Meta Ethics

Introduction

There are three levels to meta ethics...

  • Meta Ethics: What is 'good'? Does it exist? What does it mean?
  • Normative Ethics: How do we decide what is right and wrong?
  • Applied Ethics: What should X do?

Meta Ethics:

  • The Greek word 'Meta' means above and beyond, so Meta Ethics is above or beyond 'normal ethics'
  • Meta Ethics is concerned with the deeper questions of ethics
  • Is there such a thing as right and wrong? And what do ethical words mean?

Internal and External Questions:

  • The questions posed in normative and practical ethics are internal questions. The 'what should I do?' and 'how should I decide?' are within the game of ethics
  • The questions posed by meta ethics are external questions. They are questions about the game posed outside of the game.

Agree/Disagree

Naturalism:

  • Believe that there is such a thing as 'goodness'
  • What is right and wrong can be worked out using empirical evidence
  • Aquinas, Mill and Aristotle would support this view

Emotivism:

  • Emotivists believe that objective right and wrong does not exist
  • When we call something right or wrong, we are describing our emotions towards that action
  • A J Ayer was an emotivist

Intuitionism:

  • Intuitionists believe that there is such a thing as goodness but goodness is not like other properties
  • It cannot be worked out or experienced but we have an intuitive sense of right and wrong
  • When we hear of a distressing crime, we just know that it is wrong
  • G.E.Moore was in intuitionist

Prescriptivism (Not on spec):

  • Prescriptivists agree that there is no right or wrong
  • However, when we call something right or wrong, we are trying to prescribe our views to others
  • "Abortion is wrong" = "I don't like abortion and neither should you"
  • R M Hore was a prescriptivist

Naturalism - the idea that moral
values can be correctly defined by
observation of the natural world

Ethical Naturalism:

  • There is a type of moral realism. It agrees with Intuitionism that there are moral facts. It is cognitive believing that our moral language is able to be true or false.
  • It disagrees to how these moral facts are known. Naturalists argue that moral facts can be logically or empirically deduced. Intuitionists believe that moral facts are 'just known' by intuition.

Types of Ethical Naturalism:

  • There are a number of different types of naturalism. What they have in common is that they believe that things you can observe in the world lead you to moral truths
    1) Aquinas (1224-1274) - He would hold to a theological naturalism. The world has a God-given order built into it. Moral values can be worked out by understanding our God-given purpose and observing the natural order
    2) F H Bradley (1846-1924) - He argued that it is possible to understand our moral duties by observing our position or station in life. Although to some extent this is outdated and has a hint of Victorian class divisions. It could be argued that certain roles eg teacher, nurse, mother do seem to have certain duties or moral values that are attached to them
    3) Mill (1806-1873) - He argued that we can discover right and wrong by discovering what actions lead to pleasure or pain. By observing that stabbing someone causes pain, we can infer that this action is wrong.

The Naturalistic Fallacy:

  • You cannot draw the 'wrongness' of something because it is not empirical
  • The Naturalistic Fallacy says that it is a mistake to identify a moral claim (about what is good) with something that is natural eg you have sharp teeth - so it is a part of your nature to eat meat - it is good to eat meat and wrong to just eat vegetables
  • Another related problem is the fact-value distinction. In other words, there is a gap between the facts of a matter and the moral value that we deduce
  • There is no argument that can bridge this gap.

Intuitionism - the idea that moral truths are indefinable and self-evident

G E Moore agrees with Hume that there is a gap between facts and values. "You cannot get from an 'is' to an 'ought'", however, there really are moral values.

"Goodness is a simple idea" - Moore

  • "Goodness resembles yellow more than it resembles a horse"
  • Horses and other empirical things can be described and can be broken into parts
  • Goodness is a simple idea, like the concept of yellow, it cannot be broken down into parts or properties
  • It cannot be described but you can point out to many examples that you 'just know' are good.

Open Questions:

  • Another reason why goodness cannot be designed by 'natural (empirical)' properties comes in Moore's work on open/closed questions
  • (A closed question - "a bachelor is an unmarried man". Here it makes no sense to respond "yes, but is a bachelor really an unmarried man?" or "but is every unmarried man really a bachelor?". To do so would be a closed question to which there can only be one answer)
  • However, an open question - if we say "is goodness really pleasure?" it does make sense to ask "is goodness really pleasure?" and "is pleasure truly good?"
  • This is true of every attempt to define "good", "good" cannot be defined; it can only be recognised in particular cases through acts of intuition

A similarity and difference between intuitionism and naturalism:
They're both moral realist theories although naturalism says that you can work out right and wrong through empirical evidence and intuitionism says we have an intuitive sense of right and wrong

G E Moore's Intuitionism:
The most famous thinker to argue for intuitionism is G E Moore (1873-1953), the following is a summery of his views

  • Moore identifies the 'Naturalistic Fallacy' as the key error that naturalism makes. For any natural property eg pleasure, we can still ask 'is pleasure really good?' The fact that the possible answer 'no' shows that pleasure and other natural properties are not the same as good
  • We recognise goodness not through empirical facts but the 'good' in self-evident to our intuition
  • More uses the analogy with the colour yellow to explain how this intuition might work, if we are asked to describe yellow or present an argument that an object was yellow we would find the task difficult. We only answer the question of 'what is yellow?' by pointing to an object which is yellow. We are similarly able to recognise goodness. It cannot be defined but it can be shown and known

Emotivism: the idea that moral statements
are not statements but facts but are indicators
of emotional state

Background to Emotivism Logical Positivism
The original logical positivists were in Austria (the Vienna Circle) They followed the principle of Hume's Fork and applied this to language.
A statement is meaningful if it is either...

  • It is an analytic statement , true by definition
  • It is a synthetic statement that can be verified by the senses
    Any statements that do not fit into these categories are meaningless, they do not convey facts - this includes ethical statements

A J Ayer:

  • A.J.Ayer basically agrees with the logical positivists. This informs his view of ethics
  • Moral statements are not obviously logical nor can any matter of fact prove them to be true, so moral statements are something else

Ethical Statements and Emotion:

  • Ayer is not concerned with what ethical statements mean but what they are there for
  • Ethical statements are simply expressions of personal preferences/emotions
  • "Murder is wrong!" = "Murder no!"
  • If I say that you were wrong to steal my chips, the word 'wrong' doesn't add any factual content, I might as well say, "you stole my chips" in a disapproving tone

The Vienna Circle and the Verification Principle

  • The verification Principle put forward by the logical positivists suggests that statements are only meaningful if they're analytic or synthetic statements
  • Hume argued that moral judgements were feelings or sentiments rather than factual judgements. When we observe the facts if a situation we are not able to see the rightness or wrongness

Hume and the Fish:

  • The criticism of Naturalism was our inability to sense right and wrong. Hume and Mackie are supporting emotivism when they say...
  • When we percieve a murder, we see the facts but we do not percieve the wrongness.
  • The wrongness is only our feeling towards the action