classical concepts

a) know classical view of concepts + illustrate their psychological role with regard to categorization

concept = broad class of representations that are presumably tied in some way to mentalese description
-- (1) may be downstream from sensory imagery, non-modal rather than specific to vision
-- (2) may be accepted by dual coding views

b) know Fodor's criticism that definitions must come to an end + utilize ideas about compositionality and semantic primitives

classical: concepts have a definitional structure


definition game: tell me what it is, define it, then try to give better definition

prototype: concepts are statistical averages

theory-theory: concepts are mini theories

atomism: concepts have no internal structure

psychological roles of concepts

categorization: use concepts to think of an object under a category or class or kind


eg. Fred under the category <human>, <male>, <janitor>

learning: use concepts when we acquire new information // add new features to mental definitions (eg. suppose we learn that janitor is mathematician -- the mind adds <mathematician> to the defining list for <Fred> = <human, male, janitor>

reasoning: use concepts to move from one representation to another // inferences from one definition to another

definitional structure

structure of a classical concept = a list of features that are individually necessary & jointly sufficient for its application

the mind checks X against the definitional list of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions -- to see whether the concept applies


eg. if X falls under <Bachelor>, X must satisfy the definition <adult>, <male>, <unmarried>

Fodor's criticism

the definitional story must come to an end with a set of basic/atomic concepts in terms of which the other complex/molecular concepts are define


we cant keep adding new definitions


eg. <Bachelor> = <Adult, male, unmarried> but what about definition of <Male>? <-- this decomposition cannot continue ad infinitum --> therefore there must be a different theory for the atomic components

c) know Wittgenstein's critique -- many concepts do not have classical definitions + illustrate with either the concept <GAME> or <BACHELOR>

<GAME>


= <Competition Against Others>?


not sufficient (war, mating)
not necessary (solitaire, patience)

= <winning or losing>


not sufficient (war, divorce)
not necessary (pitch and catch)

= <amusement>?


not sufficient (comedy)
not necessary (bob knight basketball)

How should we explain to someone what a game is?

we should describe games to him, and we might add: 'this and similar things are called games' ad do we know any more about it ourselves? we do not know the boundaries b/c non have been drawn

d) explain how classical theory is challenged by the way people use concepts in contemplating counterfactual situation

people apply concepts to counterfactual situations where the classical theory's defining features don't apply

eg. suppose <Moses> = <speak to god>, <lead Israel from Egypt>


we would still refer to the man as Moses even if we were to find out that he never spoke to god, led Israel, etc.

eg. or suppose someone else did these things, say Fred


we wouldn't call Fred 'Moses' on that account

Kripke offered a causal theory of direct reference -- whereby the semantic value of name is the referent, not some description