POL 130 Final Prompt 7: Security Dilemma and Bargaining model
The security dilemma and the bargaining model of war each argue that uncertainty is an important cause of war. But they differ in their views of how uncertainty causes conflict, and the exact type of uncertainty that leads to war. First, explain these differences. Second, evaluate what these theories mean for the likelihood of war on the Korean peninsula. Is conflict with North Korea more likely to result from security dilemma dynamics, or “bargaining failure” as predicted by the bargaining model?
Explain how the security dilemma and the bargaining model of war differ when it comes to how uncertainty causes conflict
explain how the security dilemma and the bargaining model of war differ when it comes to the exact type of uncertainty that leads to war
what do these theories mean for the likelihood of war on the Korean Peninsula- is it more likely to stem from security dilemma issues or from bargaining failure?
Security Dilemma: pgs 92,125
Bargaining model
Bargaining Model vs. Security Dilemma:
Role of Uncertainty
Security Dilemma: Uncertainty of intentions
Bargaining model: Uncertainty of power or resolve- assumes zero sum interaction
Incentives to misrepresent
You might think I'm overstating my power
Bluffing
But if not, you'll underestimate my strength/resolve
Private information
Impossible to anticipate result of conflict
"Mutual optimistic": both sides are confident/ conflict more likely
Unwilling to accept a wise bargain
"Tragic" conflict
war based on misperception, misunderstanding
20th century examples, 21st century concerns
Definition: a dilemma that arises when efforts that states make to defend themselves cause other states to feel less secure. This dilemma can lead to arms races and war due to fear of being attacked
Spiral of fear and insecurity
Shares realisms presumption that anarchy leads to a world in which military force is often threatened or used to further states interests, and conflicts are addressed through bargaining rather than through institutions like courts
Anticipates prevention and the fear of attack as two of several mechanisms that can lead to war
The security dilemma believes that its the uncertainty of intentions
Bargaining model of war believes that its the uncertainty regarding the power or resolve
So model believe that the cause of war comes from misunderstanding or misperceptions. Basically, when your rival country is building up its arms, you not sure if that because they want to attack you or if they're just trying to defend themselves so you're not sure what their intention is
on the other hand, the bargaining model of war believes that wars come from uncertainty regarding the rivals capabilities
the model assumes that war is the undesired outcome for both actors, and only under the correct conditions will war occur.
a bargaining disagreement over the allocation of resources.
it defines the cause of wars as a lack of information and a high level of uncertainty between actors, the process of fighting a war as a means to reveal information, and the consequence of war as revealed information, allowing for involved actors to adjust behaviors and motivations.[4]
Causes of war:
Uncertainty: An actor can overestimate his own abilities or the resolve of his opponent and start a war. This under- or overestimation is common throughout history. Hitler's march on Russia in 1941 was motivated by the correct assumption that the Russian forces were significantly weaker and worse organized than the German ones.[5]
Commitment Problems: an actor has a difficulty to commit to not use military strength in the future. A first-strike advantage may force an actor to begin a preemptive war, or the threat of being attacked may cause an actor to start a preventive war.
Indivisibility of a good: if actors believe that a certain good could not be divided but only controlled in its entirety they may go to war.
For the security dilemma, the fear of being attacked is enough to make the state engage in preemptive war
For the bargaining model, an actor can overestimate his own abilities or the resolve of his opponent and start a war.
hmm this is a good question: it works for bargaining model since there is a great deal of lack of info between NK and the US. NK might try to bluff about its capabilities and this might lead the US into a war
This could also work for security dilemma because NK is definitely building up its nuclear arms and its making the US very nervous
Only thing is that I don't think it would quite fit the definition for security dilemma because its not like we don't know what their intentions are. They've made that very clear
actually no, we really don't know. while some believe that NK is actually planning on attacking the US, many others say that the country is just trying to be taken more seriously and have other countries respect it and not mess with it
so we really don't know what their plan is
so yes there is a lot of uncertainty revolving around the issue, but what kind of uncertainty?
I think the answer is more so security dilemma than bargaining model because its much more likely that a war will start because we don't know of their motives than because we don't know how powerful they are/arent
The difference between the two is that the security dilemma believes that its the uncertainty of intentions that leads to war, while the bargaining model believes that its the uncertainty of power or resolve that leads to war. For SD, the fear of being attacked is enough to make the state engage in preemptive war. For BM, an actor was over estimate his ability and start a war. I think the answer is more so security dilemma than bargaining model because its much more likely that a war will start because we don't know of their motives than because we don't know how powerful they are/arent