Wilson- because we cannot tell the difference between waking and dreaming, whatever state we might actually be in, we can doubt it as it could be dreaming.
By the same logic we could be waking so because we cannot tel the difference we have no reason to doubt
Not adequate grounds to doubt, for the fact they are indistinguishable does not make them actually equally as dubitable. It allows us to doubt, but does not does not make the two states actually doubtable
To speak of the two states as doubtable is nonsensical as one must be true for the other to be dubitable, thus unless the subject ius willing to entertain a logical impossibility, the subject cannot entertain such doubt
All rests on the assumption that being able to doubt something is the same as thing actually being dubitable
Descartes fundamental assumption in the method for doubt must be that doubting means more than just a subjective disposition towards the possible truth or falsity of something. Doubt must itself have some ontological import, for if doubt can only be a subjective disposition then it makes no sense to actually believe that the world does not actually exist. Thus dauler wilson’s argument worls but makes doubt a contigent disposition rather than a solid ground for skepticism