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Amagasaki Train Accident April 25th 2005 (People (Train driver on third…
Amagasaki Train Accident April 25th 2005
People
Train driver on third delay penalty if late to Amagasaki station
Train driver 23 years old
Train driver driving with excessive speed
Approx. 700 passengers on train
Train driver pre-occupied with thoughts of potential disciplinary action
Train driver had 11 months experience as a driver
Train driver asked conductor to 'overlook' distance overshot at previous station
Train driver had already had to participate in re-education program (for 11-13 days, 3 weeks after starting as a driver)
Environment
Accident occurred just after local rush hour (Monday morning)
Culture of verbal abuse from management integral to re-education program (described as bullying)
Residential apartment building in vicinity of derailment
Weather clear and fine
Equipment
Seven car commuter train
Service brake, not emergency break applied by train driver just prior to derailment (maximum breaking power not applied)
207 series electric multiple unit train
Tight curves inherit to design in Japanese railways (curve at derailment location was 300m in radius)
No mechanical failure of braking system(s)
Cars constructed of light-weight stainless steel compared with heavier, older car construction
Breaking system (ATS) was older style of system in vicinity of Amagasaki station (considered less effective in stopping trains)
No system in place on Fukuchiyama line in vicinity of Amagasaki station to prevent drivers from speeding
Organisation
Strict protocols regarding train punctuality
Y50000 penalty applicable to driver for causing train delay
Congestion on Fukuchiyama line (linked to train speeds and company profits for Japan Railways West)
Cumulative changes had reduced leeway in schedule from 71 to 28 seconds between Amagasaki and Takarazuka
Driver re-education program as punishment for late drivers - including weeding and grass cutting duties (employees unaware of how long program will last for)
Use of emergency break required justification/reporting from train drivers to management
Process
Red light breach on-route resulted in ATS activation, stopping train (delay)
Train speed in excess of 120km/hr on curve, recommended speed was 60km/hr
Train had overshot stopping location at previous station, resulting in it being backed up into position (delay)
Express and local trains meeting on same side of platform allow commuters to transfer between at stations
No government assessment for train driver competency, only company assessments
No regulated distance between train lines and residential buildings in Japan
Train running 90 seconds behind schedule on approach to Amagasaki station