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W11- studies (interlocking directorate occurs in business board of…
W11- studies
interlocking directorate occurs in business board of directors
Legitimacy
Legitimacy may be a prerequisite for securing of resources discussed in the previous section.
Career advancement
Interlocks occurs between organization, but they are created by individuals
Cooptation and monitoring
Profitability (or lack of profitability) drives interlocks.
Cooptation- as the absorption of potentially disruptive elements into an organization’s decision making structure.
Social Cohesion
Interlocks reflected both interorganizational and intraclass ties.
Even ties developed for organizational purposes could have the consequence of facilitating interfirm political unity.
Collusion
Within industry interlocks continue to occur suggests that some interlocks may restrict competition.
It was common for several firms within industries to share directors.
How and why do interlocks form?
Outside directors- primary affiliation are with organizations other than the focal firm.
Inside directors- primary affiliation with the firm and usually include the firm’s CEO and other top officers.
Interlocks are created by both inside and outside directors.
Information and Innovation
Between State Power and Familism
1960~1980s
(KMT State involvement)
The institutional environment was heavily regulated by the government.
To restrict institutional environment was the regulation of company law, aimed to promote market stability and economic security.
The market was highly politicized: firms were selected, protected, sponsored and, in many cases, owned by the government.
multiple relations is very high
1980
(economic liberalization)
Companies came from the textile industry
Emerging indigenous entrepreneurs in the pet- non-chemical and heavy industries.
Indigenous companies that inherited the profits of the Japanese colonial era.
familism”to become the most important
1941~1960s
(Japanese colonial period)
Japan directly invested in selected industries for development and actively lobbying companies based in Japan and Taiwan to invest in those same industries.
Some Taiwanese were built on collaborating with the colonial government, allowing them to become part of the colonial elite.
Japan selected certain industries due to the policy of improvement the infrastructural (ex: Sugar, textiles)
1990-2000
(Network from consolidation to prvatization)
The state has receded from its dominant position in the network; it is no longer is a crucial player in shaping the network structure
liberalization rising, network became less dense over time, but the networks of private company directors became sparser and more rapidly than those of directors of state-owned enterprises.
Taiwan’s corporate networks do not completely conform to the ‘financial hegemony’ model, in which financial conglomerates make up the core.