Please enable JavaScript.

Coggle requires JavaScript to display documents.

War in Syria (Timeline :check: (Current History :check: (Congress and War…

- - - - Over the course of 2012 and 2013, both congressional foreign affairs committees did hold a number of public hearings on Syria featuring administration figures and outside experts. But the latter constituted a rather narrow group; they tended to be former officials from Washington-based think tanks, nearly all of whom called for greater U.S. military support for the rebels :check:
        
        Less than a month later, the administration effectively preempted the committee's proposal for overt, controlled military aid by rolling out a program of its own, a covert CIA effort to arm and train the rebels. Reid never brought the committee's bill to the floor for a vote, and the committee never pressed him to. Bob Corker of Tennessee, its ranking Republican, complained that the administration's resort to covert methods was "leaving the public and most of Congress in the dark" and "effectively prevents any real debate about U.S. policy." He was right. :check:
        
        In August 2013, Assad's regime attacked civilians with chemical weapons, thus crossing what Obama had called a "redline" a year earlier. After preparing to unleash retaliatory air strikes, the administration made an about-face and sought congressional approval for an attack. Leaders of both parties indicated that they would support one, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the question that exclusively featured administration witnesses. But the public was not on board, and over the course of two weeks, constituents deluged their representatives with phone calls and letters opposing the attack. Then, just as the Republican-led House appeared on the verge of rejecting the president's plan (possibly along with the Democratic-led Senate), Russia swooped in with a diplomatic initiative for the disposal of Syria's chemical arsenal, and the administration accepted the offer :check:
        
        As the CIA ramped up its covert program—by June 2015, the agency had armed and trained 10,000 rebels at a cost approaching $1 billion a year—Congress confined its discussion of the program to secret sessions of the intelligence committees, which have a history of getting co-opted by presidents undertaking covert action. To this day, the House and the Senate have held no public debate over the CIA program. Nor have they held any such debate on other policy options, even as the administration has flitted between contemplating the establishment of no-fly zones and safe zones and launching negotiations for a political settlement that would eventually displace Assad. The foreign affairs committees, meanwhile, have paid declining attention to the civil war as their attention has shifted to the separate but related fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. :check:
  - - - Page 355-357 Another theme that recurred in the 2006 cable focusing on Syria's "vulnerabilities"
        and how the US should try to exploit them was that the US should take actions to try
        to destabilize the Syrian government by provoking it to "overreact," both internally
        and externally. One of the "vulnerabilities" of the Syrian government listed by
        Roebuck that the US should try to exploit was its "enormous irritation" with former
        Syrian vice president Abdul Halim Khaddam, leader of the opposition-in-exile
        National Salvation Front. Roebuck wrote:
        Vulnerability:
        THE KHADDAM FACTOR: Khaddam knows where the regime skeletons are
        hidden, which provokes enormous irritation from Bashar, vastly disproportionate
        to any support Khaddam has within Syria. Bashar Asad personally, and his
        regime in general, follow every news item involving Khaddam with tremendous
        emotional interest. The regime reacts with self-defeating anger whenever another
        Arab country hosts Khaddam or allows him to make a public statement through
        any of its media outlets.
        Roebuck proposed a means of exploiting this vulnerability:
        Possible Action:
        We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to allow Khaddam access
        to their media outlets, providing him with venues for airing the SARG's dirty
        laundry. We should anticipate an overreaction by the regime that will add to its
        isolation and alienation from its Arab neighbors. :check:
- - - - Media Conference Call: The Crisis in
        Syria-Robert Danin I think
        have to really think twice before we just say, you know, sort of, Assad going will lead to an inevitably better
        situation. Assad does have to go. There's no doubt. There's an agreement about that. But we also have to be
        mindful about what will happen the day after and to ensure that Syria not you
        know, that we not
        accelerate the descent into an even worse situation. :check:
        
        Building on Success-Joe Biden And we are aggressively pursuing a diplomatic settlement to produce a political transition in Syria— because not only is there no military solution to the conflict; there is also no way to end it so long as Bashar al-Assad remains in power. [do not use]
        
        Ridding Syria of a Despot-Elliott Abrams march 2011 Our
        principles alone should lead us to this position, but the memory of thousands of American soldiers killed in
        Iraq with the help of the Assad regime demands that we do all we can to help the Syrian people free
        themselves of that evil dictatorship. :check:
        
        Its Time to Think Seriously About Intervening in Syria-Steven A. Cook (CFR) Washington and the rest of the international community must come to grips with the idea of intervention in Syria or get used to the idea that Bashar al-Assad could stick around far longer than anyone expects. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/its-time-to-think-seriously-about-intervening-in-syria/251468/ :check:
        
        How to Weaken the Assad Regime-Frederic Hof (CFR) The top U.S. priority in Syria should be to "destroy or significantly degrade" the military's ability to fire on
        populated areas, no matter what type of munitions the Assad regime is using, says former U.S. special adviser
        on Syrian affairs Frederic C. Hof. Other goals for the United States and world powers, he says, should be
        ousting Assad and aiding the formation of a new government—one "as inclusive, representative, and
        nonsectarian as possible." :check:
        
        U.S. Led Airstrikes in Syria-Max Boot and Janine Davidson (CFR) There there
        has to be a much more serious campaign that would involve sending combat advisers to work
        with the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Iraqi security forces, the Sunni tribes and the Free Syrian Army, all of the
        proxy forces we're counting on to help fight ISIS...I think we also need to be launching, frankly, a direct American special operations effort of the kind that we
        previously carried out in Iraq, sending our Tier 1 highend
        special operations forces to target the ISIS
        network and degrade it in the way that they are so good at. [do not use]
        
        1 more item...
- - - - Ridding Syria of a Despot-Elliott Abrams march 2011 None of these steps will bring down Assad's regime; only the courage of young Syrians can do that. But we
        must not repeat the wavering and delays that characterized the U.S. response in Egypt. We must be clear
        that we view Syria's despicable regime as unsalvageable, which suggests a fifth step: recalling the American
        ambassador from Syria...We should pull our ambassador... we did pull him http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-closes-syria-embassy-pulls-all-staff/ :check: