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Bargaining over Territory (Bargaining in Territorial Disputes (Territorial…
Bargaining over Territory
Regime Type and Territorial Disputes
Democracies
Democratic leaders face domestic sanction for resolving territorial disputes
Democracies, because of the possibility of domestic sanction, are motivated to seek political cover through arbitration.
Simmons (2002)
Allee and Huth (2006a)
Allee and Huth (2006b)
Beardsley (2010)
Huth, Croco and Appel (2011)
Gent and Shannon (2011) find the opposite of this claim using ICOW dataset
Empirical findings show that joint democracy struggles to reach settlements
Do Struggle
Mitchell and Hensel (2007)
Huth, Croco and Appel (2013)
Do Not Struggle
Democratic leaders will only try to resolved disputes if they have long time horizons and do not face elections in the near future, i.e are newly installed in office
Chiozza and Choi (2003)
Bearce, Floros and McKibben (2009)
Democracies popularize the use of more successful settlement types (such as third-party settlement), but are not necessarily more likely to use them themselves
Mitchell (2002)
Preferences of voters over territorial disputes are heterogeneous, as individuals close to disputed borders are more likely to respond to economic cues and become more dovish
Tanaka (2016)
Autocracies
Since autocracies care most about regime security, when they face regime contests, they should adopt more cooperative policies
Fravel (2005)
As autocracies become more secure, they are more likely to try to resolve a dispute
Chiozza and Choi (2003)
Regime Type and Trade
Autocracies
Political Economy of Autocracies
We should evaluate the political economy of autocracies in a way that takes them as being distinct and not necessarily comparable to democracies
Kono (2015)
Variations in Autocracies
Variations in Autocracies and Political Economy
Autocracies where elites are more able to sanction the leader will be more likely to provide open trade policies and more likely to allow for private investment
Gehlbach and Keefer (2012)
Hankla and Kuthy (2013)
Chow and Kono (2017)-Add the wrench that leaders who fear sanctioning by the elites will try to gain the support of the people by temporarily opening trade policy, but letting it return to its previous level.
Variations in Autocracies and Autocratic Behavior
Autocracies embedded in institutions are more likely to have to reveal information about themselves and are thus more able to make credible commitments
Mazumder (2017)
Autocracies that are more similar to democracies, i.e. their leaders can be constrained and that constraining action can be seen from the outside, are more credible in making promises and thus will have a better reputation for resolve and be more able to cooperate
Weeks (2008)
Weeks (2012)
Mattes and Rodriguez (2014)
Democracies
Democracy and trade
Democratization makes it more likely that a state will liberalize by increasing the size of the selectorate and changing the location of the marginal member of the winning coalition to an individual who will likely have pro-trade preferences
Milner and Kubota (2005)
Democracy motivates obfuscation and harassment of trade through non-tariff barriers
Kono (2006)
Democracy motivates discrimination against poor countries by rich countries because of the domestic preferences of the scarce factor of production
Kono (2008)
Distribution of trade preferences in a democracy
Political Economy of Territorial Disputes
Territorial disputes are associated with decreased trade
Simmons (2002)
Simmons (2005)
Bargaining in Territorial Disputes
Institutional Factors and Settlement
Shared international organizational membership makes settlement of a dispute more likely
Mitchell and Hensel (2007)
Bearce, Floros and McKibben (2009)
Third-parties and settlement
The existence of third-parties that are also contesting territory with the focal government makes it harder to settle disputes
Walter (2003)
Binding third-party arbitration makes it more likely that an agreement will last
Gent and Shannon (2010)
Strong domestic opposition, joint democracy and strong ethnic ties make states more likely to involve third-parties to settle disputes
Allee and Huth (2006a)
Allee and Huth (2006b)
Territorial Dispute Characteristics
Territorial Disputes lead to a lot of war
Senese and Vasquez (2008)
Mitchell and Thyne (2010)-Territorial disputes combined with domestic turmoil create a strong diversionary war opportunity
Territorial disputes are good sources of leverage for states because they can be inflamed to receive concessions on other issues. Territorial disputes and rivalry reinforce each other
Wiegand (2011)
Owsiak and Rider (2013)
Territorial disputes carry with them a lot of identity baggage which makes it hard for states to solve the dispute
Toft (2003)
Hassner (2009)
Goddard (2010)
Domestic publics have strong preferences to win territorial disputes and can block settlement through opposition
Simmons (2002)
Tanaka (2016)
Over Time Factors and Settlement
Disputes where partial settlements occur are more likely to be resolved
Mattes (2018)
Bargaining
BATNA
Actors enjoy a stronger bargaining position and will be less likely to make concessions if they have a good alternative to a negotiated agreement
Nash (1953)
Odell (2000)
McKibben (2015)
Actors with a strong BATNA are more likely to engage in concession extraction and much less likely to be amenable to concession extraction attempts by their opponents
Odell (2000)
McKibben (2015)
Domestic constraints give leaders stronger bargaining positions because they can commit to not moving
Schelling (1960)
Putnam (1988)
Concession Extraction
Engaging in concession extraction is likely to push an opponent to also think distributively and engage in defensive value-claiming tactics, making agreement less likely
Odell (2000)
Committing to requiring impossible concessions like the other is likely to simply result in stalemate
Schelling (1960)
Odell (2000)