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CAF Governance (Intro (Brief description of how it behaves, Members, How…

- - - - 'Big man small boy syndrome'
        
        System of patronage
  - - - Issa Hayatou and Jacques Anouma have been accuesed of taking bribes related to Russia's 2018 and Quatar's 2022 World Cup bid
    - - African football trafficing is an increasing problem
        
        Culture Foot Solidarie
        
        Tragic - becasue of poverty everyone wants to leave the country
        
        Angents - ensure that players are well-traind before they come to Eurpoe
      - African Sport Academy
        
        Addis Ababa Sport Academy
        
        TP Mazembe Sport Academy
      - TPO
        
        Agents are often accused of paying of coaches so players they represent are called up to the national team
  - - - Oldest theory, 1932, managers are in charge - 'rubber stamp' model
      - Need to examine how much freedom the executive has here
    - - Organisation ought to be responsible to a range of stakeholders (Hung, 1998)
      - Having a different range of stakeholders on the board, it ought to be more flexible to respond to different needs
      - Relevant for CAF as it has to manage the needs of a broad range of stakeholders, identified earlier in the work (regions, languages, religions, degrees of ability/development)
    - - Members should be elected, pluralistic in their view (representing interests they do not hold) and above all accountable to the membership
      - Key thsat as being elected the board is there to be representitative of its memebrs
      - Also has to resolve or choose between competing priorities of its members
    - - To a point, generally a large amount of dependency and influence from outside
      - Not sure the board contributes to this aspect directly
      - Connections to FIFA higher up and the money from that could be a link at a board level
    - - Emphasis on partnership here given management and board expected to be working for the good of the company
      - Implies board members have been selected for expertise and contacts
    - - Who owns CAF?
      - How is the board's situation as executive and director expressed in relation to this?
    - - Necessary to appreciate organisations for the complexity they have rather than simplistic models (Morgan, 1986)
      - Clearly applicable here as CAF seems to be a mixture of different models laid out above
      - Representative vs expert
        
        How many non-elected members are on the executive? Have any got experience outside football
        
        Are members put forward or self selected for election?
        
        Conflict between acting in the interest of the organisation and the interests of its members
      - Conformance vs performance
        
        Must abide by several statutes from FIFA as well as various legal frameworks however must also get the best for the federation as a whole
        
        Dynamic between risk aversion (does this exist in a federation like CAF?) and maximising performance(how is performance measured? Power? On field success? Money from FIFA?)
      - Controlling vs partnering
        
        Agency + democratic models vs stewardship theories
        
        What about when stakeholders interests go against the managements? How hard should they push/enforce these onto management?
        
        Is there any ability to check the power of the executive int
      - Ambiguous Accountability
        
        If there are different models employed then these will by definition imply different routes of accountability. How do these interact with one another
        
        Are there any genuinely conflicting commitments from executive members?
        
        Idea that members are duty bound to act in the best interests of the organisation however does this occur