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MISTAKE (Common mistake in common law (void) (Associated Japanese Bank v…

- - - - Preferred Denning's approach in Lewis v Averay, suggesting that mistaken identity only ever made contracts voidable and not void, because fraud would not go to formation.
      - Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead: Fraud does not negative intention / legal obligations / obligations - voidable, not void. Presumption applies, did intend to hire car to that person in showroom. Necessary coincidence of intention may exist even where the intention and consent were induced by fraud. Intention regarded as sufficient to form contract.
      - Lord Millett: In my opinion, once one accepts that there are two questions involved: (i) did a contract come into existence at all? and (ii) if so was the contract vitiated by fraud or mistake? Whatever the medium of communication, a contract is formed if on objective appraisal of the facts, there is sufficient correlation between offer and acceptance to make it possible to say that the imposter's offer has been accepted by the person to whom it was addressed.
      - Lord Nicholls: The legal principle applicable cannot sensibly differ according to whether the transaction is negotiated face-to-face, or by letter, or by fax, or by e-mail, or over the telephone or by video link or video telephone. The essence is that the owner of the goods agrees to part with his goods on the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation made by the other regarding his identity. Since the essence of the transaction is the same in each case, the law in its response should apply the same principle in each case, irrespective of the precise mode of communication of offer and acceptance.
      - Lord Millett: Easier to apply this rule apply and accords with principle by distinguishing between the formation of a contract as a question of fact to be determined objectively and the consequences of mistake or fraud. Gives measure of protection to innocent 3rd parties. Fairer that the party who was actually swindled and who had an opportunity to uncover the fraud should bear the loss rather than a party who entered the picture only after the swindle had been carried out and who had none. Contract with imposter, imposter made offer which Shogun accepted.
      - Lord Nicholls: Prefer Phillips v Brooks and Lewis v Averay over Cundy v Lindsay. It accords better with basic principle regarding the effect of fraud on the formation of a contract. It seems preferable as a matter of legal policy. As between two innocent persons the loss is more appropriately borne by the person who takes the risks inherent in parting with his goods without receiving payment.
        A person is presumed to intend to contract with the person with whom he is actually dealing, whatever be the mode of communication.
    - - Rogue never had any face-to-face dealings with the plts, no presumption. See written contract. Terms said Mr Patel, not open to def to lead evidence to contradict that written term and establish that the party to the contract was not in fact Mr Patel but the rogue (not supposed to use parol evidence rule for interpretation of terms!)
      - Can recover car from def because there was no valid contract with the rogue who was not named in the agreement. Buyer's identity of crucial importance (really? did not check!) No consensus ad idem, rogue not debtor in agreement, did not acquire title.
      - Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough: Construction of document - clearly identified Mr Patel. Identity fundamental to transaction in consumer credit transaction. Great weight on written contract, found that plt had, on the face of the contract, intended to deal with someone other than the rogue - yes mistaken identity. Rid of fine distinction between attribute and identity.
  - - - Cannot hold that there is no equitable jurisdiction just because it may be difficult to delineate the scope or extent. It depends on facts of each case and dictates of justice.
      - Where the case does not fall within the common law doctrine of unilateral mistake and the court finds that there is constructive knowledge on the part of the non-mistaken party, the court would, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, be entitled to intervene and grant relief when it is unconscionable for the non-mistaken party to insist that the contract be performed.
        Constructive knowledge + additional element of impropriety (e.g. deliberately not bringing the suspicion to attention of mistaken party)
  - - - There is a presumption that A intends to deal with the person standing in front of him, can only be rebutted by showing that A intended to contract with C only (whose identity (not attributes) was of crucial importance)! Hector v Lyons: where the identity of the purchaser is of direct and important materiality in inducing the vendor to enter into the contract
        Inter absentes*: no presumption.
      - Ingram v Little: drew distinction between mere attributes and identity. Creditworthiness went to identity. Creditworthiness of person to whom the sisters sold the car to was a crucial fact. But Devlin LJ dissented, no meaningful distinction with Phillips v Brooks.
      - Lewis Averay: Just mistake as to person's attributes (creditworthiness). Plt in this case done relatively more to verify identity, yet no mistake.
    - - Key requirement is that there is sufficient factual evidence of a mistake (intended to deal with someone else)
      - James v Cundy & T Bevington v Thomas Lindsay: intended to deal with correct Blenkiron, never thought of / knew nothing of the dishonest man. No meeting of minds.
      - Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading: Does presumption apply? No conclusive answer. But Yong CJ's judgement that Inter praesentes cases should be treated differently hints at applicability of presumption in SG.