Origins of WW2
Treaty of Versailles
Hitler
Appeasement policy of GB & Fr
28 Jun 19
Unfairly treated Ger to make war inevitable?
Ger lost 10% territory, made to pay war reparations & restricted to army of 100k
War guilt clause
Ger not biggest loser:
Hungary lost 60% territory & pop
Austria pay reparations, lost pop & prevented from uniting with Ger
Russ lost Ukraine, Belarus, Finland & Baltics
Post-war borders not settled
Polish/Russ war
Romania invaded Hungary
Lithuania seized Danzig
France occupied Rhineland
W border disputes often settled with plebiscites
League of Nations #
Criticised for failing to solve nationality issues
promised to maintain minority rights
Poland
Fatally flawed - Ger minority concentrated on W borders - large group of aggrieved migrants
Belorussian, Russian & Ukrainian minorities combined = larger minority that Germans
'31 70% pop Polish - significant majority esp when combined with Jew (10%) who were loyal if treated well
The peace - shows Ger willing to co-operate?
Dawes Plan '24: reduced reparations
Locarno Treaties '25 confirmed borders
Ger joined LoN '26
Kellogg-Briand Pact '28/'29 - renounced war as tool of foreign policy
Young Plan '29 further reduced reparations
Stresemann
Maintained desire to see elms of ToV changed
Wright:'hard-line stance to appease right wing elms?
'33 - '38
Traditional policy of Versailles revision through peaceful means?
Planning for armed aggression?
appeared willing to negotiate
expansion an expression of self determination:
Saar voted to become German
Sudetenland overwhelmingly German
Austria mostly German
Oct '38 aims achieved peacefully
issued threats
left LoN in '33
reintroduced conscription
intimated would use force against Czech
1933 - Ger 1 of 4 countries becoming more aggressive
Japan: invaded china '31; left LoN '33; Sino-Jap war '37
Italy: Invasion Abyssinia '35, overlooked by LoN 'cos support of preventing Anschluss
SU: prioritised exporting class warfare; intensified terror @ home
Mein Kampf '24
unification of all German territories & conquest for Lebensraum will make war necessary
can it be used as evidence for policies 10 yrs down the line?
foreign policy goals reiterated throughout '20's & 30's
hillgruber: clear intentions based on ideology - 2 wars; 1 distracting war in W; 1 long cherished race war in E
AJP Taylor: Hitler was opportunist; general war a mistake due to diplomatic blunders
Broszat: Hitler a weak dictator - left management to subordinates - policy came from subordinates trying to fulfill jobs
Kershaw: polycratic governance; subordinates trying to 'please' Hitler; enable Fuhrer myth & allowed Hitler to blame mistakes on subordinates
Hossbach Memorandum
plans based on opportunism
exploiting French weakness
relying on GB reluctance for war
'41 not a 'world war' - isolated to Eu
Pearl Harbour 7/8 Dec '41
Op Barbarossa 22 Jun '41
'long planned' race war?
ec pressures?
end war by ending GB last hope?
Koch
needed to secure resources & becoming threatened by Russ
Invasion of GB not poss - Russ GB's last hope
Bell (revisionist)
psychological reasons
WW1 casualty numbers & demographic deficit
arms comp & alliance led to WW1
ToV wronged Ger
fear of aerial bombardment
Strategic reasons
Defence stronger than attack - Fr relied on Maginot Line
GB threats to empire - appease one potential en
artificial barriers through over estimation of German forces
Economic reasons
Fr in depression in '30's
GB over-accelerating re-armament could undermine export-based ec
appeasement made sense at the time - few viable alternatives
Cato: weak culpable appeasement allowed Hitler to grow over-mighty
McDonough: middle ground - post revisionist
Chamberlain framed conditions that made appeasement necessary
encourage Fr unwillingness to fight
masked Hitlers aggressiveness to public
discouraged SU from taking threat seriously
rearmament could have been accelerated