POTENTIAL RISKS POSED BY MISUSE OF VECTOR CONTROL APPLICATIONS (Kevin…
POTENTIAL RISKS POSED BY MISUSE OF VECTOR CONTROL APPLICATIONS
Kevin Esvelt: Population-level Genome Editing
Gene Drive: is comparable to a retrovirus
Requires EXCLUSIVE sexual reproduction
Accessibility is limited by difficulty of delivery
to alter/suppress an entire population but
to (temporarily) alter part of a population
Interesting as a technology
Not dangerous because
Relatively slow-- spreads over a few generations
Obvious-- sequencing reads is a tell-tale sign that is difficult to hide
Reliable countered--overwriting drives is easy.
Overwriting can restore original phenotype but not genotype
Summary: Because the mechanism of spread is slow, obvious if you look and is very readily blocked, it's not that big of a deal
Topics of Relevance
-r selected organisms(mosquitoes)--easier
-k selected (1 offspring/generation)--more difficult
Getting the DNA into the germline
Cultivated agricultural species
-Ecological keystone species
-Marine species (many many r selected species)
-wild plants and animals consumed by humans
EASY to counter with resistant alleles
Primary risk is to public perception of science and technology
: The reversibility of gene drives--yes they are counterable and not stockpilable which makes it less effective as a countermeasure. Yes gene drive can be counteracted but at great cost politically, economically, and in the lost opportunity. --How to increase transparency without making scientists feel like they are not in charge of their research. How often do they need to register their ideas?
: Capability to sequenceing the future? In the US there are privacy concerns. Technologically we are able, but socially or politically and even foreign infrastructures
: The emergence of tools to become more responsive. Stockpiles become less important. Sequencing as an immediate answer for surveillance-- analysis requires a lot of data power so on a surveillance footing,this becomes a bit difficult.
Computation power needed to do this surveillance limits the tech in and of itself
Sonia Ben OG
: Preregistration of research. How would you entice scientists to preregister and if you can't, is there a way to regulate that? At the international level?
: Every time you want to build a drive system, fill out a one page form about safeguards and post it. No controls over what you can and cannot do but just make it public so that there can be collective scrutiny. Incentive, don't have to worry about being scooped because everything is transparent. Establish a new norm.
: Clinical trials could be an example of how this could work.
: You're less concerned about gene drive attacks because of reversal drives. What if you come across a gene drive was active in the environment for a few years and now you have a transgenic. How long would it take to make a reversal drive?
: Governance models--clinical trials and proposal review systems. There are places to look at these same types of questions. Disclosure does not mean that people have a voice and
it does not enable collective scrutiny
Challenges of who is trusted to give info is a key challenge and it will become more difficult as there are more people working in the space. .
: How to have a safe and productive space to raise uncomfortable questions.
: IT's tricky because could cause public panic. There needs to be a safety and secure channel. Keep the scary topics among scientists, the public should not be involved because may cause mass panic
: Are there redlines in your line of work? How does one go about describing redlines in aositie productive way and arriving at a consensus?
: Can't really arrive a a consensus but can reach a majority view.
: There are examples of consensus amongst researchers. There are strong standards in gene drive research right now
: There are not strong safeguards i the field currently.
: Can't get a complete consensus because there are always people who push the envelope. Red lines gets more into intent and I worry when people talk about red lines for technology.
Paper may cause people to not realize full complications of genome editing
Potential of gene drives as biological weapons
Using a gene drive to convert non GM crops into GM crops--> economic warfare
-Group that would benefit most would be eco-groups
Gene drives slow--makes it unlikely but not insurmountable for a state-level actor
Whole genome sequencing is rarely used in clinical settings
Ecology: not aware of any capacity at the moment but there may be a move towards that in the future
Reversal Drives: Only looks at technical debate not political realities.
-What level would be needed to release a reversal drive?
What is liability of using a reversal drive? May not be feasible at the present?
Lack of preparedness and precooked policy needed for release of reversal drives are more problematic than the public perception
How to encourage the idea of transparency in research