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work in progress (What Gallagher does in "How the body shapes the…
work in progress
What Gallagher does in "How the body shapes the mind" 2005
there is a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neurosciences, behavioral expressions in psychology, design concerns in AI and robotics and debates about embodied exp-ce in the phenomenology and philosophy of mind
the aim of the book is to develop a conceptual framework, neither reductionistic, nor inflationistic
2 basic sets of Qs
Qs about phenomenal aspects of the structure of experience
in regards to embodiment it's formulated as following: to what extent and in what way an awareness of my body enters into the content of conscious experience?
prenoetic aspects of experience
to what extent consciousness and cognitive processes are structured prenoetically?
this distinction does not presuppose neither two different ontological categories, not manifest VS latent
it's functional distinction
G-r is taking ontogenetic approach in order to escape metaphysical assumptions: from the beginning onward
VS both reductionism and inflationism (p 3)
avoiding general assumptions (like computationalism or self-organization)
domain-specific principles
Thesis: vocabulary developed around the distinction btw body image and body schema is capable of integrating first-person phenomenology and third-person science of embodied cognition
mere explication of correlation is not a solution: it's not an explanation
VS "bridging the gap" approach
theoretical models/ causal mechanisms/representations
the task is to develop background theory that will explicate the connections within the elements of embodied cognitive system
the metaphor of redefining the terrain
the notion of proprioception is an example of the area where the distinction btw phenomenal consciousness and physical body gets redefined
subpersonal mechanism
non-conscious information
a form of consciousness
aa form of conscious awareness
complications
these 2 aspects form an intracorporeal definition of somatic proprioception
proprioception in a more wider sense deals with integrating diff modalities of sensory information concerning one's own body as moving agent in the environment with intracorporeal inf
epistemological status of proprioceptive awareness
is it object-perception or more direct, non-observational awareness?
implications pertaining to the issued concerning self-consciousness and personal identity
The Terms of Embodiment; II The Case of The Missing Schema
To what extent, and in what way, does body appear as part of one's perceptual field?
body image
"system of perceptions, attitutedes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body" (p 24)
involves a form of reflexive/self-referential intentionality
body percept
body affect
body concept
involves partial, abstract and articulated representation of the body while consciously attending to one's own body
phenomenologically impossible to attend to certain parts and functions of the body
it can has inconsistencies and contradictions
appears as distinct from the environment
To what extent, and in what way, does one's body constrain/shape perceptual field?
body schema
"system of sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring" (p. 24)
it operates in a close to automatic way, but it's not a reflex
it can be part of voluntary intentional project
it takes measure of its environment in a pragmatic rather than objective fashion
neither an account of body image, nor third-person account is sufficient how body functions in human experience
it functions in integrated and holistic way
incorporates pieces from the environment
3 functional aspects
processing new inf about posture and movement
output=set of motor programmes
intermodal communication btw proprioception and other capacities
awareness VS information
ovecoming limits of purely phenomenological analysis by study of pathological cases
inconsistent use of terms => are these terms needed?
conceptual clarification
an account on ontogenetic development of the body schema and body image
relationship to the neuroscience
explaining pathological conditions with the help of these concepts
conscious awareness
marginal awareness
we're usually marginally aware of our bodies
implications for the nature of intentionality, free will and self-identity (for example, sense of bodily ownership contributes to a sense of overall personal self)
conscious attending to one's own body
voluntary reflection
limit-situations
implications for experimental design
asking testing subjects to take reflective attitude in order to know smth about prereflective exp-ce is questionable
questionnaries etc
these exp-s are not blind
the language used within experimental situation may bias subject's report about their bodily experience
the question of objective standard for measuring the accuracy of subjective estimates of body size
these difficulties are result of following confusion
objective/subjective body/body as it operates outside conscious awareness
Gallagher's programmatic texts
"Phenomenology" 2012 book
трансцендентальный подход позволяет избежать заблуждений сознания при изучении сознания -?? тогда фен психология открыта заблуждениям?
justifying the transition from rejecting naturalism to new naturalism
what is (or ought to be) the relationship btw 1st person and 3rd person explanations? = explanatory gap
Pylyshyn: the key to the phenomena of mental imagery is lied at the level of information processing/mental representations of which these processes operate
Marbach
mutual constraining
: phenomenology is guiding cognitive science, providing reflective description of first-person exp-ce
in order to understand neural correlation, cognitive science should be provided with the
basic conceptual categories
for talking about the mental
phenomenological psychology is a solution: investigation of consciousness from the first-person perspective, while remaining within natural attitude
consciousness is a phenomenon of its own right, not just a foundation for sciences and condition for possibility for all meaning
the convergence btw phenomenology and cognitive sciences is on the methodological plane (not in the results)
transcendental phenomenology remains to be project of its own right
Gallagher's estimation of other projects of naturalization
formalizing phenomenology
andvantages
intersubjectively shareable meanings
based on Marbach's approach
example: re-enactment of perception in memory
neurophenomenology
focus is on temporal dynamics of conscious experience and brain activity
not every experiment can be designed to allow for the training of subjects in phenomenological methods
subjects can be unable to follow phenom method (children, people with pathologies)
in some cases one wants subjects to be naive about what is being tested
G. doesn't start with the empirical results (CREA) or with the training of subjects (neurophen). He starts from the experimental design
exp design is always based on some concept
these concepts can be drawn from the folk psy/natural attitude/some philosophy
less control involved in exp design than experimenters believe
G's account on the difference between first-person approach and introspection
What is an objective validity of this method? Isn't it just subjective – in both senses of subjectivity and my subjective view on things?
no controls involved
there're limitations involved in a third-person method
where third-person categories come from?
neither explanandum, nor concepts used to define cosciousness are clearly defined
third-person approaches are not free from biases
phenomenology is objective in a sense of excluding biases, not in sense of studying smth as an object
epoché allows to rule out any presuppositions
phen has intersubjective validity
the relationship between introspection and phenomenology
introspective methods are still an important part of experimental science (!!! see examples from psy of religion)
phenomenology is not an introspection
both are first-person methods
what scientists call introspection is not always a matter of reflection
testing subjects do not reflectively pay attention to the stream of consciousness; they rather look to the world around them
they use ascent routines
phenomenology is not always about internal states
intentionality
in introspection there is a belief that first-person reports are the reports about the way the world actually is
Critique from heurmeneutic point of view (+ Wittgenstein)
use of language introduces uncontrolled biases that are built into language itself
see example of Descartes and latin word Cogito, in which I is built into the ending of the word
phenomenological response
emphasis on intersubjectivity
one may look at cross-cultural phenomenological studies and find commonalities
phenom is not finished
"Phenomenology and Embodied Cognition" (Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition) 2014 article
Discovering what I do not or cannot experience.
This kind of analysis is an initial part of every behavioral study (study of reaching to grasp smth, for example). Otherwise, researcher's assumptions are built into an experiment
Example: the shaping of the grasp happens in non-conscious way.
Phenomenology can be relevant to working out causal explanations
to define an explanandum. since subpersonal processes should be linked to the first-person experience
to define what subpersonal processes to look for/how can the be explanatory
Phenomenological contribution is not confined by the analysis of the consciousness of the body
examples are brought from "How the body shapes the mind" (SO and SA)
"The phenomenological mind" 2008 (co-authored with D. Zahavi) book – просмотреть
"Mutual enlightenment: recent phenomenology in cognitive science" 1997 article + определение "плохих" способов взаимойдествия с наукой – односторонних, критика Деннета и пример "хорошего" взаимодействия – Вариле и МкКламрок
"Phenomenology and non-reductionist cognitive science" 2010 article + раздел про интроспекцию, критика нейрофеноменологии. Доводы ЗА primary pre-reflective awareness
Phenomenology and experimental design 2003 + очень важная программная статья, здесь он впервые выдвигает свой проект front-loaded phenomenology. НЕ интроспекция. Нейрофеноменологич инсайты могут быть использованы во фронт-лоад подходе. Примеры как фен различения использованы в эксп дизайне
Context: different approach to the naturalization of phenomenology
Zahavi's "Naturalized phenomenology" article 2010
Philosophical critique of naturalism
Naturalism is a form of metaphysical realism
Ontologically – monism; methodologically – scientism
Other ways of naturalization
Phenomenology provides detailed analysis, not just transcendental clarification
Science could provide first-level descriptions that might be of phenomenological relevance (see examples in the map on Z.'s article)
Examples of concrete projects
Varela
Gallagher
2 different approaches to naturalization
phenomenology is a part/extension of science
explanation VS transcendental clarification
phenomenology is engaged in productive exchange with science
to science from ph
phenomenology can question basic theoretical assumptions accepted by empirical science
can help to elaborate new experimental paradigms (Gallagher)
to ph from sci
present concrete findings that may encourage phenomenologists to revise their analysis (Varela)
Conclusion: naturalization of phenomenology should entail reexamination of the usual concept of naturalization and revision of the dichotomy between the empirical and transcendental
Critique of possibility of naturalization (Bennet, Hacker, Philosophical foundations of neuroscience)
Philosophy can clarify concepts in connection with other concepts
example: ordinary language reflects commonsense metaphysics
Philosophy has to do with sense and non-sense, not with true/false
Isn't Gallagher project is an example of such understanding of philosophy?
Points of view presented in the volume "Naturalized phenomenology" 1999
Ways of naturalizing: an overview
"As If" strategy
Phenomenological descriptions are considered to be instruments for the prediction of behavior. They might not have objective content though
Dennett's heterophenomenology
Mutual constraining
"phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their counterparts in cognitive science relate to each other through reciprocal constraints" (Varela 1989)
Bridge locus
A number of specific neural responses/structures are taken to be the bridge locus between the percept and the neural correlate
brain imaging techiniques
Q looks like Z => Q explains Z (Q - neural-psychological terms; Z - phenomenal ones)
Critique: it seems to be the same thing as eliminativist approach
Isomorphism
(Gallagher holds this position)
the cognitive scientist needs to take into account the phenomenological evidence in order to identify correct explanatory mechanisms on the neural and sub-personal levels
an example: the static constitution of time excludes cognitive view of temporal mechanism based on computational ideas
Criticism: this approach makes implicit assumption that it is important to keep disciplinary boundaries. Is this another form of psycho-neural identity theory?
Generative passages
Generating eidetic descriptions that can directly link to the processes of biological emergence
Requires abstract level of description encompassing both neurobiological and phenomenological data. Dynamical tools?
Criticism: isn't it too rigor for many topics in Cognitive Science?
Enlargement of the concept of nature (
Zahavi's point in one of his articles)
generalizing the concept of nature in such a way to include processes involving a phenomenalization of physical objectivity
Gibson's ecologism
(very similar to Lorenz's theory)
Fodor and Pylyshyn' criticism: there is a dualism between physical and symbolical => information should be either physical, or symbolical. Ecological information does not exist
Functionalist naturalization
functional properties can be shared by various substantial properties
it confronts reductionist theories
classical computationalism
dynamic-connectionist approach
Reductionism
logical integration of two scientific theories into a unitary deductive construction by deriving concepts and propositions of one of them from the concepts and propositions of the other
logical behaviorism
central identity theory
Zahavi's "Phenomenology and the project of naturalization" article 2004
Varela, Thompson, Rosch "The embodied mind" 1991
Thompson's "Mind in life" 2007
Recent texts
"Enactivist interventions" (2017)