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Personhood (consciousness (3. responsiveness, 1. wakefulness, defines…
Personhood
consciousness
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defines consciousness as - the experience of an individual's perception of the world (what it is to be that organism)
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all elusive concepts that can be found in many living organisms in many degrees - creates grey areas
focuses on whether organism can experience the world in a specific / unique way... rather than do they qualify the 3 states
computers described as awake + to an extent, respond to the world around them - they don't possess ability to have individual feelings = not conscious
animals = more problematic, because they are now included in 'personhood'
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excludes computers, but also those in comas + asleep (unconscious; no wakefulness, responsiveness + awareness)
we know that their consciousness will return - "potentially conscious" - this is why we also include comatosed people but not dead
self-consciousness
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aware of own existence, individuality + subjectivity
Rochat's summary is problematic- exclude babies up to 18 months, psychopaths, potentially the severely disabled + comatosed individuals
however, artificially reconstructed self-consciousness could make computers persons//
also the potentiality for self-consciousness which creates further indecisiveness of who or what are persons with regards to embryo/ young children
Descartes assists that a thinker can know one's own existence , because it is proven in the act of thinking it
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awareness of one's own thoughts / self-consciousness = definitive of Descartes' most important philosophical argument
thus, also definitive of his view of being a human as well
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moral responsibility
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thus, this quality could be sufficient for personhood, but not necessary
morality is arguably also not a concrete foundation for personhood - a grey area that's disputed for its existence + content
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thus, on this basis, only humans could be persons
however, within humanity, some might not have moral responsibility
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agency
to Frankfurt, second-order desires are a necessary condition of personhood
animals have capacity for 'first-order desires' - simply desires to do one thing or another eg. eating
weighing options is very close to computation process - weakens the claim that human beings are unique + agency is evidence of humans not being determined
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only humans, however, seem to have the capacity + driven by second-order desires (reflective self-evaluation) eg. will eating lead to health problems/greediness/unnecessary spending
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could it be that agency is a sufficient condition for personhood (if a being possesses agency it doesn't need to possess any other quality to be defined as a person), but not a necessary one?
this would allow babies, mentally impaired individuals + at least some animals to have access to personhood
INTRODUCTION
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Thesis: examining these conditions, the thesis of this essay is that personhood is an anthropocentric view + a human invention, which doesn't exist physically/metaphysically
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more specifically, does personhood exist?
those rights are granted by the apparent conditions; consciousness, self-consciousness, agency + moral responsibility
important consideration for ethical issues eg. abortion, animal testing
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CONCLUSION
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problems occur when mentally impaired humans / young children don't satisfy the conditions + arguably some animals might satisfy them
therefore, it leads me to the conclusion that personhood doesn't exist
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we as humans seem to manipulate the criteria , to justify the personhood of any human individual
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