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Ultimately the development of radar was more important to the allies in…

- - - - The new Japanese tactics resulted in the sinking of the heavy cruiser Chicago off Rennell Island on January 30, 1943, and damage to the light carrier Independence in the Gilbert Islands on November 20, 1943.
      - U.S fighters from the U.S.S Enterprise were not able to hunt down Japanese bombers using their short range radars. Later, fighters from the Enterprise were able to destroy Japanese bombers heading for aircraft carriers but in the darkness, many reports of friendly fire were reported.
        
        A new long-range radar was developed which could identify objects as small as a submarine periscope, while the system's high-power gave it a range of more than 100 nautical miles.
        
        New radar was mounted to the bottom of Avenger Naval fighter with the purpose of a reconnaissance plane. The New plane was called the TBM-3W.
        
        Gave allies the ability to distinguish between enemy and friendly aircraft during night time combat. Significantly reduced the number of friendly fire incidents.
    - - “We weren't going anywhere with this airplane. We were going to go up and ride over a carrier, and the object was to look at the low flying kamikazes and try to catch them at 120 miles or 140 miles, rather than have them show up on the doorsteps of the ships."
      - In response to new Japanese tactics, the U.S developed new planes equipped with radar which called the allies to detect enemy fighters at a farther range and allowed them to shoot them down.
    - - It also allowed for civilians to seek shelter in air-raid shelters and basements.
      - Before the attacks on Pearl Harbor, a U.S. Navy radar technician supposedly identified the incoming Japanese planes but the reporting officer did not trust the findings of the technology thinking it was one of their own squadrons. Therefore, no warnings were issued prior to the attack, and many U.S. naval ships, aircraft, and lives were lost.
      - This early warning system allowed time for military forces to position troops with anti-aircraft guns and artillery and to get aircraft squadrons into the air.
      - The Signal Aircraft Warning battalion was a branch in the U.S Army which used the technology of radar to provide early warning and air defense.
        
        SAW worked with Airforce defending islands. SAW was in charge of recon around islands. If anything was spotted, the information would then be relayed to close U.S aircraft. Airforce would investigate and engage any enemy in the area.
      - In 1942 conventional radar provided crucial warning of Japanese air attacks at the Battles of Midway and the Coral Sea.
    - - Radar Provided the Allies in the Pacific with ample warning of attacks by the Japanese but failed to utilize information from radar to their advantage.
  - - - Integration of radar with anti-aircraft artillery systems included the American SCR-584 radar. Radar data was routed to an
        M-9 analog gun predictor. The predictor then used the radar data to calculate where the target would be when the shell arrived. The information was used to aim and fire the gun. Would also utilize the proximity fuse which was a simple radar which was installed in artillery shells and set to explode when it was a preset distance from an object.
        
        This made shooting down aircraft extremely more efficient and effective for the allies. Provided an accurate firing system and reduced need for pinpoint accuracy.
        
        Soon there were hundreds of systems operating in Britain which enabled the RAF (Royal Air Force) to combat German Luftwaffe attacks.
    - - Richard Almand was a B-29 “Super fortress” navigator and depended heavily on radar during bombing missions.
        
        The B-29BS boasted the new AN/ APQ7 Eagle radar. It had 18-foot antenna slung beneath the fuselage.
        
        Unlike the radar set Almand had trained on, the Eagle showed the ground 30 degrees right and left of the bomber's nose.
        
        "This narrower view was just what we needed, I could give the pilot course corrections to the bomb release point without having to wait for a 360-degree radar sweep like on the older sets."
        
        Almand describes a bombing mission below:
        "We were at 15,000 feet, I gave the pilot three-course corrections. I wished afterward that every time I told him to turn left six degrees, I said 12.1 couldn't believe what that crosswind was doing to us. We never got on a straight line to the target and missed it badly."
- - - - Fighters equipped with radar such as the TBM-3W were developed. The TBM-3W's radar was sensitive enough to spot a submarine's periscope, but it took up so much room that it could not carry any weapons. Therefore, the Navy paired the plane with another TBM-3S which was armed and able to destroy vessels. The TBM-3W acted as a hunter, finding the location of any Japanese vessels and then relaying that information to the TBM-3S which acted as the killer and destroyed the vessel.
  - - - In 1943, planes equipped with radar systems began patrolling the North Atlantic and turned the tide against Germany's U-boats, which had devastated Allied shipping in the early years of the war.
        
        Hitler referred to radar as “one invention of our enemy” which had defeated his submarine fleet.
      - “One of the Navy's responses to the U-boat threat to U.S. shipping was to gather ships into convoys escorted by warships. Some radar scientists believed that a hunter-killer approach using the combined efforts of aircraft and ships equipped with microwave radars would greatly increase the effectiveness of the convoys.”
      - Royal Navy was the first to adopt this method of locating German submarines.
        Estimated positions of U-boats, plotted at Washington and London, were sent out to sea on “Fox” schedule, which was a secret bulletin transmitted several times a day on a fixed schedule. While HF/DF fixes were accurate within 50 to 100 miles, which enabled an escort commander to divert course.
        
        Admiral Doesnitz, the commander of the German U-boats, admitted this tactic frequently frustrated is U-boats.
      - “A convoy is no stronger than its ears and eyes. Radar furnished our convoys with cat’s eyes, sonar with ears, while the high-frequency direction-finders, by picking up and plotting radio transmissions of U-boats at sea, acted as highly sensitive, elongated cat’s whiskers.”
- - - - Stations were linked by telephone and allowed stations to pass radar plots back to Fighter Command, giving controllers an overall air picture.
      - When Battle of Britain began, the Chain Home and Chain Home Low stations gave an average of 20 minutes warning of incoming air raids.
        
        This information was invaluable since German bombers were able to deploy only 95 miles from the coast of Britain at Pas de Calais.
        RAF Spitfire Fighter plane required only 13 minutes to scramble and climb to 20,000ft.
        RAF Hurricane Fighter plane needed 16 minutes.
        This quick and accurate warning allowed RAF fighters to be quickly mobilized and intercept German bombers.
  - - - The complex radar enemy position triangulation and computers did not provide the best and fastest way of providing the fighters with effective intercept courses. Instead, the system was developed so radar controllers had to work out the situation by their own judgment and gathering experience. They were soon relaying information to fighters with a 93 percent success rate.
      - RDF radar development was extremely rapid that by July, 1935 radar was able to detect aircraft at ranges up to 38 miles and to track them out to 42 miles. By September, they were reliably tracking aircraft at ranges of 58 miles.
        
        This longer range or radar detection gave the British a longer time period in which they could prepare or fend off the incoming German attacks
      - Aircraft of the RAF were being installed with IFF (identification Friend or Foe) which consisted of small transmitters which gave a little radar blimp, therefore distinguishing it from enemy targets. Operators where now able to differentiate from enemy and friendly aircraft.
      - “…the network provided the crucial edge in the Battle of Britain.”