'Tony's war'? Blair, Kosovo and the interventionist impulse in British foreign policy (Daddow 2009)
Iraq will always step out as bold red in his debit column of his time in office
Blair's work in Kosovo will be undermined by his role in Bush's neo-imperial foreign pokicy
why did Blair choose to involve Britain in the Kosovo crisis at the time and in the manner he did?
the officially sanctioned conventional wisdom that the Kosovo intervention was born out of the moral purpose we see guiding Blair’s ‘doctrine of the international community’ speech in April 1999 is
contrasted with what I call a revisionist interpretation which sees Blair’s foreign policy as inextricably linked to developments in British politics at that time.
The second question is: what was the impact of Kosovo on Blair’s governance of Britain?
'But why Blair? Why Britain?'
Blair's Chicago speech 1999, a fully-fledged doctrine, Blair's Balkans policy 'capable of heroic efforts', Iraq turned this into ashes.
Doctrine of the international community: Blair's chicago speech ten years on
A key moment in the history of liberal interventionist discourse, First part of speech on action against dictator in Kosovo, second on interdependence as a consequence of globalisation and more regulation, transparency and supervision in the global economy and reiterated threats to Saddam Hussein and Milosevic posed to international order
Hardly a fully worked out doctrine
the Kosovo crisis broke two years into the reign of a Prime Minister who was neither settled domestically nor a foreign policy expert by experience or even inclination.
It is well known that the Prime Minister was keen to make his mark on defence to overcome Labour’s historic image problem of being seen to be ‘weak’ in this area
Intervening in Kosovo- On moral purpose it has been common to link the Chicago doctrine to Blair’s religiosity.
Blair as an orator in 'messianic' style made Kosovo not about territorial ambitions but about values.
What was distinctive about his policy was not, therefore, that it was a pure expression of his faith but, rather, that religious imagery and language were readily on hand to help this avid Bible reader make the case for intervention.
Second strand to this orthodoxy about Blair's motivation is about perceptions of history to right the wrongs of Bosnia, appeasement does not work, dictators must not be left unchallenged. Western inactivity in the Balkans could habe disasterous consequences. 750,000 needless deaths suffered when the international community stood by and did nothing about Bosnia
In sum, Blair was articulating a widespread concern among NATO countries that in 1991–5 ‘they had failed,
individually and collectively, to devise coherent policies and to engage in decisive actions
Revising the orthodoxy about the Chicago speech (Chandler 2003)
associating with victims of international conflicts enables leaders to ‘gain a moral authority that cannot be secured through the domestic political process.
tempting for politicians to set out more ambitious, clear and decisive goals for their foreign policies than for their
domestic policies. It is easy to criticise foreign governments, any intervention portrayed as better than none
foreign policy exploits of this nature are a win–win situation in that it is difficult to disprove the view that things would have been worse had the international community not intervened. Leaders can bask in the reflected glory of any
demonstrably successful outcomes and deflect criticism onto coalition partners or the target of military action if things turn out badly
John Simpson, who makes the same point about American policy: since the civilian victims of NATO bombers ‘didn’t count in terms of American politics— they were foreigners after all—then no-one was counting
Blair after Kosovo- Media management, confidence in leadership, decision making style
Crucial to a successful foreign policy strategy, all over the support of US involvement in Kosovo and Bosnia. Blair needed more confidence in his ability to push through a reformist vision for Britain
Blair-watchers observed a more confident, proactive post-Kosovo Blair compared to a tone distinct from the ‘risk-averse’ approach he had taken up to that point
Kosovo seems to have been the point at which Blair began to be his own man, as it were, more willing to question establishment advice and that coming from his networks of advisers across the Atlantic who had helped him fashion New Labour in the image of Clinton’s New Democrats.
Did not need to rely on Whitehall's decision-making machinery for ideas or strategy, accused of presiding over a 'kitchen cabinet', sidelines the Foreign office and cabinet as a source of policy advice and collective decision taking
Freedman suggests the civil servants in King Charles Street may have been ignored during the Chicago speech-writing process for two reasons.
Powell has said that foreign ministries in general have
been increasingly left out of decision-making cycles as western leaders have taken to conducting diplomacy bilaterally, away from established channels.
had firm ideas about what he wanted to say and often left it until the last few hours to finalise the contents of a major speech.
Given his desire to internalise everything he was saying in order to deliver it in the most compelling way possible, Blair would in those last hours write out the entire speech in long hand to help him memorise the crux of the journey on which he would take his audience during his address.
Conclusion
The evidence from close observers is that, contrary to the public image of New Labour as an all-conquering electoral machine, the project was run by a host of insecure, almost neurotic, characters—notably Blair, Brown and Mandelson—all terrified that they were in imminent danger of losing the faith of the public and governing by opinion poll to such a degree that it suffocated the highly ambitious agenda they had on coming to office
The British doctrine of international community ‘as the best way of defending our interests and the moral way of promoting our values’ is just one approach up for discussion
I would argue that revisiting Kosovo reminds us
there was a Blair before Iraq, one who was genuinely set on building a consensus around humanitarian interventionism.