Chapter 25-26
Monopoly
Part II

Deadweight loss pf monopoly

Screen Shot 2018-01-19 at 2.03.53 pm

Interpretation of DWL
the value of transactions not taking place due to market distortion

Price Discrimination:
selling different units of output at different prices

Why doesn't the monopolist sell the next unit at some p>MC?


The monopolist must charge the same price on all units. Selling the next unit at a price below pm would mean he has to charge that price on all inframarginal units

If monopolist could charge different prices on different units, his output choice would be different

First degree price discrimination
different prices on different units, and price can differ from person to person


Also referred to as perfect price discrimination

Second degree price discrimination
different prices on different units, but two consumers that buy the same amount must be charged the same price
e.g. bulk discount

Third degree price discrimination
different prices on different units, but every unit sold to a given person sells for the same price
e.g. student discount, senior discount

First degree price discrimination

the monopolist must know exactly the demand curves of every consumer

For price discrimination to work, there has to be little potential for resale


Generally, the lower the degree, he harder to implement

closest real-world examples: auto dealers, vendors in a street market, other transactions where price is determined by bargining

NO deadweight loss
CS=0, TS=PS

Third degree price discrimination

Most common and least difficult to implement form of price discrimination

Suppose the monopolist can identify two groups of people
Then the profits are give by
π = p1(q1)q1 + p2(q2)q2 − c(q1 + q2)

FOC gives Screen Shot 2018-01-19 at 2.18.58 pm


That is to say, the monopolist will set MR=MC in each market. This also implies that Screen Shot 2018-01-19 at 2.20.21 pm

Intuition: if MR was higher in one market, it would be more profitable to sell more units in that market and fewer units in the other

Recall that from MR1(q1)=MR2(q2) and MR=p(1+1/epsilon),we know at optimum Screen Shot 2018-01-19 at 2.23.02 pm


If p1>p2, then Screen Shot 2018-01-19 at 2.23.29 pm


This tells, more inelastic group will pay a higher price. This is because more elastic groups are more price-sensitive