GENOME EDITING AND GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY
GENOME EDITING AND GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY
Wrap-Up: What do we want to see in March?
: Other tech beyind genome editing need to be included
: Delivery should be looked into. Need to come to an agreement on general types of risks that we want to focus on.
: Straw-people options for governments
: Think about how designing tests factor into factors of concern.
: Keep in min different ways of thinking how new ideas can be piloted. How can a feedback loop be built?
: Proposing and critiquing partial solutions. Leave out genome synthesis
: you can't drive the risk to 0, so we have to accept some level of risk so we don't miss the benefits...greater risk to humans through genome editing of other species, not humans...no perfect solution, so hopefully that won't stall innovation...biggest risk is the PR risk, and its pretty near-term
Sonia Ben OG
: how to govern private research?
: institutions can drive behavior, there are starting to be some changes in how we develop gene drives
: Straw men or straw people. Looking outside of the life sciences for possible lessons to learn.
: More worshoppy stuff. Identifying what works and what doesn't work-putting things into different perspectives. Putting parameters on governance models, articulating policy models of interest. JCBI's options. Adjacent or synergistic tech adopting. Filling in a table that can be debated.
:1. What the groups' opinion is on potential problem actors--DIY biologists-should they be regulated differently? Will they cause a potential PR problem?
How to consider policy and what we want to put forward considering that the research itself changes fast. Consider how we make recommendations knowing the rate of technology advancement.
: Clarity on what we're focusing on. Focus around the application space--bio-weapons? are we focused on bio-weapons? BWC?
: Issue of softer governments. Honest conversations? Safe and productive spaces? Create it in a way for scientists not to feel threatened.
l: Animal health. Assessing different skill-levels--developing a matrix
Framing types of outbreaks: Types of biological attacks
Release of well known agent
Some mutated agent
Unknown or unrealized agent
Challenges to identify:
New agents: current tools may not be so effective.
Confusion over symptoms e.g. e. coli that produces flu-like symptoms
Cost of small molecule drug development
Mutations make treatment difficult
Lack of secure safety spaces for highly virulent agents
Challenges and Risk Assessments:
Single nucleotide polymorphisms
Targeted delivery or high level of editing somatic cells
Risks to human health
Public response-- what good or bad PR can do for the field.
Don't want bad PR
Ease of accessibility
Potential government strategies to curtail this ease
Beneficial uses of CRISPR
CRISPR may be useful in detection methods
Used for defense
Possibility of generating a license for Cas. Designed to track use. Think Fishing license.
Informed Consent: How do you make sure that the patients and people that are testing positive are being informed properly so that these permanent changes that you may be making are in the patient's best interest as opposed to treating more traditionally
: For Kyle-- IS CRISPR better suited than other techniques in certain areas?
For Jennifer-- FRom a GHS perspective, what are the areas where investment in a new therapeutic would have the biggest impact?
CRISPR can use one protein and a mix of guide RNAs rather than using different proteins for each edit.
RNA targeting as a way to avoid problems associated with gene editing
The activity of Cas is higher than TALEN (In general--but not always true)
: TB and HIV are primary killers.
TB is in desperate need of better detection--walking well is a huge problem--How many people are sick and spreading bacteria?
HIV-- hope to develop a vaccine hat is somewhat long-lasting
: Do these new kinds of epigenetic tools pose security challenges? Form of CRISPR that is harder to detect?
: Would have to use some sort of epigenomic mapping approach. Look for a specific marker. Can be challenging to determine what is artificial and what is natural.
: How can various types of promoters be used nefariously? How to counter a gene drive?
: Biggest challenge is making sure there is a high enough concentration. Could also use a ton of anti-CRISPR Thoughts are moving more toward prophylaxis.
: FAA uses a database to report anything on the flight deck that goes wrong. Potentially relevant to gene editing. Maybe put a partial liability release via preregistration--incentive to register.
: Response opportunities needs to be part of the solutions. Data-sharing requirements. What is the minimum level of disclosure required to carry out some sort of experiment?
Global health security
Thoughts on potential focus on antibody-based prophylaxis or treatment
Rapid ab (antibody) screening testing for massively potent ab
Vaccine developers are hesitant to get into space for development for outbreaks because there is a big liability concern. Development of vaccines that don't have monetary incentive but would be needed to be used in scenarios that are test scenarios. This is a large challenge for WHO.
What is the liability for the development companies should the vaccines have an adverse reaction?
Interesting to think of genome editing in this frame of mind.
Peer-monitored CRISPR registration??
Talk more about in March