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Utility 27/01/18 (Initial concept brainstorm (prioritarianism (priority…

- - - - Problems with the pareto model
        p129
        Another problem is that such an equilibrium might in fact not represent the Paretian version of social efficiency. The reason for that is the existence of technical market imperfections: externalities, collective goods, and economies of scale (cf. Wolf, 1988: 20-29). Wolf regards distributional inequity as a fourth type of market imperfection, but since most economists distinguish between questions of efficiency and questions of distribution, I prefer to discuss income distribution under the heading of "equality" below.
        Externalities exist when the economic activity of one firm or one household affects the cost or utility of another economic unit, positively or negatively. The importance of externalities in housing is a well-established topic of theoretical discussion. Examples of negative externalities often given are obstructed views and destroyed open spaces. At the core of the debate on externalities in housing are, however, the presumedly positive external effects of slum clearance and desegrega- tion (see
      - Provision of decent housing
        p129-130
        the provision of decent housing to those who would otherwise live in ramshackle houses may contribute to the utility not only to recipients themselves, but to all members of society. In that case, housing provision in general—though not the single housing unit—could be regarded as a public good.
- - - - Informed preferences p16
        
        welfare defined as the satisfaction of 'rational' or 'informed' preferences
        
        but this is vague, limited constraints on what can be conceived of as 'utility', hard to know what to promote on this view
        
        it drops the 'experience' requirement i.e. things (Hare's example is a spouse's adultery) can reduce an individual's utility even if they don't know about it
        
        but rational preferences about things which don't affect our conscious states (e.g. about what happens after our deaths) can produce complications
        
        very difficult to determine what increases welfare, let alone measure it
  - - - Equal consideration of interests
        
        p31 first step for addressing illegitimate prefs?
    - - Two views of the theory of util
        
        p33 util as a principle of moral equality, defining the right in terms of treating people as equals, which leads to the utilitarian aggregation standard, which happens to maximise the good.,
        
        vs defining the right in terms of maximising the good, which leads to the utilitarian aggregation standard, which as a mere consequence treats people's interests equally
        
        up to this point, I have implicitly relied on the first view, that is, utilitarianism is best viewed as a theory of how to respect the moral claim of each individual to be treated as an equal
        
        Rawls, however, says that util is fundamentally a theory of the second sort, one which defines the right in terms of maximising the good
        
        but there is somethign bizarre about this second interpretation, for it is unclear why max-ing util, as a direct goal, ought to be considered a moral duty
        
        a to whom? MOrality, in our everyday view, is a matter of interpersonal obligations, obligations which we owe to each other. But to whom do we ow the duty of max-ing util? It cannot be the maximally valuable state of affairs itself, for states of affairs do not have moral claims.
        
        Problem with the second sort of util p34
        One of the attracttions of util is its secular nature - morality matters because human beings matter. But under the second conception, humans are viewed as potential producers of consumers of a good, and our duties are to that good, not to other people. That violates our core intuition that morality matters because humans matter. Util ceases to have any attraction is cut off from that core intuition of equal respect for humans
        
        p35 On Util as an egalitarian doctrine
        If util is best seen when it is an egalitarian doctrine, then there is no independent commitment to the idea of max-ing welfare. The utilitarian has to admit that we should use the max-ing standard only if that is the best account of treating people as equals. This is important, because much of the attraction of util depends on a tacit mixing of two justifications. Util's intuitive unfairness would quickly disqualify it as an adequate account of equal consideration, were it not that many people take its maximising feature as an additional, independent reason to endorse it. Utils tacitly appeal to the good-max-ing standard to deflect intuitive objections to their account of equal consideration.
    - - External preferences p36-37
        One important distinction amongst kinds of preferences is that between 'personal' and 'external' preferences (Dworkin 1977: 234). Personal preferences are preferences about the goods, resources and opportunities etc. one wants available to oneself. External preferences concern the goods, resources and opportunities one wants available to others. External preferences are sometimes prejudiced
        
        e.g. racism, wanting some group to receive less
        
        Does the existence of such preferences count as a moral reasons for denying those groups the relevant resources?
        
        rule utils sometimes argue that we would be better off in util terms from excluding those prefs from our everyday decision procedures, but this does not account for the deepest principles in util potentially giving grounds for allowing those preferences, giving them moral weight in its standard of rightness
        
        if the deepest principle is the egalitarian one, that everyone has equal standing and respect, then it seems inconsistent to count external preferences, because it implies that some groups may not be owed equal concern
      - Selfish preferences p37
        A second kind of illegitimate preference involves the desire for more than one's fair share of resources. I will call these 'selfish preferences', since they ignore the fact that other people need the resources, and legitimate claims to them.
        Whilst selfish preferences are sometimes irrational or ill-informed, satisfying them will sometimes generate genuine utility.
        
        should satisfying them then be included in the util standard of rightness?
        
        p38
        For utils, a fair distribution is one in which utility is maximised, so no selfish preference can be identified prior to utility calculations.
        p 39
        Of the different ways of looking at it, it includes that people who have fewer resources may, in general, get more utility out of each additional resources than those who already have many resources.
        p 40
        Bu there's an important component of our everyday sense of what it means to treat people as equals, which is that we should not expect others to subsidise our projects at the expense of their own
        p 41
        So if we believe that others should be treated as equals, then we will exclude such selfish preferences from the util calculus.
        
        p 40
        This is important to Rawls: his view is that it is a defining feature of our sense of justice that 'interests requiring the violation of justice have no value', so the presence of illegitimate preferences 'cannot distort our claims upon one another'
      - In sum p42
        Util fails to recognise special relationships or exclude illegitimate preferences because in each case, util is interpreting equal consideration in terms of the aggregate of existing preferences, even when they invade the rights or commitments of others. But our intuitions tell use that equality should enter into the very formation of our preferences. Part of what it means to show equal consideration for others is taking into account what rightfully belongs to them in deciding on one's own goals in life. Hence prejudiced and selfish preferences are excluded from the start, because they fail to show equal consideration.
        ...Util has over-simplified the way in which we intuitively believe that the welfare of others is worthy of moral concern.
        p43
        My claim is that the very reason Utils give for basing their standard of rightness on the satisfaction of people's preferences is also a reason to exclude external and selfish preferences from that standard. This is an objection to the theory's principles, not the way that those principles get applied in decision-procedures.
- - - - Summation concerns from the political left and the right - need a notion of rights? p247
        In the same fashion, it has often been said in criticism of utilitarianism that its impersonal summation of utilities renders it insensitive to the distribution of utiltiies across people. A distribution that gives everything to one perosn and nothing to another would, by that standard, be better than one that gives both equal shares, just so long as the utility sum in the former case turns out to be higher than in the latter case. That is the objection from the left.
        Analogously, the objection from the right is that utilitarianism would license radical redistribution of people's property... just depending upon the utility sums. Both left and right think we need a notion of rights, constraining utilitarian maximising, to protect us against outcomes of one sort or the other.
        p247
        These two implications of utilitarianism obviously pull in opposite directions. But it is no contradiction to say that there are utilitarian considerations both for and against any particular policy.
        
        Diminishing marginal utility p247
        The crucial [response] in reassuring the left is that most goods (food, money, whatever) yield 'diminishing marginal utility' - i.e. the utility that you derive from the first unit is higher than that you derive from the second, and so on.
        
        Value of stability p247
        Whether we should achieve equality by radical redistribution of present holdings, violating property rights in ways feared by the right, is perhaps another matter. Utilitarians would recognize the value of stability and security in planning our own lives and in anticipating the ways that others' life plans will affect our own. So, for reasons first given by Bentham and Hume and reiterated frequently since, we may be reluctant - again, for purely derivative, empirically contingent reasons - to redistribute property radically, even if we are utilitarians.
    - - p246
        ...the problem is only one for hedonic or preference utilitarians. They are the ones asking us to get inside someone else's head. Welfare utilitarians, by abstracting from people's actual preferences, definitely are not. We can know what is in people's interests, in this most general sense, without knowing what in particular is inside their heads. Furthermore, at some suitably general level at least, one person's list of necessary basic resources reads much like anyone else's.
- - - - Empirical findings
        p242
        These findings do not ‘prove’ that abuse of the homelessness arrangements never occurs, nor that all homelessness applications are from households who have greater long- term housing needs than other housing applicants. However, they do indicate that the statutory system is generally a last resort for low-income families when they have run out of all other viable housing options. Given that this is consistent with the main ‘social evil’ that the homelessness legislation was intended to remedy—i.e. the ‘structural’ housing needs of low-income households who, when they lose accommodation as a result of a crisis such as relationship breakdown or eviction, lack the means to secure alternative accommodation through their own efforts—it is suggestive of a high level of legitimacy (and utility-maximisation) in the system as a whole.
        
        Conclusion
        p247
        With regard to the first set of objections, it is difficult to counter the proposition that there is some intrinsic moral hazard within the structure of these homelessness provisions. However, a distinction must be drawn between the presence of a perverse incentive and whether such an incentive is acted upon in practice. The English family homelessness survey uncovered no evidence of the type of widespread abuse of the homelessness system that would justify bringing its overall fairness (legitimacy) into question. On the contrary, all of the indications are that it addresses the main ‘social evil’ that it was intended to remedy, i.e. the ‘structural’ housing needs of low-income households who lack the means to secure alternative accommodation when they are confronted with a crisis such as relationship
    - - Empirical findings
        p245
        The study was particularly interested in whether there was a welfare (utility) gain in terms of housing conditions and/or quality of life when homeless families moved into settled housing
        ....As might be expected, physical conditions were reported to be better in settled housing than in self-contained temporary accommodation in a number of respects.
        ...quality of life at point of survey was also consistently reported to be better
        amongst families who had been provided with settled housing than for those still living in temporary accommodation.
        ...These findings suggest that the security of tenure currently offered by social housing, but threatened by recent Coalition proposals to move towards fixed-term tenancies in the social sector, is very important to both parents and children in these families.
        
        p247
        With regard to the effectiveness of the statutory system, the most important overall finding of the survey was that there appeared to be significant net improvements in the quality of life of homeless families after they had received assistance under this statutory system. Given their overall social and economic disadvantage, this can be viewed as contributing to an important welfare gain. While the largest net improvement was reported by those families who had moved into settled housing, even those still in temporary accommodation (most of it self-contained) tended to report a higher quality of life than when they were living in their ‘last settled accommodation’. The explanation seems to be the statutory system’s capacity to not only protect low-income families from ‘literal homelessness’, but also to move them from stressful personal and accommodation circumstances into more appropriate housing environments, which particularly benefits the children in these families.
  - - - Differences between groups
        p237
        Single people usually find themselves outside of this statutory framework in England as they are generally considered not to be in priority need. While there is insufficient space to pursue it here, there is an interesting utilitarian debate to be had on why homeless adults with children are given rehousing priority over single homeless adults, particularly given that the latter more often have specific vulnerabilities and support needs (see below). The most likely explanation is that children are perceived as more ‘deserving’ of help than adults because they are less able to fend for themselves, and therefore society perceives a moral responsibility for their welfare and derives utility from seeing them housed (see Fitzpatrick & Stephens, 1999).
- - - - p136
        ...a utilitarian is likely to think that the case for public utilitarianism is even stronger than that for private. For one thing, the decisions of government1 affect more persons, in the main, than private decisions. But, more than that, he is likely to feel that there is something in the nature of modern government (at least) which requires the utilitarian spirit. Private citizens might legitimately, if re- grettably, have religious beliefs or counter-utilitarian ideals, but government in a secular state must be secular, and must use a system of decision which is minimally committed beyond its intrinsic commitment to the welfare of its citizens. Thus utilitarianism can be seen almost as built into a contract of government.
      - Issues in using util calculus for social welfare decisions
        p141
        a formulation of Sen's :1 "In using individual
        welfare functions for collective choice, there are at least three separate (but interdependent) problems, viz. (a) measurability of individual welfare, (b) interpersonal com- parability of individual welfare, and (c) the form of a func- tion which will specify a social preference relation given individual welfare functions and the comparability assump- tions."
        ...Classical utilitarianism makes very strong assumptions
        with regard to (a) and (b), demanding cardinality in reply to (a) and straightforward interpersonal comparisons in reply to (b); it then offers a simple solution to (c), in the form of maximizing either gross aggregate utility, or else average utility, in the simple sense of the aggregate utility divided by the number of individuals.
        NB: some detailed discussion of these issues in the rest of the section