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Is it false that the present King of France is bald? (reading)…

- - - - "I met Jones" vs "I met a man" example (indefinite descriptions are not the same as names and don't function the same way):
        "I met a man" is not logically equivalent to "I met Jones", even if it was Jones that I met, as "I met a man, but it was not Jones" would not be a contradiction, but a lie- a false, not contradictory statement. "I met Jones" names a specific person (MIJ, maybe, where we have the predicate Mxy and the names I for me and J for Jones) whereas "I met a man" says that there is at least one object such that it is a man and I met it (∃x Hx ^ MIx, maybe, where Hx= x is a man)
        
        The proposition “Socrates is a man” is no doubt equivalent
        to “Socrates is human,” but it is not the very
        same proposition. The is of “Socrates is human” expresses
        the relation of subject and predicate; the is
        of “Socrates is a man” expresses identity. It is a disgrace
        to the human race that it has chosen to employ
        the same word “is” for these two entirely different
        ideas—a disgrace which a symbolic logical language
        of course remedies. The identity in “Socrates is
        a man” is identity between an object named (accepting
        “Socrates” as a name, subject to qualifications
        explained later) and an object ambiguously
        described. An object ambiguously described will
        “exist” when at least one such proposition is true,
        i.e. when there is at least one true proposition of the
        form “x is a so-and-so,” where “x” is a name. It is
        characteristic of ambiguous (as opposed to definite)
        descriptions that there may be any number of true
        propositions of the above form—Socrates is a man,
        Plato is a man, etc. Thus “a man exists” follows from
        Socrates, or Plato, or anyone else. With definite descriptions,
        on the other hand, the corresponding
        form of proposition, namely, “x is the so-and-so”
        (where “x” is a name), can only be true for one value
        of x at most. This brings us to the subject of definite
        descriptions, which are to be defined in a way analogous
        to that employed for ambiguous descriptions,
        but rather more complicated.
        
        Russell rejects Alexis Meinong's theory (whereby seemingly non-existent objects do have a sort of metaphysical existence, and so we can talk about them, meaning that 'the present King of France is bald' would be referring to something after all, and soloving the problem that way) because it has too tenuous a grasp on reality- we should be able to distinguish between Hamlet, where all that exists of him is what people think about him, and if nobody thought about Hamlet at all, he would not exist, and Napoleon, who would make someone think about him if nobody did! and has an existence beyond other people's thoughts of him
        “A unicorn” is an indefinite description which describes nothing.
        It is not an indefinite description which describes
        something unreal.
      - Indefinite descriptions according to Russell:
        "I met a man" as saying that a conjunction of two claims- "x is a man" and "I met x" is true one at least one occasion (I might say that ∃x that satisfies both conditions)
        Because of all this, note the important property of indefinite descriptions, of being able to make meaningful statements about 'unreal' things
        we do not need to make unicorns real in order to describe them indefinitely, on Russell's theory
    - - (names might be used properly as names, in the English language, or as descriptions. Eg. "Scott is Sir Walter" might simply use both names to name an individual, in which case it is a trivial statement along the lines of 'Scott is Scott', or might mean that "the person called Scott is the same person as the person called Sir Walter", where we are using both names as descriptions, not as names in the proper sense- so this is a non-trivial statement more like "Scott is the author of Waverly"- an identification of a name with a definite description)
    - - Thus the proposition “the author of Waverley was
        Scotch,” for example, involves:
        (1) “x wrote Waverley” is not always false;
        (2) “if x and y wrote Waverley, x and y are identical”
        is always true;
        (3) “if x wrote Waverley, x was Scotch” is always
        true.
        These three propositions, translated into ordinary
        language, state:
        (1) at least one person wrote Waverley;
        (2) at most one person wrote Waverley;
        (3) whoever wrote Waverley was Scotch.
        All these three are implied by “the author of Waverley
        was Scotch.” Conversely, the three together (but
        no two of them) imply that the author of Waverley
        was Scotch. Hence the three together may be taken
        as defining what is meant by the proposition “the
        author of Waverley was Scotch.”
      - Definite descriptions, unlike names, can occur significantly even when they apply to an object that does not exist- whereas names must name existent objects. In cases where we seem to doubt the existence of a 'named' object, that is because the supposed name is actually functioning as a description, not a name proper- for example, 'Homer' might not be a real name, but an abbreviation for 'the author of the Illiad and the Odyssey'- and so we can wonder whether Homer really existed (whether there was one unique individual who wrote both works)
        
        It is only of descriptions
        —definite or indefinite—that existence can be significantly asserted; for, if “a” is a name, it must name
        something: what does not name anything is not a
        name, and therefore, if intended to be a name, is a
        symbol devoid of meaning, whereas a description,
        like “the present King of France,” does not become
        incapable of occurring significantly merely on the
        ground that it describes nothing, the reason being
        that it is a complex symbol, of which the meaning is
        derived from that of its constituent symbols. And
        so, when we ask whether Homer existed, we are
        using the word “Homer” as an abbreviated description:
        we may replace it by (say) “the author of the
        Iliad and the Odyssey.”
      - Confusing but possibly relevant passage (I don't get it, so I'll just put it in here in case it is relevant and then move on)
        
        When descriptions occur in propositions, it is
        necessary to distinguish what may be called “primary”
        and “secondary” occurrences. The abstract
        distinction is as follows. A description has a “primary”
        occurrence when the proposition in which
        it occurs results from substituting the description
        for “x” in some propositional function φx; a description
        has a “secondary” occurrence when the
        result of substituting the description for x in φx
        gives only part of the proposition concerned. An instance
        will make this clearer. Consider “the present
        King of France is bald.” Here “the present King of
        France” has a primary occurrence, and the proposition
        is false. Every proposition in which a description
        which describes nothing has a primary occurrence
        is false. But now consider “the present King
        of France is not bald.” This is ambiguous. If we are
        first to take “x is bald,” then substitute “the present
        King of France” for “x,” and then deny the result,
        the occurrence of “the present King of France” is
        secondary and our proposition is true; but if we are
        to take “x is not bald” and substitute “the present
        King of France” for “x,” then “the present King of
        France” has a primary occurrence and the proposition
        is false. Confusion of primary and secondary
        occurrences is a ready source of fallacies where descriptions
        are concerned.
- - - - He argues that the background for Russell's theory is rejecting two different weak arguments, both of which conclude that the present King of France must exist in some sense
        
        Let us call the sentence " The king of France is wise " the sentence S. Then the first argument is as follows:
        (1) The phrase, " the king of France ", is the subject of the
        sentence S.
        Therefore (2) if S is a significant sentence, S is a sentence about
        the king of France.
        But (3) if there in no sense exists a king of France, the sentence
        is not about anything, and hence not about the king of France.
        Therefore (4) since S is significant, there must in some sense
        (in spime world) exist (or subsist) the king of France.
        
        And the second argument is as follows:
        (1) If S is significant, it is either true or false.
        (2) S is true if the king of France is wise and false if the king
        of France is not wise.
        (3) But the statement that the king of France is wise and the
        statement that the king of France is not wise are alike true only
        if there is (in some sense, in some world) something which is the
        king of France.
        Hence (4) since S is significant, there follows the same conclusion
        as before.
        
        Let me refer to the phrase, "the
        king of France ", as the phrase D. Then I think Russell's reasons
        for rejecting these two arguments can be summarised as follows.
        The mistake arises, he says, from thinking that D, which is certainly the grammatical subject of S, is also the logical subject of S.
        But D is not the logical subject of S. In fact S, although gram
        matically it has a singular subject and a predicate, is not logically
        a subject-predicate sentence at all. The proposition it expresses
        is a complex kind of existentital proposition, part of which might
        be described as a " uniquely existential " proposition. To
        exhibit the logical form of the proposition, we should re-write the
        sentence in a logically appropriate grammatical form; in such
        a way that the deceptive similarity of S to a sentence expressing
        a subject-predicate proposition would disappear, and we should
        be safeguarded against arguments such as the bad ones I outlined
        above.
        
        Strawson argues that Russell concedes to these arguments that if there is something which logically is of subject-predicate form, then either that statement is meaningless or its subject must exist- his solution to the two arguments involves ducking out of the statement's being of subject-predicate form in favour of his theory of definite descriptions.
    - - This is, I think, the distinction between the sentence itself as a type, and individual uses of it as tokens, that was drawn in the Wolfram
      - Referring happens at the level of the use of an expression, and is not contained within the meaning of the expression itself, according to Strawson.
        
        Example: the expression 'I', when used by different people, clearly has different uses- but the meaning of the expression itself remains the same
        
        This is what Russell does. Generally, as against Russell, I shall say this. Meaning (in at least one important sense) is a function of the sentence or expression; mentioning and referring and truth or falsity, are functions of the use of the sentence or expression. To give the meaning of an expression (in the sense in which I am using the word) is to give general directions fQr its use to refer to or mention particular objects or persons; to give the meaning of a sentence is to give general directions for its use in making true or false assertions. It is not to talk about any particular occasion of the use of the sentence or expression. The meaning of an expression cannot be identified with the object is used, on a particular occasion, to refer to. The meaning of.a sentence cannot be identified with the assertion it is used, on a particular occasion, to make. For to talk about the meaning of an expression or sentence is not to talk about its use on a particular occasion, but about the rules, habits, conventions governing its correct use, on all occasions, to refer or to assert. So the question of whether a sentence or expression is significant or not has nothing whatever to do with the question of whether the sentence, uttered on a particular occasion, is, on that occasion, being used to make a true-or-false assertion or not, or of whether the expression is, on that occasion, being used to refer to, or mention, anything at all.
    - - Overtly fictional uses apart, however, I said just now that to use such an expression as " The king of France " at the beginning of a sentence was, in some sense of " imply ", to imply that there was a king of France. When a man uses such an expression, he does not assert, nor does what he says entail, a uniquely existential proposition. But one of the conventional functions of the definite article is to act as a signal that a unique reference is being made-a signal, not a disguised assertion. When we begin a sentence with " the such-and-such " the use of " the " shows, but does not state, that we are, or intend to be, referring to one particular individual of the species " such-and-such". Which particular individual is a matter to be determined from context, time, place and any other .features of the situation of utterance. Now, whenever a man uses any expression, the presumption is that he thinks he is using it correctly: so when he uses the expression, "the such-and-such ", in a uniquely referring way, the presumption is that he thinks both that there is some individual of that species, and that the context of use will sufficiently determine which one he has in mind. To use the word " the " in this way is then to imply (in the relevant sense of "imply ") that the existential conditions described by Russell are fulfilled. But to use " the "in this way is not to state that those conditions are fulfilled. If I begin a sentence with an expression of the form, "the so-andso", and then am prevented from saying more, I have made no statement of any kind; but I may have succeeded in mentioning some one or something
      - Strawson says that our reaction if asked whether the statement is true or not is to reply that the question of whether the King is bald or not is not one we can answer with truth or falsity- the question simply doesn't arise because there is no such King- there is a presupposition failure here
- - - - With suitable changes the same difference in use can be formu
        lated for uses of language other than assertions. Suppose one is at a party and, seeing an interesting-looking person holding a martini glass, one asks, "Who is the man drinking a martini ?" If it should turn out that there is only water in the glass, one has nevertheless asked a question about a particular person, a question that it is possible for someone to answer. Contrast this with the use of the same question by the chairman of the local Teetotalers Union. He has just been informed that a man is drinking a martini at their annual party. He responds by asking his informant, "Who is the man drinking a martini?" In asking the question the chairman does not have some particular person in mind about whom he asks the question; if no one is drinking a martini, if the information is wrong, no person can be singled out as the person about whom the question was asked. Unlike the first case, the attribute of being the man drinking a martini is all-important, because if it is the attribute of no one, the chairman's question has no straight forward answer.
    - - Turning to Strawson's theory, it was supposed to demonstrate
        how definite descriptions are referential. But it goes too far in this
        direction. For there are nonreferential uses of definite descriptions
        also, even as they occur in one and the same sentence. I believe
        that Strawson's theory involves the following propositions:
        (i) If someone asserts that the q is b he has not made a true
        or false statement if there is no q
        (2) If there is no q then the speaker has failed to refer to
        anything."
        (3) The reason he has said nothing true or false is that he has
        failed to refer