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Defamation II (All defences available (Privilege (Absolute, Qualified…
Defamation II
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Privilege
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Qualified (common law)
Need for freedom of speech not so great as absolute privilege but requires some protection from the threat of litigation
Adam v Ward (1917)
1) The defendant has a legal, social or moral duty to communicate the information
Examples of (1) and (2) - duty must be reciprocal - forms of privilege usually either between publications and limited audiences (e.g. employment references) and publications and the public
Todd v Hawkins (1837) - defendant wrote to mother-in-law about her future husband - he believed in allegations and no evidence of malice - under moral duty to make her aware of man's character, and she had a corresponding interest in receiving the information
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4) There was no malice
What is meant by malice?
Horrocks v Lowe (1975) - no honest belief in truth, or acting out of improper motive
Dr Adu Seray-Wurie v Charity Commission - "must go beyond that which is equivocal or merely neutral... in the sense that the relevant person was either dishonest is making the defamatory statement or had a dominant motive to injure the claimant"
Reynolds test for responsible journalist - now abolished and replaced with s4 Defamation Act 2013, but still useful - Lord Nicholls said above all, "the court should have particular regard to the importance of freedom of expression"
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Relationship between test and publication not by mass media - Kearns v General Council of the Bar (2003)
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Operators of websites
Common law
Godfrey v Demon Internet (2001) - chose not to remove defamatory content after they had been made aware of it
Tamiz v Goggle Inc (2013) - regarded as second publisher of blog once it had been drawn to their attention
Bunt v Tilley - Eady J found as a matter of law that an ISP which performs no more than a passive role in facilitating internet postings cannot be deemed a publisher - should be read in light of Tamiz
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Honest opinion
S3 Defamation Act 2013
Abolishes common law defences of fair common and honest comment - common law requirement for public interest not included in the state - Spiller v Joseph (2011)
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S3(3) - the second condition is that the statement complained of indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion
Kemsley v Foot (1952) - explained why believed Kemsley was bad quality, referring to inaccurate reporting and the tone of the articles
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