is resolved? Therefore, it would be interesting to combine the pupil dilation measure with Vaish et al.’s (2009) approach of measuring children’s concern for victims as measured in their facial expression. In combination, measures of pupil dilation and facial expression may provide rich insights into the quality and origin of young children’s other‐oriented concern, such as the extent to which it arises from feelings of sympathetic concern.
Another powerful and promising measure that has recently been introduced and used to study the role of emotional processes in toddlers’ prosocial behavior is pupil dilation [36••,37]. Pupillary responses predominantly reflect autonomic nervous system activity, and pupil dilation (as opposed to constriction) is considered a correlate of internal arousal [37]. Most strikingly, research using this method has revealed that the degree to which seeing someone needing help elicits pupil dilation in 2 year olds relates to subsequent displays of helping behavior, with greater pupil dilation being associated with a shorter latency to help [38,39•]. Thus, in a given situation greater emotional arousal predicts toddlers’ helping behavior, suggesting that internal arousal processes function as a motivational force guiding early prosociality. (Grossman 2018)