Report Amoussou. Summary by POC Office ( POC Strategy (Relied heavily on…
Report Amoussou. Summary by POC Office
Relied heavily on the military component
Challenges in translating early warning into early action;
Lack of civilian capacity in field offices; a lack of joint planning at field offices
Insufficient political engagement to prevent or mitigate threats to civilians
JOC and the JMAC, efficiently triangulate information to extract EW + appropriate recommendations to the Mission’s leadership
Limited or lack of action on EW = loss of confidence and
trust by the population and the humanitarian community
Civilian capacity and leadership at field offices
General lack of civilian capacity and leadership in field offices.
high turnover of the civilian leadership
lack of continued presence of the civilian leadership
We cannot mandate mission as if we were monitoring a ceasefire. We are in a war zone (just like Congo, Mali, and South Sudan).
Forces need to ensure, secure and protect all the zone in which they are. Example, with (night and unpredictable) patrols
UN troops cannot longer just wait / stay in basses to be shoot at.
serious deficiencies in terms of civil-military-police
planning with regards to the protection of civilians
civilians were unable to shape the operations planned by the uniformed personnel, with both components working in silos and taking decisions based on information available to them.
Force operating with little
attempts to engage.
Conservative, Risk-adverse posture adopted placed those contingents at greater, not lesser, risk, making them a prime target for spoilers.
Civil population feel more insecure despite the presence of UN Troops , as they wondered how the Moroccan peacekeepers could protect them if they are unable to protect themselves.
Training and guidelines
All T/PCCs interviewed in the southeast indicated that they received pre-deployment training with a module on protection of civilians
Training does not include detailed modules on protection of civilians tasks
neven understanding that PoC is the priority
mandated task for T/PCCs.
guidelines have not completely been translated into workable and operational guidance for units
at the tactical level.
Rotation schedules of contingents have a negative operational impact on the overall performance on POC
Low institutional memory in missions,
85% of troops resources in the southeast are used for logistic convoys, leaving only 15% resources for tasks more directly related to the protection of civilians
Perception / outreach
perception of partiality remains deeply rooted, especially towards Moroccan peacekeepers, and it may be the result of an inefficient or insufficient outreach to the local, mostly christian population