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THE SUCCESSFUL FAILURE: THE FLIGHT OF APOLLO 13 (WORKPLACES (WORK…
THE SUCCESSFUL FAILURE:
THE FLIGHT OF APOLLO 13
PEOPLE
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
FATIGUE
MENTAL
HIGH WORKLOAD
STRESSFUL SITUATION
WORKING WITH THE UNKNOWN
IMPROVISING ON THE JOB WITH NEWLY DEVISED PROCEDURES
EMOTIONAL EFFECTS
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
DECREASED ABILITY TO DEAL WITH ADVERSITY
FRUSTRATION AND INTERPERSONAL CHALLENGES
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
PHYSICAL
LACK OF SLEEP
COLD
38 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
(3 DEGREES CELSIUS)
CONDENSATION ON INSIDE OF SPACECRAFT
STRESSFUL SITUATION
CIRCADIAN DYSSYCHRONY
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
ACCOUSTIC NOISE
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
SCHEDULED SLEEP PERIODS PRIOR TO EXPLOSION
MONITORED BY FLIGHT SURGEON
GENERAL
AFFECTS PERFORMANCE
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
AGE
MISSION CONTROL OPERATORS MOSTLY YOUNG PROFESSIONALS IN THEIR EARLY TO MID-THIRTIES
(HUTCHINSON 2012D)
GENE KRANZ 32 YEARS OLD DURING APOLLO 13
(HUTCHNSON 2012D)
HEALTH
STRONG AND HEALTHY ASTRONAUTS
ASTRONAUTS MONITORED BY BIO-MONITORS
FED TO MISSION CONTROL DOCTOR
FLIGHT MEDICALS
NORMAL PHYSIOLOGY, ABNORMAL ENVIRONMENT
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
PHYSIOLOGICAL CHANGES DUE TO MICROGRAVITY
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
MUSCLE ATROPHY (LOSS OF
MUSCLE MASS AND STRENGTH)
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
20% DECREASE OVER 2 WEEKS
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
SUB-OPTIMAL NUTRITION
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
STRESS
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
EXPERIENCE MUSCLE TIGHTNESS AND
SORENESS ON RETURN TO EARTH
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
RE-DISTRIBUTION OF BODILY FLUIDS IN MICROGRAVITY
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
ACCLIMATISATION TO NEW ENVIRONMENT
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
KEN MATTINGLY ORIGIANALY ON PRIME
CREW BUT EXPOSED TO GERMAN MEASLES.
PULLED FROM CREW 2-3 DAYS BEFORE LAUNCH
REPLACED BY BACK UP CREW MEMBER
JACK SWIGERT
POSSIBLE MILD HYPOXIA DUE
TO LOW OXYGEN, HIGH CO2
ENVIRONMENT
VETRAN MILITARY JET PILOTS TRAINED TO DEAL WITH THE BEGINNINGS OF HYPOXIA
SPACE SICKNESS
USUALLY OCCURS IN FIRST 1-2 DAYS OF FLIGHT
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
NO 'UP OR DOWN' IN SPACE / MICROGRAVITY
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
AFFECTS PERFORMANCE, ESPECIALLY AT THE START AND END OF MISSIONS WHEN THE CHANGES ARE MOST EXTREME
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
DEHYDRATION DUE TO LACK OF WATER
LOVELL LOST 14 POUNDS (7 KGS)
CREW LOST TOTAL OF 31.5 POUNDS (15.5 KGS)
RATIONED WATER INTAKE TO 1/5 OF NORMAL INTAKE
DRANK FRUIT JUICES AND ATE WET-PACKED
FOOD TO INCREASE FLUID INTAKE
APOLLO PROGRAM RECORD WEIGHT LOSS
ORGAN DAMAGE
LONG-TERM HEALTH EFFECTS?
MENTAL HEALTH
POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
ASTRONAUTS' FAMILY AND FRIENDS
ASTRONAUTS' CO-WORKERS
ASTRONAUTS
PHYSICAL HEALTH
PHYSICAL STRESSORS FROM
THE ENVIRONMENT
BREATHING COLD AIR
POOR DIET/MALNUTRITION
DAMAGE TO INTERNAL ORGANS DUE
TO CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
HYGIENE
ABILITY TO SEPARATE WASTE FROM PEOPLE
EXPOSURE TO BACTERIA
EXPOSURE TO UNPLEASANT SMELLS
CULTURE
NASA - GET IT DONE ATTITUDE
POSITIVE CULTURE
SAFETY CULTURE
AWARE OF RISKS INVOLVED
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
MILITARY PILOTS
RISK VS. REWARD FOR ASTRONAUTS
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
SIMULATOR TESTING OF PROCEDURES
ADAPTATION OF DESIGNS AFTER INCIDENTS
I.E. OXYGENATION, WIRING, FLAMMABLE MATERIALS, HATCH DESIGN ETC. AFTER THE APOLLO 1 FIRE
RISK NOT IGNORED, BUT MANAGED
(DICK AND COWLING 2004 IN GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009).
COMPANY/DEPARTMENT CULTURE
PIONEERING CULTURE
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
SUCCESSFUL IMPROVISATION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
EMPLOYEES ENCOURAGED TO THINK LATERALLY
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
CREATE SOLUTIONS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
EMPLOYEES OPTIMISTIC ABOUT FINDING SOLUTIONS TO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, NOVEL SOLUTIONS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
GOALS
RETURN THE ASTRONAUTS SAFELY TO EARTH
CALCULATE REQUIRED ENGINE BURNS FOR TRAJECTORY UPDATES
COMMUNICATE PARAMETERS FOR ENGINE BURNS TO ASTRONAUTS
RECOVERY OF ASTRONAUTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE UPON LANDING/SPLASH-DOWN
DETERMINE A COURSE OF ACTION TO ADDRESS LOWERING OXYGEN AVAILABILITY
APOLLO PROGRAM AS A WHOLE "ONEOF THE MOST AMBITIOUS AND COSTLY SINGLE PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES IN PEACETIME"
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
COMPLETE MISSION OBJECTIVES
ATTENTION
ATTENTION SPAN DIMINISHED BY FATIGUE
NASA ENGINEERS MAINTAIN ATTENTION IN STRESSFUL SITUATION
ASTRONAUTS MAINTAIN ATTENTION IN DIFFICULT PHYSICAL AND MENTAL SITUATION
INITIALLY, LITTLE INTEREST IN
ANOTHER MISSION TO THE MOON
WORLD WATCHING THROUGH
THE MEDIA IN ANTICIPATION OF
SAFE RETURN OF ASTRONAUTS
KAUFFMAN 2001
INTEREST IN THE SPLASHDOWN ON TELEVISION AND RADIO SURPASSED THAT OF THE ACTUAL APOLLO 11 MOON LANDING
KAUFFMAN 2001
TV STATIONS DIDNT BROADCAST
LIVE INTERVIEW WITH CREW IN SPEACE
RADIO BROADCASTS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE TELEVISION
KAUFFMAN 2001
NEUROVESTIBULAR ACCLIMATIONS
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
AFFECTS PERFORMANCE, ESPECIALLY AT THE START AND END OF MISSIONS WHEN THE CHANGES ARE MOST EXTREME
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
EXPECTATIONS
MISSION CONTROL
"FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION"
(WIKIPEDIA 2017; HOWARD 1995)
MISSION CONTROL
ENGINEERS
ASTONAUTS
PERFECTION
(WIKIPEDIA 2017)
SPACE A HIGH RISK ENVIRONMENT; ONE SMALL MISTAKE OR FAILURE CAN KILL
CREW
MISSION CONTROL WOULD GET 'RESCUE' PLAN TO THEM WITH ENOUGH TIME TO PERFORM REQUIRED MANOUVERS
ENVIRONMENT CHANGES DURING EVENT (I.E. COLD)
GET HOME TO FAMILY AND FRIENDS, CO -WORKERS
POSSIBLITY THEY WOULD PERISH
FAMILY AND FRIENDS
RETURN THE ASTRONAUTS TO EARTH SAFELY
NASA MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION/REGULAR UPDATES
NASA WILL DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE ANY MISSION
WORLD WATCHING
STRESS
PHYSICAL
ASTRONAUTS
PHYSIOLOGICAL
NEUROVESTIBULAR ACCLIMATIONS AFFECTS PERFORMANCE, ESPECIALLY AT THE START AND END OF MISSIONS WHEN THE CHANGES ARE MOST EXTREME
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
PRONE TO BACTERIAL AND VIRAL INFECTIONS
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
PSYCHOSOCIAL
TIME CRITICAL, MAJOR CONSEQUENCE
OPERATIONAL SETTING
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
SPACE-FLIGHT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
PHYSICAL SEPARATION FROM FAMILY
(ASTRONAUT AND THEIR FAMILY)
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
MISSION CONTROL
FAMILY AND FRIENDS
ASTRONAUT SPOUSE TAKES ON FULL FAMILY
AND HOUSEHOLD RESPONSIBILITIES
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
PHYSICAL SEPARATION FROM FAMILY
(ASTRONAUT AND THEIR FAMILY)
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
PROLONGED STRESS ASSOCIATED WITH ASTRONAUT TRAINING REGIME AND RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THE JOB
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
EMOTIONAL
FAMILY AND FRIENDS
PROLONGED TRAINING REGIME
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
PHYSICAL SEPARATION FROM FAMILY
(ASTRONAUT AND THEIR FAMILY)
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
WORRY DUE TO NATURE OF SPACE TRAVEL
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
MISSION CONTROL
ASTRONAUTS
KNOWLEDGE
APOLLO 13 ASTRONAUTS
HIGHLY TRAINED MILITARY PERSONNEL
(I.E. AIRFORCE/NAVY TEST PILOTS)
(NASA 1983, NASA 1987, NASA 1994, NASA 1996)
JOHN 'JACK' L. SWIGERT JR
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
1953
MASTER OF SCIENCE
AEROSPACE SCIENCE
1965
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
1967
US AIR FORCE PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM
1953-1956
FIGHTER PILOT
JAPAN AND KOREA
1956
MEMBER
CONNECTICUT AIR NATIONAL GUARD
1960-1965
ENGINEERING TEST PILOT
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION INC.
ENGINEERING TEST PILOT
PRATT AND WHITNEY
1957-1964
JET FIGHTER PILOT
MASSACHUSETTS AIR NATIONAL GUARD
1957-1960
RECRUITED AS NASA ASTRONAUT
1966
ASTRONAUT SUPPORT CREW - APOLLO 7
APOLLO 13 BACK UP CREW
PROMOTED TO APOLLO 13 PRIME CREW 3 DAYS BEFORE LAUNCH
1970
JAMES 'JIM' A. LOVELL JR
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
TEST PILOT, NAVAL AIR TEST CENTRE
AVIATION SAFETY SCHOOL GRADUATE
BACKUP CREW ON GEMINI 4 AND 9
PRIME CREW GEMINI 7
COMMANDER GEMINI 12
COMMAND MODULE PILOT AND NAVIGATOR - APOLLO 8
FIRST CREW TO ORBIT THE MOON
COMMANDER APOLLO 13
FIRST MAN TO JOURNEY TO THE
MOON TWICE (BUT NEVER LANDING)
RECRUITED AS NASA ASTRONAUT
1966
'VETERAN' ASTRONAUT WHOSE EXPERIENCE WAS CRUCIAL IN THE SUCCESS OF APOLLO 13
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
THOMAS K. 'KEN' MATTINGLY II
ASTRONAUT REP-RESENTATIVE
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF THE APOLLO SPACESUIT AND BACKPACK (EMU)
COMMAND MODULE PILOT
PRIME CREW APOLLO 13
REMOVED FROM FLIGHT STATUS 72 HOURS BEFORE LAUNCH OF APOLLO 13 DUE TO EXPOSURE TO GERMAN MEASLES
RECRUITED AS NASA ASTRONAUT
1966
PILOT SERVING ON USS FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT
1963-1965
PILOT SERVING ABOARD USS SARATOGA
1960-1963
RECIEVED WINGS
1960
BEGAN NAVAL CAREER (ENSIGN)
1958
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE
AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING
1958
ASSISTED IN DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR RE-ENTRY STARTUP OF THE COMMAND MODULE WITH LIMITED POWER SUPPLY
ASTRONAUT SUPPORT CREW
APOLLO 8 AND APOLLO 11
FRED W. HAISE JR
FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR PILOT
OKLAHOMA AIR NATIONAL GUARD
1957-1959
GRADUATE OF AEROSPACE RESEARCH PILOT SCHOOL
1961-1962
TACTICS AND ALL WEATHER FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR
US NAVY ADVANCED TRAINING COMMAND
PUBLISHED ACADEMIC ARTICLES BASED ON RESEARCH
US MARINE CORPS
FIGHTER PILOT
1954-1956
RESEARCH PILOT
NASA LEWIS RESEARCH CENTRE
1959-1963
NAVAL AVIATION CADET
1952
RESEARCH PILOT
NASA FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTRE
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE (HONOURS)
IN AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING
1959
RECRUITED AS NASA ASTRONAUT
1966
BACK UP CREW FOR APOLLO 8 AND 11
1969-1969
LUNAR MODULE PILOT APOLLO 13
1970
US AIRFORCE TACTICAL FIGHTER PILOT
1961-1962
MILITARY BACKGROUND ENSURED A DEGREE OF CALM UNDER SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
FAMILY AND FRIENDS
AWARE OF WHAT CAN GO WRONG
PUTTING PRESSURE ON NASA STAFF TO FIND OUT WHAT IS GOING ON/PROSPECTS FOR SAFE RETURN
CONTACT WITH NASA MEDIA PERSONNEL
LIVE RADIO STREAM FROM THE SPACECRAFT - COULD HEAR WHAT HAPPENED AS IT WAS HAPPENING
STRESS ON FAMILY
STRESS ON NASA PERSONNEL
MEDIA COVERAGE
MISSION CONTROL
NASA ENGINEERS
HIGHLY SKILLED, QUALIFIED,
UNIVERSITY EDUCATED
SOME PHD QUALIFIED
VARIED SKILL SETS
PILOTS
PRACTISE REMAINING CALM IN STRESSFUL SITUATIONS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
ENGINEERS (ELECTRICAL,
AERONAUTICAL, STRUCTURAL ETC)
MEDICAL DOCTORS
MEDIA
COMMUNICATIONS
CHEMISTS
FELLOW ASTRONAUTS
MANAGEMENT
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
MILITARY
PRACTISE REMAINING CALM IN STRESSFUL SITUATIONS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
SPECIFIC OPERATOR FOR EACH MONITORING
AREA IN MISSION CONTROL
FIRST ROW
NASA HQ
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
(USUALLY A MILITARY GENERAL)
PAO - PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
DFO - DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS
SECOND ROW
INCO - INSTRUMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
O&P - ORGANISATION AND PROCEDURES
FLIGHT - FLIGHT DIRECTOR AND ASSISTANT FLIGHT DIRECTOR
FAO - FLIGHT ACTIVITIES OFFICER
NETWORK - NETWORK CONTROLLER
THIRD ROW
TELMU - TELEMETRY, ELECTRICAL AND EVA MOBILITY UNIT (LM EECOM)
GNC - GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL
EECOM - ELECTRICAL, ENVIRONMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
CAPCOM - CAPSULE CONTROLLER
SURGEON - LIFE SYSTEMS OPERATOR/FLIGHT SURGEON
CONTROL - LM GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION
FOURTH ROW
RETRO - RETROFIRE OFFICER
FDO - FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICER
BOOSTER - BOOSTER SYSTEMS ENGINEER
GUIDO - GUIDANCE OFFICER
LARGER CONTINGENT OF PERSONNEL IN BACK ROOMS TO REVIEW DATA AND PROVIDE FEEDBACK
TO THE MISSION CONTROL OPERATOR
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
USUALLY GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
WORKED AS A DEDICATED TEAM,
NEVER ADVERSARIAL
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
TEAM EXTENSIVELY TRAINED
FOR SPACE MISSIONS
SIMULATED TRAINING
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
PRACTICED IMPROVISATION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
PRACTISE REMAINING CALM
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
EFFECTIVE
COMMUNICATORS
ABLE TO NEGOTIATE REQUIREMENTS BETWEEN ALL MISSION CONTROLLERS/OPERATORS TO POWER UP THE COMMAND MODULE
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
COMMON GOAL
MONITOR INFORMATION, AND COMMUNICATE INFORMATION VERBALLY OR WRITTEN TO FLIGHT DIRECTOR (HUTCHINS 2012B)
FLIGHT DIRECTOR
(WIKIPEDIA 2017)
GENE KRANZ
BEGAN AT WORKING AT NASA AS A MISSION CONTROL PROCEDURES OFFICER FOR UNMANNED MERCURY MISSIONS (MERCURY 3 AND 6)
MERGED MURCURY MISSION CONTROL WITH LAUNCH CONTROL (IN SEPARATE LOCATIONS)
WROTE THE 'GO, NO GO' PROCEDURES FOR LIFT-OFF
SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR BETWEEN CAPE CANAVERAL AND NUMEROUS TRACKING STATIONS WORLD WIDE
COMPLETED THIS ROLE FOR FIRST MANNED SPACE FLIGHTS
RESEARCHER FOR SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES FOR US AIR FORCE
ASSISTANT FLIGHT
DIRECTOR (1962)
MERCURY MISSIONS X2
GEMINI MISSIONS X3
QUALIFIED AERONAUTICAL ENGINEER (1954)
FLIGHT DIRECTOR LEVEL
GEMINI 4 (1965)
APOLLO MISSIONS 5, 7, 9, 11 AND 13
ON DUTY FOR APOLLO 11 WHEN IT LANDED ON THE MOON
LEAD FLIGHT DIRECTOR ON APOLLO 13
1 more item...
US AIR FORCE PILOT (1955)
EXTENSIVE TRAINING AND KNOWLEDGE
OF THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT
COMPILED INDEXED HANDBOOKS OF EVERY
COMPONENT OF THE SPACECRAFT
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
EFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
1 more item...
DECISIONS CLEARLY COMMUNICATED
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
UNDERSTANDING OF SYSTEMS AND
PROBLEMS AT A DEEP LEVEL
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
EFFECTIVE CRISIS RECOGNITION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
EFFECTIVE DELEGATION OF TASKS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
2 more items...
RELENTLESS IN PREPARATION "PREPARED FOR ANYTHING"; DEVOURED MANUALS AND PROCEDURES; "HE DIDNT WAIT TO LEARN IT, HE KNEW IT AHEAD OF TIME".
(LIEBERGOT IN HUTCHINSON 2012D)
MILITARY EXPERIENCE ALLOWED HIM TO STAY CALM UNDER EXTREME PRESSURE
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
PREVIOUS FLIGHT DIRECTOR AND PREVIOUS MISSION CONTROL EXPERIENCE AIDS CLAMNESS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
ULTIMATE AUTHORITY
OVER ENTIRE MISSION
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
"TAKE ANY ACTION NECESSARY FOR
CREW SAFETY AND MISSION SUCCESS"
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
NASA MANAGEMENT
HIGHEST RANKING OFFICIALS REPRESENTED THE AGENCY DURING THE CRISIS
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
DEKE SLAYTON, DIRECTO OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS, MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTRE
CHRIS KRAFT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTRE
S. A. SJOBERG, DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS
JAMES A. MCDIVITT, APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTOR
NEIL ARMSTRONG, ASTRONAUT AND FIRST MAN ON THE MOON, CHIEF SPOKESPERSON AT ONE OF THE PRESS BRIEFINGS
THOMAS PAINE, NASA ADMINISTRATOR
CLEAR LINES OF AUTHORITY
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
LIKLEY AIDED BY THE STRONG MILITARY
BACKGROUND OF MANY OF THE PERSONNEL
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
LEGITIMISATION
OF IMPROVISATION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
PERMISSION TO IMPROVISE IN THE FLIGHT DIRECTORS JOB DESCRIPTION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
STRIP POLICY
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
ALL MISSION CONTROL PERSONNEL HAD TO STAY WOTHIN 30MINS OF MISSION CONTROL IN CASE OF EMERGENCY
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
RECRUITMENT STRATEGY
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
ABILITY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH RISK
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
SECTIONS OF TEST PILOTS AND ENGINEERS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
THINK LATERALLY IN CRISIS SITUATIONS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
MOSTLY WITH A
MILITARY BACKGROUND
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
GROUP COHESIVENESS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
GENERAL PUBLIC
DIFFICULT TO CONVEY SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
ATTITUDE
NASA
UNDIVIDED WILLINGNESS TO TAKE LARGE RISKS THAT GIVE WAY TO MAJOR INNOVATIONS
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
'FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION' - THE TRUE NATURE OF MISSION CONTROL'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS APOLLO 13 (WIKIPEDIA 2017)
STRONG INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
AND TEAM CULTURE BETWEEN MISSION CONTROLLERS
AND BACK ROOM OPERATORS (USUALLY CONTRACTORS)
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
BACK ROOM OPERATORS PRAISED WHEN IDENTIFIED FAULTS DURING SIMULATION TRAINING SESSIONS
ALWAYS GIVEN THE CREDIT THEY DESERVED.
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
MISSION CONTROL OPERATORS WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY WHEN BACK ROOM OPERATORS MADE AN ERROR
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
PUBLIC
LOST INTEREST AFTER
APOLLO 11 MOON LANDING
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
US CITIZEN LABELLED APOLLO 12
MOON LANDING AS 'OLD HAT'
(CHAIKEIN IN DICK AND LAUNIUS, 2007 IN GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
PUBLIC LACKED ENTHUSIASM
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
COVERAGE OF PROGRAM TECHNICALLY-FOCUSSED
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
GOVERNMENT
MILITARY
NAVY CHANGED FOCUS TO LOW-EARTH ORBIT RATHER THAN 'DEEP' SPACE
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT NOT WORTH THE COST
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
CONGRESS / PRESIDENT
SUPPORTIVE IN EARLY DAYS
(LATE 1950'S TO 1968)
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
CHANGE IN ADMISITRATION BETWEEN KENNEDY/JOHNSON AND NIXON REDUCED ENTHUSIASM
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
NEW ADMINISTRATION REDUCED BUDGET
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
BUDGET PEAKED IN 1966
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
ACADEMIA
RELEVANCE OF SPACE PROGRAM TO SOCIETY IN RELATION TO COST
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
DATA ONLY ADVANCING RESEARCH OF A SMALL PROPORTION OF SCIENTISTS
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
SUPPORTIVE OF PROGRAM UNTIL AROUND 1970
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
FUNDING, OTHER THAN THOSE ATTACHED TO MEDICAL RESEARCH IN SPACE, WERE 'INDIFFERENT TO SOCIAL WELFARE'
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
INGENUITY
DEVISING PLANS TO RESCUE THE CREW OF APOLLO 13 WITH ONLY RADIO AND LIMITED VIDEO CONTACT (WIKIPEDIA 2017)
ADAPTED TO THE SITUATION
DETERMINED NEW PROCEDURES IN SIMULATORS
TO ADDRESS THE SITUATION
IMPROVISATION: "NEARNESS IN TIME BETWEEN PLANNING AND EXECUTION"
(CHELARIU
ET. AL.
2001; MOORMAN AND MINOR, 1998 IN GROTAN
ET. AL.
, 2008)
SUCCESSFUL IMPROVISATION
(GROTAN
ET. AL.
, 2008)
MORE FLEXIBLE BEHAVIOUR (I.E. CREATIVITY)
(GROTAN
ET. AL.
, 2008)
SUFFICIENT AND RELEVANT EXPERTISE
(GROTAN
ET. AL.
, 2008)
TEAMWORK QUALITY
(GROTAN
ET. AL.
, 2008)
HIGH LEVEL OF REAL-TIME INFORMATION
(GROTAN
ET. AL.
, 2008)
PERSONNEL SUITABLE
(GROTAN
ET. AL.
, 2008)
SUFFICIENT TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT
(GROTAN
ET. AL.
, 2008)
ORGANISATIONAL SUPPORT OF IMPROVISING
(GROTAN
ET. AL.
, 2008)
VALUES
TOUGH
FOREVER ACCOUNTABLE FOR WHAT WE DO OR FAIL TO DO. NEVER COMPROMISE RESPONSILBILITY - THE KRANZ DICTUM POST APOLLO 1 (WIKIPEDIA 2017)
COMPETENT
NEVER TAKE ANYTHING FOR GRANTED; NEVER BE SHORT ON KNOWLEDGE OR SKILL - KRANZ DICTUM POST APOLLO 1 (WIKIPEDIA 2017)
STRENGTH
MENTAL STRENGTH
ASTRONAUTS
ISOLATION
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
CONFINEMENT
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
FAMILIES
MISSION CONTROL
PHYSICAL STRENGTH
MUSCLE STRENGTH DECREASES BY 20% IN 2 WEEKS
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
WORKPLACES
WORK ENVIRONMENT
LIGHTING
SPACECRAFT
NEAR DARKNESS
CONTRIBUTES TO BONE DEMINERALISATION
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
LACK OF VITAMIN D FROM THE SUN
OCCURS IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL IN SPACE
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
POWER CONSERVATION
BRIGHT FLASHES OF LIGHT ASSOCIATED WITH PLASMA AT ATMOSPHERIC RE-ENTRY
BACKLIT BUTTONS ON CONTROL PANELS
DIFFERENT COLOURED BUTTONS FOR DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS
DIFFERENT SHAPED BUTTONS FOR DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS
ARTIFICIAL LIGHTING
HIGH CONTRAST MONITORS
MISSION CONTROL
LOW ARTIFICIAL LIGHT (FLUORESCENT)
(HUTCHINSON 2012A)
EASIER TO SEE SCREENS/CONTROL PANEL
(HUTCHINSON 2012A)
BACKLIT BUTTONS ON CONTROL PANEL
HIGH CONTRAST MONITORS
TEMPERATURE
ATRIFICIAL ATMOSPHERE/ENVIRONMENT
POWER CONSERVATION
NO HEATING, VERY COLD
3 DEGREES CELCIUS
CONDENSTATION ON SURFACES INSIDE THE SPACECRAFT
SPACECRAFT DESIGNED
WITH HEAT SHIELDS
PROTECT ASTRONAUTS FROM BURNING ENGINES
PROTECT ASTRONAUTS DURING
RE-ENTRY THROUGH THE ATMOSPHERE
VIBRATION
EXPLOSION
'BANGS AND SHIMMYS' (HOWARD 1995)
FRICTION BETWEEN CM AND ATMOSPHERE ON RE-ENTRY
CHEMICAL EXPOSURE
LOW OXYGEN, HIGH CO2 CONCENTRATION
SOLAR RADIATION
(SCHEURING ET AL 2008)
NOISE
EXPLOSION
'BANGS AND SHIMMYS' (HOWARD 1995)
ROARING NOISE GENERATED BY FRICTION WITH THE ATMOSPHERE ON RE-ENTRY
ALARMS
AIR / OXYGEN
SPACECRAFT
ARTIFICIAL ATMOSPHERE
WITHIN SPACECRAFT
RELIANT ON ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS PERFORMING WITHIN THE DESIGNED PARAMETERS.
PURE OXYGEN CUASED A FIRE ON APOLLO 1
WIRING WAS CHANGED
WIRING WAS PROTECTED
TEFLON WIRING CRACKED DUE TO HEAT
AND FELL OFF IN APOLLO 13 OXYGEN TANK
EXPOSED WIRING TO PURE OXYGEN
CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN APOLLO 13 EXPLOSION
CHANGES TO INSULATION/PROTECTION ON WIRING BEHIND SPACECRAFT CONTROL PANELS
MINIMISED THE RISK OF SHORT CIRCUITING WHEN APOLLO 13 COMMAND MODULE WAS RESTARTED WITH CONDENSATION EVERYWHERE
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL REMOVED WHERE POSSIBLE
TEFLON COATING USED
INSIDE OXYGEN TANKS
TEFLON NOT COMBUSTIBLE UNLESS EXPOSED
TO EXTREME HEAT AND PRESSURE
OXYGEN TANK 2 - HIGH PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE EXPLOSION
LITHIUM HYDROXIDE CANNISTERS/CO2 SCRUBBERS
DEADLY OUTSIDE SPACECRAFT WITHOUT PORTABLE ARTIFICIAL ATMOSPHERE AND SPACESUIT
MISSION CONTROL
CIGARETTE SMOKE-FILLED ROOM
(HUTCHINSON 2012A)
MICRO GRAVITY
HEALTH IMPACTS
NORMAL PHYSIOLOGY, ABNORMAL ENVIRONMENT
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
FLUID RE-DISTRIBUTION IN ALTERED ENVIRONMENT
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
SPACE SICKNESS
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
TYPICALLY SUBSIDES WITHIN
2-3 DAYS AFTER FLIGHT COMMENCEMENT
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
INDIVIDUAL RESPOSNSE - SOME EXPERIENCE SPACE SICKNESS FOR ENTIRETY OF JOURNEY
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
ALTERED PERCEPTION
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
DISORIENTATION
3D ENRIVOMENT OF SPACE - NO 'UP OR DOWN'
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
AFFECTS PERFORMANCE, ESPECIALLY AT THE START AND END OF MISSIONS WHEN THE CHANGES ARE MOST EXTREME
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
SYMPTOMS
STOMACH AWARENESS
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
COLD SWEATING
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
HEADACHE
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
LETHARGY
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
NAUSEA / VOMITING
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
TYPICALLY OCCURS WITHIN
1-2 DAYS OF ARRIVNG IN SPACE
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
AFFECTS PERFORMANCE, ESPECIALLY AT THE START AND END OF MISSIONS WHEN THE CHANGES ARE MOST EXTREME
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
AFFECTS ALL ORGANS OF
THE BODY
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
REACLIMATISATION
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
GAIT DISTURBANCE
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
MOTION SICKNESS
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
VERTIGO
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
LIGHT-HEADEDNESS
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
TYPICALLY 1-2 DAYS DURATION
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
WORKPLACE DESIGN
WORKSTATION CONFIGURATION
MISSION CONTROL
EACH CONTROLLER HAD AT LEAST ONE CONSOLE
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
BACK ROOM TEAM MONIOTORED DATA TO REDUCE WORKLOAD OF CONTROLLER
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
ANOMOULOUS DATA REVIEWED BY CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR, BACK ROOM ENGINEERS AND OUTSIDE RESOURCES
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
HARD-WIRED CONSOLES FOR
SPECIFIC TASKS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
FUNCTION SPECIFIC PANELS COULD BE MOUNTED
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
CHANGING CONSOLE FUNCTION REQUIRED REWIRING
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
2-3 DISPLAY SCREENS PER CONSOLE
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
PASSIVE DISPLAYS ONLY
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
CONSOLES 'DUMB' I.E. CONTAIN NO
COMPUTING ELEMENTS. PURELY A DISPLAY
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
VACUUM TUBE DISPLAYS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
EQUIPMENT BAYS OF VARYING SIZES
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
ERGONMONICS OF THE MISSION
CONTROL CONSOLE DESIGN
(HUTCHINSON 2012D)
COLOUR OF BUTTONS
LABELS ON BUTTONS
SHAPE OF BUTTONS
SIZE OF BUTTONS
COLOUR OF BUTTONS
SPACECRAFT
NUMEROUS INSTRUMENTATION PANELS
THROUGHOUT THE THREE MODULES
COLOUR OF BUTTONS
LABELS ON BUTTONS
SHAPE OF BUTTONS
SIZE OF BUTTONS
COLOUR OF BUTTONS
USABILITY WITH BULKY
ASTRONAUTS GLOVES
ACCESSIBILITY
NASA MISSION CONTROL
THROUGH AN OFFICE BUILDING
SECURITY DOORS
(HUTCHINSON 2012A)
3RD FLOOR
(HUTCHINSON 2012A)
ELEVATOR ACCESS TO FLOOR
MULTI TIERED WORKSTATION PLATFORM LAYOUT
(HUTCHINSON 2012A)
FIRST ROW
NASA HQ
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
(USUALLY A MILITARY GENERAL)
PAO - PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
DFO - DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS
SECOND ROW
INCO - INSTRUMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
O&P - ORGANISATION AND PROCEDURES
FLIGHT - FLIGHT DIRECTOR AND ASSISTANT FLIGHT DIRECTOR
FAO - FLIGHT ACTIVITIES OFFICER
NETWORK - NETWORK CONTROLLER
THIRD ROW
TELMU - TELEMETRY, ELECTRICAL AND EVA MOBILITY UNIT (LM EECOM)
GNC - GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL
EECOM - ELECTRICAL, ENVIRONMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
CAPCOM - CAPSULE CONTROLLER
SURGEON - LIFE SYSTEMS OPERATOR/FLIGHT SURGEON
CONTROL - LM GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION
FOURTH ROW
RETRO - RETROFIRE OFFICER
FDO - FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICER
BOOSTER - BOOSTER SYSTEMS ENGINEER
GUIDO - GUIDANCE OFFICER
SPACECRAFT
STRONG, PROTECTIVE STRUCTURE
DESIGNED TO KEEP ASTRONAUTS IN
ACCESSIBILITY TO CM FOR INITIAL BOARDING
ASTRONAUTS ASSISTED WHEN BOARDING DUE TO BULKY SUITS AND SMALL HATCH
ASTRONAUTS STRAPPED FIRMLY
IN PLACE BY ASSISTANTS
SPACE
VIA AN AIRTIGHT SPACECRAFT
ARTIFICIAL ATMOSPHERE
ARTIFICIAL LIGHTING
STRONG, PROTECTIVE STRUCTURE
ROCKET LAUNCH VEHICLE
VERY TALL REQUIRING AND
ELEVATOR TO REACH TO EMBARK
110M HIGH
FLYING FOX TYPE TOWER EMERGENCY ESCAPE METHOD
TECHNICALLY COMPLEX
ACHIEVE THRUST SUFFICIENT TO BREAK THROUGH THE ATMOSPHERE
NEED TO ACHIEVE THRUST SUFFICIENT TO TAKE OFF
MAINTAIN THRUST UNTIL ORBIT CAN BE ACHIEVED
ADDITIONAL THRUST TO BREAK OUT OF ORBIT TOWARDS THE MOON
PHYSICALLY DIFFICULT
ADDITIONAL THRUST TO BREAK OUT OF ORBIT TOWARDS THE MOON
MAINTAIN THRUST UNTIL ORBIT CAN BE ACHIEVED
ACHIEVE THRUST SUFFICIENT TO BREAK THROUGH THE ATMOSPHERE
NEED TO ACHIEVE THRUST SUFFICIENT TO TAKE OFF
ASTRONAUT MOBILITY IN MICROGRAVITY
(WILLIAMS
ET. AL.
, 2009)
SPACE SUITS ARE BULKY AND CONSTRICTING
FACILITY LAYOUT
MISSION CONTROL
FOUR MAIN PLATFORMS WITHIN MISSION CONTROL
(HUTCHINSON 2012A)
FIRST ROW
PAO - PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
(USUALLY A MILITARY GENERAL)
DFO - DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS
NASA HQ
SECOND ROW
FAO - FLIGHT ACTIVITIES OFFICER
FLIGHT - FLIGHT DIRECTOR AND ASSISTANT FLIGHT DIRECTOR
INCO - INSTRUMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
O&P - ORGANISATION AND PROCEDURES
NETWORK - NETWORK CONTROLLER
THIRD ROW
EECOM - ELECTRICAL, ENVIRONMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
SURGEON - LIFE SYSTEMS OPERATOR/FLIGHT SURGEON
CAPCOM - CAPSULE CONTROLLER
GNC - GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL
TELMU - TELEMETRY, ELECTRICAL AND EVA MOBILITY UNIT (LM EECOM)
CONTROL - LM GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION
FOURTH ROW
RETRO - RETROFIRE OFFICER
FDO - FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICER
BOOSTER - BOOSTER SYSTEMS ENGINEER
GUIDO - GUIDANCE OFFICER
3 SPACE VEHICLES
SERVICE MODULE
LUNAR MODULE
COMMAND MODULE
USED DURING FLIGHT
ASTRONUTS RETURN TO EARTH AND SPLASH DOWN
ASTRONAUTS STRAPPED IN FOR BLAST-OFF
EMPLOYMENT DESIGN
EASE OF USE
DISPLAYS
MISSION CONTROL USED VACUUM TUBE DISPLAYS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
PASSIVE DISPLAYS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
WARNING SYSTEMS
LIMITS OF EACH PARAMETER SET
TO BE TIGHTER THAN THE FAIL LIMIT
(HUTCHINSON 2012C)
LIMITS PROGRAMMED IN TO COMPUTER AND LIGHTS WOULD ILLUMINATE WHEN THE PARAMETERS WERE OUTSIDE THE PRESCRIBED LIMITS
(HUCHINSON 2012C)
CONTROLLER WOULD USE THE FLIASHING LICHT TO DETERMINE WHICH SCREEN NEEDED TO BE VIEWED ON THE CONSOLE DISPLAY
(HUTCHINSON 2012C)
LIMITS MANUALLY PROGRAMMED BY EACH OPERATOR
(HUTCHINSON 2012C)
POTENTIAL FOR HUMAN ERROR IN INPUT
SO MANY PARAMETERS FAILED ON APOLLO 13, BUT THE SYSTEM WAS NOT DESIGNED TO COPE WITH MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS FAILURES.
(HURCHINSON 2012C)
LIT INDICATORS WOULD TURN OFF ONCE PARAMETERS RETURNED TO NORMAL RANGE MAKING ISSUES
DIFFICULT TO TRACE/MONITOR
(HUTCHINSON 2012C)
CHANGES MADE TO THE SYSTEM POST APOLLO 13. INDICATOR LIGHTS REMAIN ON ONCE PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED .
(HURCHINSON 2012C)
PROBLEM SCOPE ONLY ABLE TO BE DETERMINED BY REPLAYING TELEMETRY TAPES
(HUTICHINSON 2012C)
IMPEDED ANAYLSIS AND DETERMINATION
OF ROOT CAUSE OF THE ISSUE
(HUTCHINSON 2012C)
SIMULATOR TRAINING PREPARED
PERSONNEL WELL FOR EMERGENCIES,
BUT ALSO PROGRAMMED INTIAL
RESPONSES TO PROBLEMS - FIXATION
(HUTCHINSON 2012D)
INITIAL RESPONSE WAS AN INSTRUMENTATION ERROR RATHER THAN A PHYSICAL FAILURE OF THE SPACECRAFT
(HUTCHINSON 2012D)
CONTROLS
BUTTONS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
HEAVY BUTTONS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
REQUIRES REASONABLE PRESSURE
TO DEPRESS THE BUTTONS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
METALLIC 'CHUNK' SOUND WHEN ENGAGED
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
FEEDBACK
CONSOLE BUTTONS HARD TO PRESS;
PHYSICAL FEEDBACK
CONSOLE SCREENS PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT WERE FEEDBACK FROM THE COMPUTERS ON BOARD THE SPACECRAFT
INTERPRETED DATA WAS USED TO PROVIDE FEEDBACK TO A VARIETY OF 'CUSTOMERS' I.E. ASTRONAUTS, MISSION CONTROLLERS, FLIGHT DIRECTOR
INTERFACE
BUTTONS (HUTCHINSON 2012B)
LIGHTS (HUTCHINSON 2012B)
SCREENS (HUTCHNSON 2012C)
MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS ORGANISATIONAL MANAGEMENT
POLICIES
MEDIA POLICIES
OPEN, HONEST, TIMELY INFORMATION AND UPDATES
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
MINIMISE RUMOURS AND SPECULATION
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
QUICK REACTION TO THE EVENT
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
REPORTERS HAD DIRECT ACCESS TO THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE SPACECRAFT/ASRTONAUTS AND MISSION CONTROL
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
FAMILIES ALSO HAD A SIMILAR SOURCE OF INFORMATION
(HOWARD 1995)
POLICY ALTERED AFTER CRITICISM POST-APOLLO 1 ACCIDENT
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
ONE PRINT REPORTER AND ONE TELEVISION REPORTER WERE ALLOWED IN TO MISSION CONTROL DURING KEY EVENTS AND EMERGENCIES - SERVED AS A PRESS POOL FOR THE REST OF THE MEDIA
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
NASA PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE CONFIRMED THE ACCURACY OF THESE REPORTS WITH MISSION CONTROL
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
ACCURATE RESPONSE
SHARE INFORMATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS
PUSHED FOR A QUICK RESPONSE
STRIP POLICY
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
ALL MISSION CONTROL PERSONNEL HAD TO STAY WOTHIN 30MINS OF MISSION CONTROL IN CASE OF EMERGENCY
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
LIGITMISATION OF IMPROVISATION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
FLIGHT DIRECTOR'S JOB DESCRIPTION - "THE FLIGHT DIRECTOR CAN DO ANYTHING HE FEELS IN NECESSARY FOR THE SAFETY OF THE CREW AND THE CONDUT OF THE FLIGHT REGARDLESS OF THE MISSION RULES".
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT
1961 - PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
MOON LANDING PROMISE
(GISLER AND SORNETTE 2009)
GET THE JOB DONE SAFELY
USA REPUTATION AT STAKE
SHORT TIME FRAME (10 YEARS)
SOME PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL
BEAT THE RUSSIANS TO THE MOON
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
CREATING COMPLEX MACHINES
MANY EARLY PROBLEMS WITH APOLLO
NASA REPUTATION AT STAKE
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
GOVERNMENT FUNDING
APPROXIMATELY 5%
OF FEDERAL BUDGET
AFTER SUCCESSFUL APOLLO 11, WAS THIS
APPROPRIATE SPENDING?
KAUFFMAN 2001
1971 NASA BUEDGET: USD $3.6 BILLION
1971 APOLLO BUDGET $910 MILLION
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
HIGH STAKES - SUCCESS WAS A MUST
FUTURE OF SPACE
PROGRAM AT STAKE
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
MAJORITY OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM CONGRESS
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
PUBLIC SUPPORT
OPEN COMMUNICATION
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
HONEST COMMUNICATION
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION CRITICAL
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
5 more items...
QUICK RESPONSE
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
1 more item...
PROVEIDE CONSTANT FLOW OF INFORMATION
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
REPUTATION OF THE SPACE PROGRAM
KAUFFMAN 2001
LIVES OF THE THREE ASTRONAUTS
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
REPUTATION OF NASA
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
REPUTATION OF US GOVERNMENT
"US PREEMINENT IN SPACE", "SECOND TO NONE IN ITS ABILITY TO EXPORE THE EXPECTED RICHES IF THE SOLAR SYSTEM AND BEYOND"
(GISLER AND SORNETT, 2009)
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENT
AT THE TIME OF APOLLO 13
APOLLO 13 LANDING - MOST EXCITING AND
MEANINGFUL DAY HE HAD EXPERIENCED
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
USED 'FRONTIER NARRATIVE' AND CHARACTERISED APOLLO 13 AT A SUCCESS
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
DESCRIBED ASTRONAUTS QUALITIES AS SUPERIOR TO MACHINES: EVEN IN AN ERA OF "MAGNIFICENT TECHNOCRACY, MEN DO COUNT, THE INDIVIDUAL DOES COUNT" - RICHARD NIXON
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT OF SCIENCE AND MATHS CURRICULUM IN SCHOOLS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
NATIONAL SCHOOL CURRICULUM ADAPTED TO FOCUS ON MATHS AND SCIENCE SUBJECTS TO PRODUCE STUDENTS WITH SUITABLE BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE TO RECRUIT IN TO THE SPACE PROGRAM
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
KEY TO THE SUCCESS OF IMPROVISATION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
CONTRIBUTED TO THE SKILL LEVEL OF MISSION CONTROLLERS AND ASTRONAUTS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
POLITICAL BENEFIT OF SUCCESSFUL RETURN?
(KAUFFMAN 2001)
HIGH LEVEL MANAGERS AT MISSION CONTROL TO BE ABLE TO MAKE HIGH LEVEL DECISIONS AND APPROVALS DURING SPACECRAFT RECOVERY
SOMEWHAT AWARE OF ISSUES WITH OXYGEN TANK 2
SATISFIED WITH THE ADJUSTED PROCEDURES
ALLOWED COMPONENT TO BE INSTALLED ON SPACECRAFT RATHER THAN BEING REPLACED/CAUSING DELAYS TO BLAST-OFF
DEEMED TANK SAFE TO FLY WITH
TANK TESTED AND
PASSED MODIFIED TESTING
MODIFIED TESTING MISSED HIGHLY INCREASED TEMPERATURE GENERATED WITHIN THE TANK
MAINTAIN OPEN AND HONEST
AND TIMELY COMMUNICATION
(KAUFFMAN, 2001)
FAMILIES KEPT UP TO DATE
PUBLIC KEPT UP TO DATE
INTERNAL PERSONNEL KEPT UP TO DATE
PRESIDENT UP TO DATE
ORGANISATION OF WORK
INVESTIGATION TEAM APPOINTED QUICKLY
NASA PERSONNEL
NO LINK TO APOLLO 13
TRANSPARENCY
OPPENNESS
OBJECTIVITY
INDEPENDENT CONSULTANTS
INFORMATION TRANSFER
INSTRUCTIONS
WRITTEN
FLIGHT MANUALS
CALCULATIONS WITHIN INSIDE THE MANUAL
FLIGHT CONTROL LABELS
INDICATOR LIGHTS REQUIRING ACTION/ATTENTION
INDICATOR LIGHTS COMMUNICATING INFORMATION
COPILED INDEXED HANDBOOKS OF EVERY
COMPONENT OF THE SPACECRAFT
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
DECISIONS CLEARLY COMMUNICATED
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
UNDERSTANDING OF SYSTEMS AND
PROBLEMS AT A DEEP LEVEL
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
ENABLED DECISIONS TO BE MADE QUICKLY
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
VERBAL
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS (WITHIN MISSION CONTROL AND BETWEEN MISSION CONTROL AND THE SPACECRAFT)
PROMPTING FOR
STANDARD PROCEDURES
STIRRING ON OXYGEN TANKS
REQUIRED COURSE CORRECTIONS
BURN TIMES
COMMUNICATION OF ISSUES AS THEY AROSE
TROUBLE SHOOTING
MONITORING OF
FLIGHT PROGRESS
GUIDANCE, TELEMETRY AND TRAJECTORY
ENVIRONMENT AND LIFE SYSTEMS
ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION AND COMMUNICATION
FELLOW ASTRONAUTS USED TO COMMUNICATE
DIRECTLY WITH ASTRONAUTS (CAPCOM)
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
ONE LINE OF COMMUNICATION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014; HUTCHINSON 2012B)
STREAMLINED COMMUNICATIONS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
LIMITED CONFUSION
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
LIMITED CONFLICTING INSTRUCTIONS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B).
ONLY A FEW VOICES PROVIDING INSTRUCTIONS (DIFFERENT SHIFTS TO COVER 24 HOUR DAY). FEWER ROTATIONS THAN OTHERS IN MISSION CONTROL.
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
FELLOW ASTRONAUTS FAMILIAR WITH THE TIME EACH TASK WOULD TAKE TO CARRY OUT
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
BETTER ABLE TO COMMUNICATE INFORMATION TO LIKE-MINDED INDIVIDUALS (I.E. OTHER ASTRONAUTS)
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
FAMILIAR WITH TRAINING FELLOW ASTRONAUTS HAVE
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
CLEAR COMMUNICATION REQUIRED TO ENABLE
SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF IMPROVISED TASKS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
RADIO TRANSMISSIONS CONSTANTLY MONITORED
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
CONTROLLERS HAD STRICTLY
DISCIPLINED COMMUNICATION
(HUTCHINSON 2012C)
OFTEN UP TO 8 SIMULTANEOUS AUDIO LOOPS/CONVERSATIONS PLAYING TO
HEADSETS OF CONTROLLERS AT ANY ONE TIME
(HUTCHINSON 2012C)
CONTROLLERS HAD TO LISTEN AND SELECT THE
INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THEM IN ADDITION TO LISTENING TO THE TRANSMISSION FROM THE SPACECRAFT.
(HUTCHINSON 2012C).
TO MINIMISE CONVERSATIONS ON THE AUDIO LOOP, MISSION CONTROLLER WOULD MONITOR A FEW STATIONS AT A TIME AND CLARIFY ISSUES ONE-ON-ONE WITH THE RESPECTIVE CONTROLLER.
(HUTCHINSON 2012C)
TRANSMISSION
SIMPLE COMMANDS
DIRECTLY GENERATED AT CONTROLLER'S CONSOLE
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
EXECUTE COMMANDS AND SEND
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO STATION
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
COMPLEX COMMANDS
UNDERWENT MULTIPLE CHECKS FOR ERRORS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
QUEUED FOR TRANSMISSION AND SENT AT SCHEDULED INTERVALS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
LABELS
CONTROL PANELS
MISSION CONTROL
GROUPED CONTROL PANELS
AND PANEL OPERATORS
FIRST ROW
NASA HQ
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
(USUALLY A MILITARY GENERAL)
PAO - PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
DFO - DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS
SECOND ROW
INCO - INSTRUMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
O&P - ORGANISATION AND PROCEDURES
FLIGHT - FLIGHT DIRECTOR AND ASSISTANT FLIGHT DIRECTOR
FAO - FLIGHT ACTIVITIES OFFICER
NETWORK - NETWORK CONTROLLER
THIRD ROW
TELMU - TELEMETRY, ELECTRICAL AND EVA MOBILITY UNIT (LM EECOM)
GNC - GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL
EECOM - ELECTRICAL, ENVIRONMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
CAPCOM - CAPSULE CONTROLLER
SURGEON - LIFE SYSTEMS OPERATOR/FLIGHT SURGEON
CONTROL - LM GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION
FOURTH ROW
RETRO - RETROFIRE OFFICER
FDO - FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICER
BOOSTER - BOOSTER SYSTEMS ENGINEER
GUIDO - GUIDANCE OFFICER
SPACECRAFT
LUNAR EXCURSION MODULE (LEM)
SERVICE MODULE (SM)
COMMAND MODULE (CM)
SIMULATORS
FULLY FUNCTIONING SIMULATION ENVIRONMENTS (SPACECRAFT AND VACUUM ENVIRONMENT)
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
ENABLED REALISITC TESTING OF IMPROVISED PROCEDURES FOR COMMAND MODULE START UP
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
VACUUM CHAMBER USED TO TEST THE LITHIUM HYDROXIDE CO2 SCRUBBERS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
MULTIPLE PROTOTYPES LED TO
SUCCESSFUL IMPROVISATION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
CLOSE PROXIMITY TO MISSION CONTROL
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
STATE OF THE ART
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
COMMUNICATIONS (WRITTEN AND VERBAL)
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
FELLOW ASTRONAUTS USED TO
COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH
FLYING ASTRONAUTS
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
ONE LINE OF COMMUNICATION
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
ONLY A FEW VOICES PROVIDING INSTRUCTIONS (DIFFERENT SHIFTS TO COVER 24 HOUR DAY)
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
FELLOW ASTRONAUTS FAMILIAR WITH THE TIME EACH TASK WOULD TAKE TO CARRY OUT
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
BETTER ABLE TO COMMUNICATE INFORMATION TO LIKE-MINDED INDIVIDUALS (I.E. OTHER ASTRONAUTS)
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
FAMILIAR WITH TRAINING FELLOW ASTRONAUTS HAVE
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)
VIDEO LINK
VARIOUS FLIGHT MANUALS FOR SPACECRAFT
MISSION CONTROLLERS DID NOT DISCUSSED OPTIONS WITH FLIGHT DIRECTOR UNTIL THERE WAS A RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION.
(HUTCHINS 2012B).
SCREENS
SPACECRAFT
MISSION CONTROL
DATA PROCESSED THROUGH MAINFRAME AND
DISPLAYED ON THE SCREENS IN MISSION CONTOL
(HUTCHINSON 2012B).
TV SCREENS/BROADCAST
JOB DESIGN
TASK DESIGN
UNIQUE WORK ENVIRONMENT (SPACE)
COMPLETE PROCEDURES WITHIN
SHORT TIME FRAMES (IMPROVISATION)
(TROTTER
ET. AL.
, 2014)*
PROCEDURES HAD TO BE RE-WRITTEN
FOR THE APOLLO 13 SITUATION
CAUTIOUS WITH STARTING UP COMMAND
MODULE AFTER HOURS POWERED DOWN
COLD
CONDENSATION
POTENTIAL FOR SHORT CIRCUITS IN CONTROL PANELS
SPACECRAFT
DAMP/WET INSIDE
'RAINING' ON RE-ENTRY AS THE CONDENSATION FELL
WORK SCHEDULE
LONG HOURS FOR TRAINING
MISSION IN SPACE LASTING A NUMBER OF DAYS
SCHEDULE CHANGES AT SHORT NOTICE (I.E. MATTINGLY BEING REPLACE BY SWIGERT WITHIN DAYS OF LAUNCH).
BACK UP CREW TRAINED FOR SAME MISSION AS PRIME CREW
ASTRONAUTS TRAVELLED FREQUENTLY
BETWEEN SPACE CENTRES
OVERINVESTMENT OF WORK
COMMITMENTS AND WORKLOAD
(GISLER AND SORNETTE, 2009)
JOB REQUIREMENTS
COMPLETE THE MISSION
COMPLETE MISSION OBJECTIVES
REPORT ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE SPACE CRAFT TO MISSION CONTROL
BE INVOLVED IN SOLUTIONS FOR PROBLEMS
RETURN TO EARTH SAFELY
BE INNOVATIVE/INNOVATIVE THINKER
BE A PROBLEM SOLVER
ENTHUSIASM
CREATIVE ENGINEERING
TESTING COMPONENTS OF A COMPLEX MACHINE
CONSTRUCTION OF A COMPLEX MACHINE
DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX MACHINE
RE-DESIGN/RE-ENGINEERING WHERE REQUIRED
WORKLOAD
LOW WORKLOAD
NORMAL SPACE FLIGHT FOR FIRST 55 HOURS
REST PERIODS
VIDEO BROADCASTS TO MISSION CONTROL/MEDIA
PASSING TIME UNTIL INSTRUCTIONS WERE PASSED ON
HIGH WORKLOAD
MISSION CONTROL OPERATORS
(HUTCHINSON 2012B)
MULTIPLE BACK ROOM OPERATORS FOR EACH MISSION CONTROL STATION TO MONITOR DATA AND REPORT ISSUES TO MISSION CONTROL OPERATOR.
(HUTCHINSON 2012B).
ASTRONAUTS
MANUAL ENGINE BURNS FOR TRAJECTORY CORRECTION
WORKING AT FAST PACE TO COMPLETE TASKS PRIOR TO SHUTDOWN OF SERVICE MODULE DUE TO IMPENDING OXYGEN DEPLETION
ADDRESSING ALARMS (CAUTION AND WARNINGS) THROUGHOUT FLIGHT; ESPECIALLY IMMEDIATELY AFTER EXPLOSION
PREPARING COMMAND MODULE FOR RE-ENTRY/SPLASHDOWN - ADDING WEIGHT TO IMPROVE DESCENT TRAJECTORY
HAND BUILDING CO2 SCRUBBERS