The difficulties with these loosened links are obvious: they create entire classes of people as ‘enemy
aliens’; it allows for the condemnation of entire groups, whether by terrorist attackers, or by those
who seek to repress terrorism; and it relies on military authorities rather than police and
intelligence work, which might be more tailored to resist terrorist activity.
Yet the broader practice has begun to find favour with other States: Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan,
in particular, have all adopted similar lines of reasoning as the United States: they have suggested
that so long as armed reactions to terrorism are necessary and proportionate, they have the right
to invoke self-defence against terrorist activities fomented by non-State actors, and use force
against States that are harbouring terrorists (passive acquiescence to terrorist activity), and certain
if the harbouring States provide protection or material assistance to terrorists. See Tams (pp. 379-
81) for a list of State practice, where States have invoked such grounds for using force (the United
States, Iran, Russia, Colombia), or have claimed such a right (Russia, Australia, the African
Union’s defence pact, and the United States’ ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre-emptive self-defence against
non-imminent threats) (see Lowe, p. 191, for the relevant extracts).