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Mill's Proof (The jump from egoistic hedonism to universalistic…
Mill's Proof
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Moore's criticism:
Mill fails to spot a crucial difference between that which is visible and that which is desirable - to say an object is visible is to say it is capable of being seen, but to say an object is desirable does not mean it is capable of being desired - it means that we should desire it
Response: Mill was aware of this difference and meant still to say that if people desire something, it means we should desire it (is this an is-ought fallacy?) - Mill is not interested in defining words
An acceptabel definition of something should not leave an open question e.g. triangle, properly defined does not leave any questions - defining good as 'desires' fails this test
Mill attempts to derive an evaluative conclusion from non-evaluative premises - but he is not doing this because it contradicts his claim that a direct proof of an ultimate end is not possible, and he is not claiming that goodness is what is desired, he says that desires offer the evidence for what is good
Meaning of 'proof'
'There is a larger meaning of the word proof [...] the subject is within the cognisance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition'
'The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it.'
Cannot be proved deductively - ultimate ends cannot be proved - but for proving matters of fact we can appeal to the senses and internal consciousness - for an empiricist that is equivalent to proof
Sanctions
External: hope of favour from others, fear of anger and sympathy for them
Internal: conscience - takes origins in external influence from others, but then takes on a life of its own
Why should we favour utilitarianism as a basis for these sanctions: because humans naturally want cooperation and harmony
As people are educated to become more and more impartial, the better their lives will be for them, and the more their sympathies extend beyond self-concern, the better their lives will be
The proof itself
Three claims:
- Happiness is desirable because everyone desires it for themselves
- The general happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons
- Happiness is the only thing that people desire, and therefore the criterion for morality
Objections:
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Objection to claim 2: Aggregation comes at the cost of equality, and does Mill mean that if a happiness if good to me, then the general happiness is good to me, or that if we add together the happiness of everyone we get a aggregate good of the whole of humanity?
Response: Because A's happiness is good and B's happiness is good, together they can both be called good and they increase the amount of good in the world, and this should be our altruistic aim to increase the good in the world, because this in turn maximises our happiness
Objection to claim 3: some people desire things other than happiness - Mill responds that the theory of associationism says that we only desire them because we associate them with happiness - they are means rather than ends e.g. money
Social instinct is natural, but must also be guided and educated - if we apply this aim to a wider level of society, then this produces the general happiness
Challenge from virtue: Mill accepts that virtue is desirable - but associationism suggests that virtue is an ingredient to happiness, as it biomes enjoyable - first through the perceived response to it - and eventually for its own sake
Criticism: it is still the case therefore that virtue provides a counter-example to the claim that only happiness is desired
Response: virtues become eventually not only means to happiness but constituents of it (hence the seeming necessity)
e.g. a parent who would rather learn that their child is dead than be left uncertain as to whether or not they are dead - this knowledge will not bring them pleasure, but they will desire it - however some argue it is minimising their pain from uncertainty
Crisp example: a mother can choose - either her kids succeed and she thinks they fail, or they fail and she thinks they succeed - she will choose what is best for her kids
Response: what she desires has become so inextricably linked to what she wants for her kids, that she it still acting out of desire
Mackie
Mill hesitates between saying that a proof is required for all means and ends, and saying that a proof cannot be found for end, simply for means
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Mill rejects intuitionism - inductive meta-ethics must be settled by 'direct appeal to the faculties which judge of fact - namely, our sense, and our internal consciousness'
The only proof that an object is visible is that people see it - therefore the only proof that an object is desirable is that people desire it
The nature of pleasure
Pleasure is not a stuff but a relation - this is sometimes the grounds for rejecting Mill's proof - we do not desire pleasure in itself, but in relation to our experiences
Mackie argues that reasoning can be used to prove means, but not ends e.g. reasoning can be used to prove that health is good, but we must fundamentally accept it is a food in itself