Vulnerability 18/01/18
Initial concept brainstorm
need
risk
resilience
dependence
complex need
children
young people
Questions thrown up from policy chapter
role of vulnerability in priority need, broadly and specific inclusion
- original design, intent and application of the priority need test?
policies which create or exacerbate vulnerability e.g. housing insecurity following welfare reforms, sanctioning
prevention - a strategy linked to risk management
what role is played by comparison e.g. in the Pereira test and subsequent legislation
what definitions of vulnerability are used or assumed in legislative and policy terms
what is it about institutionalisation that leads to vulnerability? does the fact that we apply the label 'vulnerable' to people who have been in institutions tell us something about the nature of vulnerability itself?
and what does it mean if welsh legislation 'missed out' rough sleepers, who are presumably the most vulnerable under some definitions?
Dean 2013
- S36 universalist view of need: "We are vulnerable creatures clinging together against the dark, but may be assured that the wisest among us will ensure the security and protection of the weakest. Needs are held in common; they are shared by all and are interpreted for us through such social institutions as family, community, church and state."
- S38 "The republican discourse is soli- daristic in that the citizen is constructed as a vulnerable associating subject who looks to the social collective towhich she belongs and on which she depends for mutual protection against shared risks"
- S39 "At the intersection between solidaristic citi- zenship and claims-based demands, the paternalistic approach to need comes into play, demanding or accepting protective rights to welfare. Needs are held in common, reflecting an imperative of con- formity and stability in a hierarchically ordered society. The right to have such needs met is claimed on the basis that one belongs to and accepts one’s place within the social collectivity. Such rights arise because the common denominator shared by all members of society is a degree of present or potential vulnerability. "
Watts 2013
p41
Concerns have been voiced that such convertibility may not be straightforward, insofar as it requires that those who are most vulnerable actively assert, demand and seek their rights (see chapter two and Goodin, 1986, p255).
p55
It was anticipated that the homeless men sought to take part in the research would, to a greater or lesser extent, be vulnerable, with the sample likely to include individuals who suffer with addiction issues and/or mental health problems.
Ecclestone 2017
p443
As the review article for this themed section notes, understandings and uses of vulnerability are not only contested within and outside different disciplines, policy and practice contexts but also reflect explicit and implicit normative expectations of their human subjects (Brown et al., this issue).
p444
As Brown et al. also note, the growing focus on vulnerability in social science research is rooted, at least in part, in well-known analyses of risks and threats arising from modernisation processes (particularly those associated with globalisation) that aimed to explain the growing preoccupation with risk in everyday life and politics (e.g. Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1998). Over the past twenty years or so, academic, political and public discourses have increasingly presented vulnerability and risk as imperatives for building communal and individual resilience (Furedi, 2008; Chandler, 2014)
In policy
p444
Under Labour governments between 1998 and 2010, these imperatives have
underpinned a shift from policy definitions of vulnerability as arising from some form of impaired agency caused largely by social and economic conditions to much wider understandings and uses (see McLaughlin, 2011;Brown, 2015). Successive legislation has drawn many more people of all ages deemed to have impaired agency, and therefore to be in need of support,....
These trends have continued under a Conservative-led coalition government (2010–15) and a Conservative government from 2015, changing not onlywhat is deemed to comprise impaired agency and its causes, but also what types of support and intervention are needed.
Children
p445
vulnerability in children. Their ‘needs-based construction of vulnerability’ acknowledges complex intrisic and extrinsic factors and ‘has parallels with . . . “more fluid constructions of diversity”’ (Jopling and Vincent, 2015: 15)
Agency
p445
wider notions of impaired agency, risk and harm are implicated in typical depictions
Universality
p445
understandings of universal vulnerability as an existential state of precariousness in the face of certain death and likely illness now encompass authentic personhood. For example, Brene Brown’s popular talk on vulnerability for the website TED is the most downloaded in the TED series, arguing that we are all innately and structurally vulnerable, and that we should take pride in understanding and revealing our vulnerability and empathise with others. The potent cultural resonance of this presentation has led to its widespread use in public and private sector leadership and management programmes (Brown, 2011). The celebration of universal vulnerability is also integral to a liberal Left social agenda
that challenges pathologised appropriations of vulnerability which suggest that structural and material problems are individual outcomes of psychological weakness, impaired agency and lack of ‘resilience’. Here a progressive politics aims to recast vulnerability as an attribute of an understanding, empathetic citizenship, integral to the ‘fragile and contingent nature of personhood’ and a ‘universal’ ontological dimension of human experience and identity where we are all ‘potentially vulnerable’ (Beckett,
p446
In this scenario, acceptance of vulnerability enables everyone to claim their right to ‘be protected from the effects of potential vulnerabilities [whilst] defending the rights of others to receive support in the light of their actual vulnerability’ (Beckett, ibid.).
Stigma
p446
Liddiard, this enables a powerful politicised attack on the myriad disadvantaged groups we position as ‘Other’, a position rooted in images of the archetypal liberal and neo-liberal citizen:
Because our culture uses vulnerability to justify cultural abjection and social exclusion . . . it is difficult for us to be or claim vulnerability; so we actively disassociate with becoming a vulnerable subject (ableism in a nutshell!) . . . Iwant to question theways inwhich collectively claiming vulnerability might be different. (Liddiard in Ecclestone et al., 2015:3,original emphasis).
Conclusion
p453
I have aimed to showthat as both description and explanation of experience, vulnerability has crept horizontally and vertically into policy, everyday life, and institutional life, especially in education. This has created vulnerability as a predominantly psycho- emotional concern rather than a structural and political one
Clough 2017
Universalisability
p469
This article engages with emerging debates in law and feminist philosophy around the concept of vulnerability. Central to this is the call to re-imagine and re-frame vulnerability as universal – as something which is experienced by all individuals, by virtue of their humanity and context as social beings....
This article engages critically with the range of literature that has developed more recently,which conceptualises vulnerability as a shared, universal ontological experience for all human beings, by virtue of our nature as interdependent social beings (Turner, 2006; Fineman, 2008, 2014, 2015; Fineman and Grear, 2013
Social control and paternalism
p469
Given concerns about theway inwhich vulnerability discourse may be used to create dangerous new categorisations and binaries, and to effect social control and paternalistic intervention in the lives of those classed as vulnerable, it is important that we do not valorise vulnerability as a guide for new modes of legal and policy reform. This is perhaps most salient in contexts such as disability and adult social care, where the concept of vulnerability is eyed with suspicion due to its perceived synonymous relationship with weakness and powerlessness, and its traditional ascription to disabled people to enable controlling interventions
p475
These concerns capture the sense that vulnerability as an indicator in social policy
can be dangerous, and may lead to interventions which reinforce power positions, which prevent the ability to develop resilience or personal preventive strategies, and which work to normalise ‘acceptable’ behaviours. However,
p473-474
The central point here is that far from reinforcing categories of ‘vulnerable’ groups, the universal understanding of vulnerability as shared ontological experience allows us to begin to dismantle and question the binaries, categories and resultant legal and policy responses currently engendered and perpetuated in law. It helps us to reframe our ontological experience as a shared and often positive interaction between our bodies and our context, including through relations with others and institutions. It also brings to the fore otherwise obscured or hidden institutional or systemic elements which can exacerbate the experience of vulnerability.
A number of theorists are challenging traditional approaches to vulnerability, which saw it as a group or status based concept, linked to an inherent condition such as age or disability, and seeking to situate the concept within understandings of all individuals as interdependent, relational and, as such, universally ontologically. At the forefront of this is the work of Martha Fineman who has sought to re-imagine, at a political level, what we mean by vulnerability (Fineman, 2008). Central to Fineman’s thesis is the notion of ontological ‘universal vulnerability’, advancing the idea that all human beings, by the very nature of being social beings, are vulnerable. Whilst
Resilience and social context
p474
The ‘responsive state’ is a key normative aspect of Fineman’s vulnerability thesis, in
that an understanding of the various sources of vulnerability forms the basis of a claim that the state must be responsive to these (Fineman, 2010: 13). This signals an important recognition of the role that the state plays in the formation of systemic and institutional sources of vulnerability, and conversely that the state is in a position to ameliorate this and instead foster resilience. Vulnerability again is not seen as an inherent quality that individuals or members of particular groups possess, but instead as an experience constituted by the interaction between an embodied being and their societal context – their lived experience.
Structural relationships
p477
the literature on vulnerability stresses a richer notion of autonomy
which steps outside of these theoretical constraints imposed by thinking in terms of autonomy/paternalism, or empowerment/protection. What is often ignored by such criticisms is the way in which the state, through various structures, institutions and norms, does already interfere in our lives. It is often the case that such structures are normalised and thus made invisible.
Caraher & Reuter 2017
Connotations of the term
p483
vulnerability is employed to suggest both fairness and targeting of those deemed ‘deserving’ of support. The obvious flipside of such an approach is that all those individualswho are not ascribed the label of vulnerability are seen as potentially undeserving of benefits or services, hence justifying a reduction of welfare provision. Vulnerability has therefore similar features as the concepts of social exclusion (Levitas, 2005) and risk (Beck, 2009), because it appears as intrinsically ambiguous, invites varied if not competing definitions and opens up a potential gap between politically motivated and diverse analytical interpretations, such as those that have been successfully applied in academic research on for example low income and intergenerational interdependency, housing and youth justice (examples include Emmel and Hughes, 2010; Levy-Vroelant, 2010;Brown, 2012, 2014).
Ways of using vulnerability as a concept
p484-485
Following Brown, Ecclestone and Emmel (in this issue), it is possible to differentiate
between three ways of using vulnerability as a concept: as a metaphor to capture the challenges of living in unequal societies; as a robust analytical tool to explore forms of disadvantage or need that emerge out of specific social and individual circumstances; and as a mechanism of guiding policy and practice, usually in response to social problems. Due to the diversity of definitions and applications of vulnerability, gaining sufficient conceptual clarity is as much a challenge as engaging with the often ambivalent use of the term – an ambivalence that arises from the fact that vulnerability may be framed in a sense of compassion and support, but can equally be understood and used as a tool of regulation, social discipline and control, invoking a degree of normativity
Universality - pushing back against Fineman
p484
interpretation of vulnerability as a universal human condition, as presented by Fineman (2008). Since all humans are essentially and equally vulnerable, as a consequence of being ‘embodied’ in fragile and decaying bodies as well as of being ‘embedded’ in social institutions on which they depend, vulnerability can be used as a critical and political tool to challenge the prevailing ideal of the ‘autonomous and independent subject’ (Fineman, 2008: 2). This notion of universal vulnerability is interesting conceptually and helps to avoid stigmatising normative interpretations of vulnerability that single out particular groups for support as well as potentially for disciplining intervention, but it is not without flaws. Not only may some of those deemed vulnerable by others not identify themselves as such (Chambers, 1989;Brown, 2015), but the idea of universal vulnerability could be seen as too abstract to enable analyses of real world situations. For Fineman (2008), it is the degree of resilience that determines an individual’s ability to cope with the human condition of universal vulnerability.While degrees of resilience vary subject to the support provided by social institutions, vulnerability is a universal, one could say natural, constant.
- instead, subscribe to the view that vulnerability and resilience are linked like two sides of the same coin
Social determinacy and social risks
p485-486
Vulnerability is then a socially determined condition of exposure to social risks that undermines material living standards and affects the sense of identity and self. Therefore,weargue thatwhilst vulnerabilitymay be regarded as a universal condition,
and hence a potentiality to be experienced by all individuals, we need to perceive it as socially determined and necessarily shaped by the environment in which individuals or groups exist and which determines to what extent this potential vulnerability actually manifests itself and consequently affects well-being and life chances. The more resilient individuals or groups are, as a result of being supported by social institutions such as families, local communities, stable employment or the social protection system, the less vulnerable they are in practical terms
Emmel 2017
Use of the term to describe deficit
p 457
The term vulnerability has little theoretical purchase in social policy. It is used widely as a short-hand phrase to describe deficit. As such, it provides only limited value and has little regard for the wider structures of society that might ameliorate, sustain or exacerbate vulnerability. There
Vulnerability has become a common-place term in social policy. Formal policy interventions describe individuals as vulnerable because they possess a measurable deficit and require treatment (Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act, 2006; Fineman, 2008; Protection of Freedoms Act, 2012). These formal definitions of vulnerability are supported through the widespread colloquial use of the term across policy and among service providers to describe individuals who are at risk of physical or mental harm, frequently because of ill-defined personal short-comings (Ecclestone and Lewis, 2014;Furedi, 2004). This discrimination-based account has little regard for the wider structures of society that might ameliorate, sustain or exacerbate vulnerability
Flourishing as an opposite
p457
There is, however, a critical literature that seeks to understand the social, economic and political relationships that produce vulnerability and its potential opposite, flourishing. This article draws on this theoretical literature, focusing particularly on relational accounts of autonomy, capabilities and functioning, and the role of societal institutions
Political economy of vulnerability
p457-458
Critiques of this individualistic and rational use of the term have sought to bring political economy back into an understanding of vulnerability. The vulnerable subject is positioned in relation to economic liberalism and increasingly selective state welfare provision (Brown, 2014, 2015). Similarly, McLaughlin (2012) notes the increasing emphasis on individual vulnerable identities at the expense of collective accounts, neglecting political, social and economic factors that shape experience in relation to societal structures. Contemporary characterisations purposefully ignore howvulnerability is produced and reproduced in society, emphasising, as Brown et al. (this issue) elaborate, an account of vulnerability imbued with normative assumptions about deservingness, deviance and deficit
Relational account
p458
the relational account is presented is to contrast universal vulnerability as a forever imminent experience pertaining to the body that may affect us all at different times across the life-course, with particular vulnerabilities that have their genesis ‘in the interruption or destruction of social relationships’ (Fineman, 2010: 268)...
Fineman proposes a benign state with responsive structures within which citizens choose from a range of options to address the vulnerabilities in their lives. Autonomy and vulnerability are therefore theorised as oppositional terms
Structure and capacity
p459
Bohle et al.(1994: 38) suggest three basic coordinates of vulnerability (1) the risk of exposure to external crisis; (2) the risk of inadequate capacities of individuals to cope with this external stress and shock, including effective and timely external interventions; and (3) the risk of severe consequences, including slow and limited recovery
Adding a fourth dimension
p460
Time is frequently implicated in accounts of vulnerability; references aremade to the ‘episodic and shifting’ (Fineman, 2010: 265) and the ‘frequent downward spiral’ of vulnerability (Mackenzie, 2014: 46)
Agency and access to resources
p461
Themost frequently reported constraint cited by participants is an inability to exercise their agency. Difficulties in accessing basic needs and material deprivation can significantly curtail the range of possible ways of being (Doyal and Gough, 1991), where the notion of being does not capture mere existence of basic needs but the relations needed to acquire those needs...
p461-462
Geoff’s account of their attempt to access welfare provision evidences a lack of
agency, an inability to access the resources they need and to which they feel entitled. But Geoff’s narrative is also one of both confrontation and frustration. And this is a frustration borne of a recognition that they do not, and nor can they, adequately exercise control over their lives. As Geoff notes ‘we keep hitting a bloody brick wall’ – the impediments to accessing services are the social institutions that control resources. Accounts of vulnerability that assume a causal link between poverty and vulnerability locate powerlessness and inability to engage meaningfully with societal institutions in their explanation. Fineman (2010: 266) notes that vulnerable populations are frequently characterised as ‘discriminated against, marginalized, and disenfranchised from mainstream society’. Yet, in this research individuals who would not be regarded as poor, using any relative or actualmeasure of poverty, also report the difficulties they have in accessing services.
Control over resources
p462
These cases point to the role that the ability to assume control over resources plays
out in definitions of vulnerability. It emphasises how resources are mediated through institutions and how, when individuals are unable to lever access to these resources, however just they feel their case for access may be, this is expressed as frustration and failure.
Agency
p462-463
Lynn’s case provides insight into the ways in which agency cannot be separated from a relational account in any understanding of vulnerability...Yet Lynn rejects the label of being vulnerable in a forthright way. An investigation of her case shows that this is not hubris but situated in practices that mediate, reduce and militate against vulnerability through the ways Lynn exercises her agency. This understanding of agency cannot be divorced from the ways in which she relates to institutions or without reference to the social settings in which she exhibits her self-confidence
Empowerment
p463
For Wallerstein (1992: 197), empowerment is ‘a multi-level construct that involves people assuming control and mastery over their lives in their social, [economic] and political environments’. This reflects the capacities Lynn describes, which also appear to be absent in the experiences of other grandparents in this study. Empowerment is the opportunity and capability of individuals and groups to be included in the economic, social and political processes of capability.
p464
...agency, in which people act to bring about
change relative to the adequate function of public services, is one part of a relational model of vulnerability. Accounts that focus on an evaluation of an individual’s assets and their position relative to institutional relationships are insufficient.While it is right to recognise, as Fineman (2010) does, that state institutions can privilege some groups at the expense of others, it does not necessarily follow that the resolution to these relationships of disadvantage lies only in the reform of these state institutions. This article has shown that an explanation of vulnerability must include what people ‘do’ to access, or to fail to access, resources and opportunities
p464
The notion of empowerment provides an explanation of these relationships between institutions that have the capacity to produce and maintain vulnerabilities and themastery and control individuals may be able to exert to flourish in their lives. T
Capacity and basic needs
p464-465
Now labelled meeting basic needs (Doyal and Gough, 1991), this dimension extends explanation to recognise a broader consideration of services, goods and wants. These include intermediate basic needs such as childhood security and safety.... As Doyal and Gough (1991) emphasise a basic needs approach requires explanation of the capacity for action through agency and the ways in which this might be constrained or liberated.
The second dimension, drawing on capability theory (Sen, 1999), is relabelled as
capacity to be reflecting the extension in this discussion to understand the opportunities and constraints individuals experience in exercising functions to address vulnerabilities or to flourish
Each of these dimensions of vulnerability cannot be divorced from the third
dimension, access to service providers... the cases in this article highlight how inequalities persist and may often be exacerbated for individuals who are unable to develop relationships to connect the three dimensions of the longitudinal space of vulnerability elaborated. They are not able to act to bring about change to reduce vulnerabilities.
Fineman 2008
Universalism
p1
In this essay I develop the concept of vulnerability in order to argue for a more responsive state and a more egalitarian society. I argue that vulnerability is-and should be understood to be-universal and constant, inherent in the human condition. The vulnerability approach I propose is an alternative to traditional equal protection analysis; it is a "post-identity" inquiry in that it is not focused only on discrimination against defined groups, but concerned with privilege and favor conferred on limited segments of the population by the state and broader society through their institutions. As such, vulnerability analysis concentrates on the structures our society has and will establish to manage our common vulnerabilities.
Advocacy for use of vulnerability in law and social policy
p1-2
To richly theorize a concept of vulnerability is to develop a more complex subject around which to build social policy and law; this new complex subject can be used to redefine and expand current ideas about state responsibility toward individuals and institutions. In fact, I argue that the "vulnerable subject" must replace the autonomous and independent subject asserted in the liberal tradition. Far more representative of actual lived experience and the human condition, the vulnerable subject should be at the center of our political and theoretical endeavors.
Stigma
p8
In discussions of public responsibility, the concept of vulnerability is sometimes used to define groups of fledgling or stigmatized subjects, designated as "populations."' 9 Vulnerability is typically associated with victimhood, deprivation, dependency, or pathology.
p8-9
In contrast, I want to claim the term "vulnerable" for its potential in
describing a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition that must be at the heart of our concept of social and state responsibility. Vulnerability thus freed from its limited and negative associations is a powerful conceptual tool with the potential to define an obligation for the state to ensure a richer and more robust guarantee of equality than is currently afforded under the equal protection model.
Embodiment
p9
Vulnerability initially should be understood as arising from our
embodiment, which carries with it the ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and misfortune from mildly adverse to catastrophically devastating events, whether accidental, intentional, or otherwise. Individuals can attempt to lessen the risk or mitigate the impact of such events, but they cannot eliminate their possibility. Understanding vulnerability begins with the realization that many such events are ultimately beyond human control.25 Our embodied humanity carries with it the ever-constant possibility of
dependency as a result of disease, epidemics, resistant viruses, or other biologically-based catastrophes. Our bodies are also vulnerable to other forces in our physical environment: There is the constant possibility that we can be injured and undone by errant weather systems, such as those that produce flood, drought, famine, and fire. These are "natural" disasters beyond our individual control to prevent.
Structural interaction
p10
Because we are positioned differently within a web of economic and institutional relationships, our vulnerabilities range in magnitude and potential at the individual level. Undeniably universal, human vulnerability is also particular: it is experienced uniquely by each of us and this experience is greatly influenced by the quality and quantity of resources we possess or can command.27 Significantly, the realization that no individual can avoid vulnerability entirely spurs us to look to societal institutions for assistance. Of course, society cannot eradicate our vulnerability either. However, society can and does mediate, compensate, and lessen our vulnerability through programs, institutions, and structures. Therefore, because both our personal and our social lives are marked and shaped by vulnerability, a vulnerability analysis must have both individual and institutional components.
Vulnerable subject juxtaposed with liberal subject
p10-11
Liberal subjects have the ability to negotiate contract terms,
assessing their options and making rational choices. They consent to such agreements in the course of fulfilling society's mandate that they assume personal responsibility for themselves and for their dependants. Privacy principles that restrain the state and its institutions from interfering with the iberal subjects' entitlements to autonomy and liberty depend on this presumed competence and capability.
Vulnerability analysis questions the idea of a liberal subject, suggesting that the vulnerable subject is a more accurate and complete universal figure to place at the heart of social policy.
Structural analysis
p18
the claim of failure of personal responsibility might be harder to make if we do not frame equality arguments in terms of the absence of impermissible discrimination but, rather, question whether the system provided an impermissible advantage to some individuals or groups. Within that framework, claims that individuals are entirely responsible for their own failures become less tenable. A vulnerability inquiry proposes a more thorough and penetrating equality analysis--one that considers structural and institutional arrangements in assessing the state's response to situations of vulnerability before indicting the individual. This structural focus illustrates a second political advantage to a
vulnerability analysis: It brings institutions-not only individual actions- under scrutiny, redirecting our attention to their role in providing assets in ways that may unfairly privilege certain persons or groups, even if unintentionally.
Vulnerability analysis
p20
A vulnerability analysis greatly magnifies state responsibility for the institutions and structures the state constructs and utilizes. Vulnerability analysis demands that the state give equal regard to the shared vulnerability of all individuals, transcending the old identity categories as a limitation on the recognition that the state has a vital role to play in protecting against discrimination. A vulnerability analysis begins by first considering how the state has responded to, shaped, enabled, or curtailed its institutions. Has it acted toward those institutions in ways that are consistent with its obligation to support the implementation and maintenance of a vital and robust equality regime-a regime in which individuals have a true opportunity to develop the range of assets they need to give them resilience in the face of their vulnerabilities?
Sarewitz et al 2003
- advocate vulnerability-informed policies as opposed to risk-avoidance policies as a means of mitigating the impact of extreme events
- p810: William Hooke of the American Meteorological
Society has suggested that vulnerability reduction can be framed in terms of fundamental human rights— that modern society has an obligation to ensure that all citizens live in homes and communities that provide a basic level of protection from the threat of disasters
lack of agency
Prowse 2003
- p6: use of the word ‘vulnerability’ encourages a view of societies and people as ‘passive’ and non-responsive (Hewitt in Quarantelli 1998). In this sense the condition of ‘vulnerability’ appears to emphasise weakness, a lack of agency, and an inability to cope among ‘affected’ societies and people (Ibid., Bankoff 2001).
Capabilities relational account
p458
Framed by capability theory (Dr`eze and Sen, 1995; Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2011), this relational approach to vulnerability is concerned to understand howan individual’s innate and learned capacities affect opportunities to achieve valuable functioning in relation to social, political and economic conditions in which political and legal institutions may enable or constrain an individual’s freedoms and entitlements. In this relational capabilities approach, autonomy, as an evaluative effort by individuals to address their vulnerabilities (Sayer, 2011), is not considered as being in opposition to vulnerability. The capabilities approach to explaining vulnerability seeks to account for an individual’s agency and how this might be exercised within legal and social structures....
In this article, the opposite of vulnerability is taken to be flourishing, which, following Sayer (2011)and Rawls(1973: 433), consists partly of ‘an account of what things are good for human beings taking them as they are’ achieved through their evaluative effort.
p460
Drawing on capability theory, this article extends understanding of the relationships between agency and social institutions, including social care, legal systems and welfare provision.
Critical realist account
p458-459
this article applies a (critical) realist approach to explanations of
vulnerability (Harr´e, 1986; Bhaskar, 2008). This recognises that social processes, like a relational understanding of vulnerability and the ways in which agency is exercised, cannot be measured.
See also Prowse 2003: 8
d by Marcus and Wilkinson (2002) who focus on people who are “particularly vulnerable to the effects of poverty” (p.1). This change of emphasis, focusing on the outcomes of poverty, highlights the important difference between the means and ends of human welfare. Whilst the means of human welfare “refers to indicators of inputs intended to achieve an end result”, such as income or the consumption of food or the use of health services, the ends of human welfare measures the outcomes themselves, such as life expectancy or nutrition or literacy (Lok-Dessallien 1998, p.7; Henninger 1998). This focus on the ends of human welfare, often described as human capabilities, is commonly associated with Sen’s work on entitlements, capabilities and functionings (Sen 1981, 1984, 1999; Dreze and Sen 1989)
Prowse 2003: 12
Key to the discussions of vulnerability and risk in the CPRC literature is the suggestion by Hulme et al. (2001) that:
“What poor people are concerned about is not so much that their level of income, consumption or capabilities are low, but that they are likely to experience highly stressful declines in these levels, to the point of premature death. This approach suggests that poverty can be seen as the probability (actual or perceived) that a household will suddenly (but perhaps also gradually) reach a position with which it is unable to cope, leading to catastrophe” (p.9).
This definition of poverty can also be seen as a particularly accurate proxy for a definition of vulnerability, especially due to its emphasis on the risk (whether real or imagined) of being unable to cope
- risk seen as a precursor to vulnerability
p21
As noted above, the implicit definition of vulnerability in the ‘Meanings’ paper as ‘the probability of an inability to cope’, frames the discussion and this highlights the importance of engaging with the relationship between risk and vulnerability.
See also Prowse 2003: 18
In the CPRC literature the concepts of social exclusion and social capital are both
related to vulnerability.... This relates to Hulme et al.’s (2000) assertion that the concept of social exclusion can be used to cover some of the multi- dimensional aspects of poverty such as insecurity and resignation
deficit
Prowse 2003: 21
We have seen how increased attention is currently being paid to the ‘concept’ of vulnerability, and that just as the multi-dimensional nature of poverty is a complex subject to unravel, so vulnerability is also a phenomenon which is extremely hard to capture. For instance, Webb and Harinarayan (1999) assert that “assessing vulnerability is like trying to measure something that is not there. It is an absence of security, basic needs, social protection, political power and coping options” (p.298).
See also Prowse 2003: 22
The starting point in disaggregating vulnerability is the internal/external distinction proposed by Chambers (1983, 1989):
“Vulnerability thus has two sides: an external side of risks, shocks, and stress to which an individual is subject to; and an internal side which is defenceless, meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss” (Chambers 1989, p.1).
p23
Moser (1998) also utilises a two-step model of vulnerability but uses the concepts of sensitivity and resilience to significantly change the focus and emphasis of Chamber’s internal/external distinction
Levy-Vroelant 2010: 445
The ‘social paradigm’ itself is undergoing transformation with the importation of the concept of vulnerability from the field of development (Thomas, 2010). This shared matrix (being the concept of vulnerability and its corollary, that of risk)
Levy-Vroelant 2010: 447
Amartya Sen develops a particularly rigorous and well-argued analysis of these issues, underlining that the term social exclusion is relatively recent and should be placed in parallel with the older and more generalised concept of the deprivation of capacities. He argues that ‘povertymust be seen in terms of poor living, rather than just as lowness of income . . . It is essential, [to] look at impoverished lives and not just as depleted wallets’ (Sen, 2000, p. 3 quoted in Burstein, 2005)
Levy-Vroelant 2010: 447
, the concept highlights a deficiency, a lack and a failure (of
health, rights and power). But, according to her, it is based on two sources, the first being psychological and medical, and the second ‘humanitarian’. The fact is that the concept of vulnerability,which has largely entered political language as well as that of scientific research in the social sciences, is used to qualify individuals or groups that, as a result of their characteristics, need to be helped and assisted.
frailty
See also Levy-Vroelant 2010: 448
The development in European social states of the concept of frailty with regards the elderly is contemporary with that of risk, with the latter understood to be the basis for access to or eligibility for social assistance, an approach that takes the place of having the right to assistance (Beck, 1992), explains H´
el` ene Thomas. The fact of being exposed to stressors and of the individual not being able to adequately cope due to physical,mental or social difficulties (similar to victims of catastrophes or poverty) prevents the individual from efficiently dealing with a situation resulting from risks and hazards. In the best of cases, the social and political use of vulnerability invites the search for an antidote from within the resources of each individual. In the worst of cases, the state becomes more penal and imposes compliant behaviour through social control or even repression (Wacquant, 2009). In either case, the doctrine of vulnerability refocuses public policies around intensified personal accountability rather than on rights and collective protection systems
Levy-Vroelant 2010:449
The impossibility of having a general and operational definition of vulnerable groups is due to the link with the concept of risk which, by definition, proceeds by estimation and is largely dependent on context. The lack of efficiency in classifica- tion, no matter howsophisticated it might be, also results from the placing of persons and groups into competition for access to rare housing resources. The more that the definition of vulnerable populations is linked to the concept of risk, the more it is encompassing. The FEANTSA categories (ETHOS), for instance, cover all situa- tions concerning bad housing, lack of housing and the insecurity of housing status. As a result of the concept of specified social risk, which defines a large number of groups that are vulnerable because the people are at risk (children, isolated individ- uals, single-parent households, immigrants, the disabled, the elderly, etc.), housing policy priorities tend to dilute and enlarge poverty by considering the difficult living conditions of people rather than just their financial insecurity
2010: 1
"Vulnerability is posited as the characteristic that positions us in relation to each other as human beings and also suggests a relationship of responsibility between state and individual"
p9-10
- uses universal vulnerability to ground state responsibility to ensure meaningful equality and autonomy of its citizens