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The Question of Terrorism (The Present: An Expansive Position? (III: The…

- - - - US attacks in Afghanistan: i. The United States was attacked by Al-Qaeda.
        ii. Al-Qaeda operated and trained its operatives in territory occupied by the
        Taleban,
        iii. The Taleban, despite being the illegitimate government of Afghanistan,
        was a threat to international peace and security.
        iv. Therefore, the United States was entitled to attack Afghanistan, in selfdefence,
        in order to remove the continued threat to peace and security
        created by the Taleban’s harbouring and tolerance of Al-Qaeda.
        
        The difficulties with these loosened links are obvious: they create entire classes of people as ‘enemy
        aliens’; it allows for the condemnation of entire groups, whether by terrorist attackers, or by those
        who seek to repress terrorism; and it relies on military authorities rather than police and
        intelligence work, which might be more tailored to resist terrorist activity.
        Yet the broader practice has begun to find favour with other States: Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan,
        in particular, have all adopted similar lines of reasoning as the United States: they have suggested
        that so long as armed reactions to terrorism are necessary and proportionate, they have the right
        to invoke self-defence against terrorist activities fomented by non-State actors, and use force
        against States that are harbouring terrorists (passive acquiescence to terrorist activity), and certain
        if the harbouring States provide protection or material assistance to terrorists. See Tams (pp. 379-
        81) for a list of State practice, where States have invoked such grounds for using force (the United
        States, Iran, Russia, Colombia), or have claimed such a right (Russia, Australia, the African
        Union’s defence pact, and the United States’ ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre-emptive self-defence against
        non-imminent threats) (see Lowe, p. 191, for the relevant extracts).