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Torts: Intentional Torts to the Person (Pt. 1) (False imprisonment …
Torts: Intentional Torts to the Person (Pt. 1)
Battery
direct and intentional physical contact without lawful excuse or justification
Directness: contact
natural and probable consequence
(
Scott v Shepherd
)
could be inflicted through the medium of something under the control of the actions of the D (car driven by D onto policeman’s foot)
(
Fagan v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police
[1969])
Active v passive acts
bouncing off passive bouncer
(
Innes v Wylie
) -> no assault
pure omission to act or continuing act? (latter) -> assault
(
Fagan v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police
)
Force
generally, no
outlier case because no tort of privacy, trying to plug gap -> celebrity in hospital; intentional flash photos (court held battery where there is distress, sets back recovery); but, actionable per se? trying to create force in photo-taking?
(
Kaye v Robertson
)
Intention
Anger
least touching of another in anger is a battery
(
Cole v Turner
(1704))
need to show hostility (horseplay of kids); not practicable to define according to acceptable ordinary conduct
hostility
: anger, word, gesture, or act speaking for itself (e.g. stabbing); not equivalent to ill-will or malevolence, not solely governed by an expressed intention
(
Wilson v Pringle
[1986])
Range of accepted conduct
test is not anger, but
"whether the physical contact…has in the circumstances gone beyond
generally accepted standards of conduct
…depends upon the facts of the particular case"
police officer physically restraining suspected prostitute
gone beyond scope of duty in detaining short of arrest and had committed a battery
(
Collins v Wilcock
[1984])
Current UK position
intrusive search during prison visit
combined hostility and acceptable conduct: hostility as an e.g. of unacceptable conduct
(
Wainwright v Home Office
[2004])
Current SG position
"conduct that are ordinarily acceptable in daily life”
(
Goel Adesh Kumar v Resorts World at Sentosa
(2015))
Doctors and medical cases
hostility and ordinary conduct not suitable
Actual consent or necessity
hostility test not suitable (doctors wanted to help her)
cannot imply consent (mental capacity was so impaired)
medical cases:
actual consent, or necessity
(life, health, or wellbeing, or best interests of patient)
(
In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation)
[1990])
False imprisonment
directly and intentionally causing plaintiff to be confined within a particular area without lawful excuse or justification
Total restraint
P could turn around and go back the way he came from
(
Bird v Jones
)
not right to restrain and impose conditions to freedom
(
Goel Adesh Kumar
)
no-one was prevented from leaving, family members left and returned, P not prevented from going toilet and had been assisten on going [mainly contradictory evidence which caused Pf's case to fail] (
Amutha Valli v Titutlar Superior of the Redemptorist Fathers in Singapore
)
Honest mistaken belief/knowledge
sujective view of Df not relevant, but objective actuality: Lord Slynn and Lord BW: “false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability” -> NOT that no MR or intention required, BUT that you cannot say "it was not my fault/I thought I had a lawful basis" -> as long as you did not have a lawful basis, then you are liable
miscalculated prison term, Df thought he was doing the right thing
(
R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans (No.2)
[2001])
Directness
store detective (Dfs) called cops, who acted on their discretion and arrested suspected shoplifters (Pfs)
no false imprisonment, cops exercised discretion
(
Davidson v Chief Constable of the North Wales Police
[1994])
Active v passive acts
(1) whether Pf had a right, leading to a duty on Df
(2) only if duty is present can an omission be false imprisonment
lack of directness too, because the officers withdrew their labour but this did not directly lead to the P being confined in his cell; that was from the governor’s decision made as a result of the strike
(
Iqbal v Prison Officers Association
[2010])
Awareness of restraint not important
P's awareness not an element of the tort; lack of awareness will not bar claim
(
Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd
)
-
detained in house by soldiers searching for IRA suspects without being told she was under arrest until later
lack of knowledge just affects amount of damages (nominal) but still actionable
real issue in this case is whether she was lawfully detained/arrested
(
Murray v Ministry of Defence
)
Consent
depends on what the original consent was
P paid for ferry ride, changed his mind, refused to pay penny to leave wharf -> no "total" restraint because of means of departure via payment per contract + knowledge of payment scheme
(
Robinson v Balmain New Ferry
)
Pf held to conditions of contract which they have accepted (i.e. exit at end of shift)
Df made an omission not an act (active imprisonment v omission where there is no affirmative duty)
(
Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal and Coke Company Limited
)
Assault
directly and intentionally causing the plaintiff to reasonably apprehend the imminent infliction of battery
Intention
strike during discourse -> not assault
intention to assault but missed -> assault
threatening manner -> assault
Directness: active v passive act
bouncing off passive bouncer
(
Innes v Wylie
)
Reasonable apprehension of imminent battery
prevention of frivolous claims
use of words and actions ("If the cops were not there, I would come and get you.") -> assault
(
Tuberville v Sauvage
)
advancing in threatening manner with a clenched fist -> assault even though he was stopped and not near enough to commit battery
(
Stephens v Myers
)
cf.
"If I have the power of God I will knock your head" -> not assault because not next to P, not immediate
(temporally imminent)
(
Amutha Valli v Titular Superior of the Redemptorist Fathers
)
Requirements for trespass torts
direct
intentional
actionable per se
Directness
natural and probable consequence of act by D; gave mischievous faculty to the squib (
Scott v Shepherd
, battery)
Intention
varies slightly for assault v battery v false imprisonment
negligent trespass?
Actionable per se
intangible forms of harm (interference with plaintiff’s
bodily integrity; mental well-being; liberty of movement
)
not that the plaintiff did not suffer harm, but that he does not need to prove harm
harm relevant for quantum of damages or remedies e.g. injunction
policy: not about loss-spreading but protection/balance of freedoms