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classical concepts (a) know classical view of concepts + illustrate their…
classical concepts
a) know classical view of concepts + illustrate their psychological role with regard to categorization
classical: concepts have a definitional structure
definition game: tell me what it is, define it, then try to give better definition
definitional structure
structure of a classical concept = a list of features that are individually necessary & jointly sufficient for its application
the mind checks X against the definitional list of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions -- to see whether the concept applies
eg. if X falls under <Bachelor>, X must satisfy the definition <adult>, <male>, <unmarried>
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c) know Wittgenstein's critique -- many concepts do not have classical definitions + illustrate with either the concept <GAME> or <BACHELOR>
<GAME>
= <Competition Against Others>?
not sufficient (war, mating)
not necessary (solitaire, patience)
= <winning or losing>
not sufficient (war, divorce)
not necessary (pitch and catch)
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b) know Fodor's criticism that definitions must come to an end + utilize ideas about compositionality and semantic primitives
Fodor's criticism
the definitional story must come to an end with a set of basic/atomic concepts in terms of which the other complex/molecular concepts are define
we cant keep adding new definitions
eg. <Bachelor> = <Adult, male, unmarried> but what about definition of <Male>? <-- this decomposition cannot continue ad infinitum --> therefore there must be a different theory for the atomic components
d) explain how classical theory is challenged by the way people use concepts in contemplating counterfactual situation
people apply concepts to counterfactual situations where the classical theory's defining features don't apply
eg. suppose <Moses> = <speak to god>, <lead Israel from Egypt>
we would still refer to the man as Moses even if we were to find out that he never spoke to god, led Israel, etc.
eg. or suppose someone else did these things, say Fred
we wouldn't call Fred 'Moses' on that account
Kripke offered a causal theory of direct reference -- whereby the semantic value of name is the referent, not some description
concept = broad class of representations that are presumably tied in some way to mentalese description
-- (1) may be downstream from sensory imagery, non-modal rather than specific to vision
-- (2) may be accepted by dual coding views