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FINLAY (INTERPRETIVE PHENOMENOLOGY “The meaning of phenomenological…

- - - - VAN MANEN HERMENEUTIC REDUCTION: "One needs to reflect on one’s own pre-understandings, frameworks, and biases regarding the (psychological, political, and ideological) motivation and the nature of the question, in search for genuine openness in one’s conversational relation with the phenomenon. In the reduction one needs to overcome one’s subjective or private feelings, preferences, inclinations, or expectations that may seduce or tempt one to come to premature, wishful, or one-sided understandings of an experience that would prevent one from coming to terms with a phenomenon as it is lived through." (2012, p. 25)
      - "GADAMER (1975) describes this process in terms of being open to the other while recognizing biases" (2012, p. 25) ".
        "This kind of sensitivity involves(...)the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings. (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 268-269)
        Thus,
    - - Finlay warns about the risk of the researcher becoming navel (ombligo) fixed and reminds us of Giorgi's argument about the need to keep clear the intentional objects to which the researcher's acts are directed.
      - Those who "embrace the intersubjective relationship between researcher and researched" (...) argue that what we can know about another arises from that intersubjective space between." (2012, p. 26)
        This argument could be bridged with ideas ranging from attachment theory to the field of play from Kenny. It also points out to the need to recognize that the Other and the infant, in particular, is not given to me but also results from the intersubjective relation to which we both contribute
        
        "Examples of this way of working include the research by Halling and colleagues (2006) using their dialogal method; Churchill’s (2003) research on empathy and communication with a bonobo; and my own reflexive-relational phenomenology. (Finlay, 2009; Finlay & Payman, forthcoming" (2012, p. 26)
      - "Following the existential and hermeneutic lead of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, I suggest that one way the researcher can engage the phenomenon of interest is through an iterative and dialectical process of hermeneutic reflexivity (Finlay, 2003a). Reflexivity in this context is defined as the "process of continually reflecting upon our interpretations of both our experience and the phenomena being studied so as to move beyond the partiality of our previous understandings and our investment in particular research outcomes" (Finlay, 2003a, p. 108). Here, the researcher steps away from initial pre-understandings to gain sufficient distance from which to critically and reflexively interrogate them. As new thoughts and insights begin to challenge these pre-understandings, the researcher makes interpretative revisions and the ground is recovered. And the "dance" steps begin once more ..." (Finlay, 2008, p. 6) Certainly, reflection is a big part of the process and commitment I wonder, however, if we could highlight the embodied part a bit more as to recognize it at least as an equally important source of interpretation. *WHERE IS THE EMBODIED?!?
- - - - Giorgi (1985), a proponent of a thorough, descriptive Husserlian method, and prolific writer provided the impetus for what became known as the Duquesne approach or tradition
    - - He suggests that phenomenologists engage three levels of analysis: firstly, they look at particular experience, such as one person’s story of being disillusioned; secondly, they concern themselves with themes common to the phenomenon (for instance, the nature of disillusionment in general); thirdly, they probe philosophical and universal aspects of being human, by asking what is it about our nature and relationships that creates disillusionment. Halling counsels researchers to move back and forth between experience and abstraction – between experience and reflection – at these different levels. (2012, p. 21)
      - Halling (2008) suggests a slightly different version of this free imaginative variation which he calls “empirical variation.” Here, emphasis is placed on working collaboratively with others where the group members dialogue about their various perspectives allowing the phenomenon to show itself in new ways. In adopting such an approach, Halling is engaged in a distinctly scientific project. However, he also acknowledges something of the art within the process: “The process is an intermingling of receptivity and creativity, of discovering truth and creating truth” (Halling, 2008, p. 168). (2016, p. 185-186)
    - - "(FINLAY) I also agree with Langdridge when he notes that in practice there are no hard and fast boundaries between description and interpretation, as “such boundaries would be antithetical to the spirit of the phenomenological tradition that prizes individuality and creativity” (Langdridge, 2008, p. 1131)"
        And she gives the example of a combined description with an embodied interpretation of a caregiver experience when taking care of a partner with Alzheimer.
      - "My research encounter with Kenny raised several issues relating to the use of the phenomenological attitude in research practice. Firstly, it highlights how the process of engaging the epoche is intertwined with reflection which can occur both during and after the research encounter. It is a moot point whether this reflection is a necessary part of the epoche or a separate process. (...) For one thing, researchers need to be reflexive to ensure their reflections are also subject to the reduction. In this sense, the reduction is more a stance or tone which permeates the phenomenological reflection and research process as a whole."(2008, p. 10)
      - It would seem to me from what she described that the first thing she drew from in her interpretation was her own bodily sensation and not "the accepted psychological knowledge positions (2008, p. 10)". Indeed, she says: "I suddenly realised that I was reacting quite strongly to him and became aware my own bodily responses. I remember noticing how my arms were folded tightly across my stomach. I was protecting myself, but also 'holding my self in' and somehow 'holding myself together' (2008, p. 9)
        There was a bodily/embodied mirroring of the emotion that happened here (or happens in every case??) which is what might make the phenomenological exercise so challenging...?
        
        Is it possible not to "co-constitute meanings"? (2008, p. 10)
- - - - Besides from having an anchor in phenomenological philosophy, mainly, in this case, in regards to the embodied aspect of the experience, and the idea of separateness is also what makes it possible to...?
- - - - "There is a “reciprocal insertion and intertwining” of others in ourselves and of us in them where self-understanding and other understanding unite in mutual transformation." (2013, p. 7) Contributing a phenomenological and embodied understanding of the relationality between adults and children challenges the preeminence of hierarchies based on age and physical and material dependence and survival.
      - "...our
        access to the worlds of others is gained through our bodies, that our body is our openness to the world." (2013, p. 7)
        Our body seemingly becomes a core research tool in that it will serve us to identify some of the relational elements that need to be present in the phenomenological description.
        The way in which we inhabit our body and others theirs -children included- signifies our being in the world and limits or expands our capacity to experience phenomena.
- - - - "Novice
        researchers often misunderstand this process of bracketing as an initial first step where subjective bias is acknowledged as part of the project to establish the rigor and validity of the research." (2012, p. 24)
        
        "Novice researchers are particularly disadvantaged as they commonly mistake the bracketing process as a straightforward method of setting aside assumptions and as an initial step in research of acknowledging subjective bias towards establishing rigour and validity. The radicality, complexity, and discipline of the phenomenological attitude as a whole can be completely missed."(2008, p. 1)
      - BRACKETING involves a process whereby “one simply refrains from positing altogether; one looks at the data with the attitude of relative openness” (Giorgi, 1994, p. 212, as cited in Finlay, 2012, p. 24)
      - "SETTING ASIDE" is required throughout the research process:
        "Ashworth (1996) suggests that at least three particular areas of presupposition need to be set aside: (1) scientific theories, knowledge and explanation; (2) truth or falsity of claims being made by the participant; and (3) personal views and experiences of the researcher which would cloud descriptions of the phenomenon itself." (2012, p. 24)
        
        the researcher needs to be fully and CONTINUOUSLY ENGAGED IN MANAGING INTRUSIONS of pre-understandings throughout the research. “Enquiry is a continuous beginning” (Merleau-Ponty 1960/1964, p. 161).
        
        "HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGISTS DISAGREE THAT [SETTING ASIDE " PERSONAL VIEWS AND EXPERIENCES OF THE RESEARCHER IS DESIRABLE, LET ALONE POSSIBLE" (2016, P. 176)
      - WHAT AND HOW SHOULD WE BRACKET is where we have divergent positions. For instance, "Giorgi, takes a thorough-going Husserlian position, adopting a determinedly rigorous, scientific approach to the “reduction”; others such as Walsh (2003) and Finlay (2008) argue that researcher influence is inevitable and must be explicitly acknowledged and worked reflexively (i.e., with critical self-awareness)." (2016, p. 176)
        
        "There are important differences between a philosopher’s reflections, however, and the phenomenological researcher’s approach to reflective analysis of descriptions of lived experience. (...) A modified form of the reduction is called for—one that emphasizes an open, reflective stance without necessarily entering into Husserl’s transcendental realm. Giorgi calls this modified form the SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION (expanding Husserl’s “psychological phenomenological reduction” to include all human scientists).(2016, p. 177)
        
        SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION "Researcher strive to be fully present with their participants (or to the transcript or text) and what is being described. As part of this disciplines approach, past knowledge (specifically theoretical or scientific understandings) need to be held in abeyance. In other words, the objects to which acts of consciousness are directed are not existentially posited." (2016, p. 176)
        
        "The conundrum then is how and when to include self-reflection and personal experience as part of the phenomenological attitude." In my view, it is necessary for the researcher to take time to reflect on both
        prior and evolving understandings. Researchers have to know what it is they are striving to bracket in order to be open. Some critical self-awareness (i.e., reflexivity) is called for. In my own practice, I see the phenomenological attitude as a kind of reductive-reflexive dance where “the researcher slides between striving for reductive focus and reflexive self-awareness; between bracketing pre-understandings and exploiting them as a source of insight” (Finlay, 2008, p. 1) (2016, p. 179)
        
        Wertz describes the PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE as being an ATTITUDE OF WONDER THAT IS HIGHLY EMPATHIC:
        The researcher strives to leave his or her own world behind and to enter fully ... into the situations of the participants. The researcher empathically joins with participants ("coperforms" participant's involvements) in their lived situation(s). This sharing of the experience is the basis for later reflection on meanings and experiential processes. This attitude involves an extreme form of care that savors the situations described in a slow, meditative way and attends to, even magnifies, all the details. This attitude is free of value judgments from an external frame of reference and instead focuses on the meaning of the situation purely as it is given in the participant's experience (Wertz, 2005, p. 172 as cited by Finlay, 2008, p. 6). This type of discourse/invitation seems very similar to the one which an ECED would receive in order to be a "better" practitioner. Interestingly enough, that these attitudes are encouraged and embraced by many educators is not something that is usually acknowledged nor supported let alone considered the manifestation or exercise of a research capacity
      - “I stand above the world, which has now become for me, in a quite peculiar sense, a phenomenon” (Husserl, 1936/1970, p. 152).
      - I wonder about the extent of this freedom which presumably we have to redirect our attention. The freedom exists but, again, we need to look at those forces which are deterring us from it.
    - - "the reduction(s) can be intertwined with reflexivity (2) and that, in this process, something of a dialectical dance occurs. (...) There is tension as the researcher moves between striving for reductive focus and being reflexively self-aware; between bracketing pre-understandings and exploiting them as a source of insight; between naive openness and sophisticated criticality." (2008, p. 1-2)
        
        "The phenomenological attitude here does not simply involve suspending researcher pre-suppositions. It is a process in which the researcher opens themselves to being moved by an Other, where evolving understandings are managed in a relational context(2008, p. 2)
        This would be fundamental if we consider the attitude we might want to cultivate in educators in the sense of supporting them to be open to meet, encounter and face the child while, simultaneously, becoming aware of those experiences and meanings which stand in the way of such encounter.
        
        "My understanding of Ann came from more than a focus on tussling with my pre-understandings. While I had to bracket my therapist's view of multiple sclerosis I was, simultaneously, also being open to her experience of being a therapist and a mother. I needed to be open to her being a person as a whole. This mirrors Husserl's suggested stages of the reduction where bracketing of knowledge is followed by a process of examining the phenomenon in a fresh way that enables new understandings to emerge. The reduction is thus concerned with engaging phenomenological understanding as a whole, and not just eliminating pre-selected bits to be strategically bracketed out." (2008, p. 8)
        Part of the reflective tasks is to identify what is the effect that our pre-understandings have regarding the encounter and our capacity to see the Other anew. Seemingly, there would be some kind of gradient where at different point a particular aspect might bring us together while at others it might put us apart. (Not sure about this part, need to work it out more...)
        
        "the reduction is best seen as a stance or process, rather than a mechanical procedure; as an improvised
        movement toward and between, rather than a pre-established order of steps and routines." (2008, p. 7)