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Deep Water Horizon Macondo Oil Well Disaster 2010 (The System (Well and…

- - - - Pressure increases with depth of water
        Mud is required to maintain pressure inside of the drill hole and casing to prevent collapse.
        Access is difficult due to lack of machinery to handle these depths.
      - No visibility. Control must be maintained through digital read outs from other sensors.
      - Bleed line to monitor and maintain pressure is required so that surface operators can maintain pressure in the well. No way to visually check for blockages.
    - - Unknown until drilling commences
        Ground may be to porous to make extracting resources viable.
        Ground may be too unstable to maintain well integrity.
        Oil and gas may not be present at drill site.
        No physical access to man due to depth and lack of capable machinery.
      - Negative testing is required to ensure the bottom of the drill hole maintains integrity. Neither BP of Transocean gave the drill staff a process to follow for the negative pressure testing or the margins to decide if a negative pressure test was a success or a failure.
      - Cemment barrier required to isolate hydrocarbons, seal annulus and prevent oil and gas flow back into the bore hole.
        
        Cement testing showed that cement mix was not suitable at this depth.
        Finding were not passed on.
        More test were run to establish a way to make the cement stable and fit for use.
        Methods were not communicated to the rig.
        
        Casing shoe did not seal the production casing allowing hydrocarbons to flow from the annulus into the production casing.
      - Centralisers are required to keep the drill casing in place while cementing activities are occurring. IF the drill casing is not centralised pockets of weak or no cement can form which reduces the integrity of the cement and its ability to prevent hydrocarbon flow.
      - Testing result were interpreted incorrectly. Shift managers failed to realise that the bleed line was blocked leading to a false test result of no inflow.
    - - Designed and manufactured by Cameron
      - Had a drained battery due to faulty instalation
      - Had a mis-wired solenoid.
      - Incapable of sealing off the well if the drill pipe is no longer centered.
      - Design Features
        Can be manually operated by personnel on the surface.
        Has an emergency shut off system if communications and power are lost from the drill rig.
      - Must be tested and maintained.
      - May have been blocked by displaced drill mud
    - - Companies directly involved in the drill process
        .
        
        BP Exploration & Production Inc. (BP)
        
        Transocean
        
        Cameron
        
        Supplier of the Blow Out Prevention Device(BOP)
        
        1 more item...
        
        Halliburton # #
        
        Tasks:
        :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside:Cementing
        :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside: well monitoring services
        
        2 more items...
        
        Sperry-Sun #
        Subsidiary to Haliburton
        
        Schlumberger Ltd.
        
        Performed wireline serviceson the Macondo well in the days leading up to the tragedy. Were on call to perform a cement bond log in order to ascertain integrity of the cement job.
        
        1 more item...
        
        Contractor tasked with:
        :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside:all drilling operations
        :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside:hiring subcontractors
        
        Management focused on job completion,
        
        BP
        Owns the lease and
        the rights to drill for and
        extract oil on the Macondo site.
        
        BP Management decided that it would cost to much and take to long to use longstring methods and wanted to use short string.
        
        Halliburton engineers recommend 21 centralisers be used to align casing prior to cementing.
        
        BP Managers don't want to take the time to fit 21 stabilisers and ask Haliburton to test using 7 centralisers even though only 6 were available on the rig at the time.
        
        1 more item...
        
        BP Management:
        Focused on:
        :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside:Profit
        :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside:length and cost of drill time
        :diamond_shape_with_a_dot_inside:Viability of well
    - - Owned and operated by Transocean.
        Semi submersible off shore rig
        Requires motors and thrusters (power) to maintain position.
        Susceptible to damage in extreme weather.
  - - - Dekker et al., (2011) discusses the need to understand that complex systems will also tend to have complex failures.
        
        The system
        
        System Failures
        
        Underwater Environment
        
        Due to the decreasing pressure towards the surface of the water gas from the well rapidly expanded exacerbating the flow.
        Change in pressure and flow buckled the drill pipe.
        
        Blow out Preventer
        
        Failed to operate as intended.
        Annular preventers failed to seal the annular space.
        Emergency system at loss of power from the rig failed to initiate.
        Failed to shear drill pipe.
        Untested at this depth.
        
        Rig
        
        No back up power supply
        Not enough life boats
        Warning systems and alarms inadequate
        Inability to isolate engine room from gasses
        Separator tank overflow or disbursement inadequate
        
        Under Sea Floor Environment
        
        Many layers
        Delicate
        Cracks and fissures allowed drill mud to escape and required extra casing to be used.
        Caused costs to increase.
        
        People
        
        Lack of communication between company decision makers. Lack of communication between teams especially during shift handover. BP executives had the power to override decisions made by engineers and other professionals. More emphasis placed on profits than on safety or following correct process. Emergency training and drills inadequate
- - - - Abandonment Phase
        
        1 more item...
        
        Production Phase
        
        Production assets are put in place. Well is uncapped. Oil/gas is moved from well site to storage facility
        
        Exploratory/Prepatory Phase
        
        Identify areas of potential hydrocarbon stores. Apply for leases and drilling permissions. Conduct feasibility study. Engage contractors or source exploratory assets. Begin exploratory drilling. Complete drilling. Determine production profile.
        Cap well. Exploratory rig is disengaged from well and moved to new site. Capped well remains dormant until owner decides go into production.
  - - - Design Concept
        Source Natural Resources to allow growth of economy.
      - Design Concept Failure
        Expensive components
        High risk to environment, economy and company
    - - Concept
        Steel components
        Cement used to secure in place
        Casing fabricated as drilling is conducted
      - Concept Failure
        Depth under ocean changed pressures
        More casing needed to counter fragility of ocean floor
        More cement required
        Cement not tested at depths reached.
        No backup if BOP failed.
        No backup if cap fails.
    - - Concept
        Production well to be put in place when production was required.
        Oil and gas to be tankered to production facility.
      - Concept Failure
        Never got to be commissioned due to blow out.
    - - Concept
        Normal well maintenacne activities. Usually at a rig level.
        Casing and cement is expected to last the life of the well until abandoned.
      - Concept Failure
        Never got to this stage due to blow out.
        No Plan in place for maintaining the infrastructure and integrity of this well if it failed or if it blew out.
    - - Concept
        Remove above mud level infrastructure.
        Cap well and abandon.
      - Concept Failure
        Never got to this stage due to blow out.
        Cement and steel corrodes and breaks down
        All components can be damaged by adverse events like an earthquake leading to hydrocarbons escaping into the environment.
- - - - 8-Nov-2009 Hurricane Ida – Marianas rig damaged. Moved to safe harbour for repairs.
      - 31-Jan-2010 Deepwater Horizon replace the Marianas on the Macondo Well drill site.. Six days of pre-job maintenance and testing of blowout preventer (BOP) followed. Drilling activities recommenced on February 6.
      - 23-Feb-2010 Pilot valve leak of 1 gpm noticed on yellow pod of BOP; leak reduced after switching to blue pod.
      - 1-3 Feb 2010 Pre job maintenance and testing of BOP.
      - 8-Mar-2010 Pipe gets stuck
      - 12-Mar-2010 Casing changed to address stuck pipe issue.
      - 9-Apr-2010 Reached 18,360 ft. Data collected for five days.
      - 14-Apr-2010 Halliburton determine that long string casing can be used and still meet requirements.
      - 15-Apr-2010 Theoretical testing of data deremins that 21 centralisers would be needed for long string casing.
      - 15-Apr-2010 15 additional centralizers were order as only 6 were available onboard.
      - 16-Apr-2010 11:51 15 centralisers were delivered to the rig.
      - 16-Apr-2010 12:48 12:53 Engineers expressed concerns about the type of centralisers delivered and their integrity.
      - 18-Apr-2010 20:58 Halliburton delivers partial lab test results to BP. These test were conducted on using 7 inline centralisers. Show high risk of hydrocarbon leakage.
      - 19-Apr-2010 13:30 Final casing installed.
      - 19-Apr-2010 14:30 16:20 Crew take 9 attempts to establish circulation.
      - 19-Apr-2010 16:20 19:30 Circulation pressure of 340 psi did not match modelling results of 570 psi.
      - Final circulation pressure significantly lower than modelled pressure.
      - 19-Apr-2010 19:30 Management decides to commence and complete cement job despite the result of the partial report showing high risk of hydrocarbon leakage.
      - 9-Apr-2010 Well site leader reports a leak in one of the Blow Out Preventer (BOP) pods. Policy states drilling must cease until rectified. BP fails to notify government agencies and continues drilling.
  - - - 20-Apr-2010 24:00- 7:00 Two positive pressure tests successfully completed.
      - 20-Apr-2010 7:30 BP and contractors discuss and decide not to run final cement bond test.
      - 20-Apr-2010 10:55 - 12:00 Successful positive-pressure test of the production casing.
      - 20-Apr-2010 12:00 - 15:04 Mud displacement commences despite mudlogger informing assistant driller that pit levels wouldn’t be able to be monitored to indicate well integrity while displacement is taking place. First negative pressure test run.
      - 20-Apr-2010 15:04 15:56 Seawater used to displace mud.
      - 20-Apr-2010 15:56 16:53 Displacement believed to be complete. Data from this time is unreliable due to trip tank being cleaned while displacement was taking place.
      - 20-Apr-2010 16:54 Unequal pressure readings noted between drill pipe and kill line.
      - 20-Apr-2010 16:54 17:27 Negative pressure test run.
      - 20-Apr-2010 17:17 Offloading of mud from mud pits to carrier vessel completed.
      - 20-Apr-2010 17:27 17:52 Negative pressure test fails. Well site leader stated the negative-pressure test needed to be done on the kill line in accordance with the BP plan submitted to MMS.
      - 20-Apr-2010 17:52 18:00 Flow noted from the kill line during negative pressure test.
      - 20-Apr-2010 18:00 18:35 Drill pipe pressure continued to fluctuate and increase.
      - Shift change commenced. Shift bosses discussed the failed negative pressure tests and possible causes.
      - 20-Apr-2010 18:35 19:50 A second negative pressure test was commenced.
      - 20-Apr-2010 19:50 21:20 Various anomalies occur with pressure fluctions and pump issues.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:20 Senior toolpusher informed that second pressure test was “fine”.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:20- 21:40 Pressure readings still varying from normal.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:40 Mud begins to be expelled from the well.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:41 Flow routed to mud gas separator Tool pusher attempts to activate BOP.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:42 - 21:44 Drill pipe pressure continues to increase.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:44 Mud begins shooting into the air accompanied by gas and oil. Well site leader contacted.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:45 Announcement that well is blowing out made.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:46 Gas begins to accumulate on the decks of the drill rig.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:47 First gas alarm sounds.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:48 Onboard generators begin to overspeed.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:49 Generators cut out causing power loss and igniting gas. First explosion occurs. Crew begins to abandon the rig.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:52 Mayday call made by Deepwater Horizon.
      - 20-Apr-2010 21:52 21:57 Another attempt was made to activate the BOP.
      - 20-Apr-2010 22:00 23:22 M/V Damon Bankston rescues survivors from the water. 11 people were determined to be missing.
  - - - 20-Apr-2010 22:00 ----- Oil and gas flow freely from well.
      - 22-Apr-2010 10:22 Deepwater Horizon sank.
      - 23-Apr-2010 17:00 The search for the 11 missing people was suspended.
      - 21-Apr-2010 18:00 1:15 Remotely operated vehicles(ROV) attempt to activate the BOP to shear the pipe.
      - 22-Apr-2010 2:45 ROV finally succeed in activating the BOP shear function but well continues to flow. simulated automatic mode function AMF in an attempt to activate BSR. Well continued to flow.
      - 25-Apr-2010 15 July 2010 Well continues to flow until it can finally be capped.
      - 25-Sept-2010 Well is permanently sealed.
      - 20-Apr-2010 22:00 - 23:22 M/V Damon Bankston rescues survivors from the water. 11 people were determined to be missing.
- - - - Barrier 2 Blow Out Preventer
        
        Barrier 3 Separator tank .
        
        Failed to contain flow from well.
        
        Was not designed to handle high rates and amounts of flow.
        
        Emergency process unclear on use of separator tank.
        
        Uncontrolled gas's and hydrocarbons build up on deck of Deepwater Horizon.
        
        Failed to shut off flow from the well.
        
        Failed due to incorrect wiring of one solenoid and low battery in one pod. BP aware of low battery in yellow pod.
        
        #
        
        BOP was not tested before installation
        Was not tested under high pressure underwater conditions
        Not capable of severing buckled or displaced drill pipe.
        
        Supplier of BOP did not have adequate systems, processes and procedures in place.
        
        Spacer mud not completely cleared causing a blockage in the kill line.
        
        To save time and money drill mud was being offloaded to carrier ship at the same time as mud was being pumped from drill hole making it impossible for the mud logger to monitor the amount of mud removed from the hole.
        
        Annular preventers may have been stripped during drilling operations causing them to fail when needed.
        (Marine Board 2012)
        
        Procedures not followed and casings were stripped out through annular preventer while it was closed in order to save time and money.
        
        Management ignored reports on inadequacies in BOPS
        (Lipton & Broder 2010)
        
        Acknowledging reports would have held up drilling and cost money
      - Failed to seal annual space.
        
        Cement mix used to seal the space failed integrity testing.
        Testing report not supplied to BP Management.
        
        Inadequate number of centralisers used during cementing process.
        
        Testing not adequate or completed due to BP management direction.
    - - Barrier 2
        Alarms and warning systems
        
        Alarm and warning systems failed to notify workers of emergency situation.
        
        Alarms deactivated due to false alarms disturbing sleeping workers.
        
        Reason for false alarms not investigated.
        Alarms on all Transocean rigs deactivated for a number of years
        
        Workers
        Drill Rig Platform
        Environment
      - Data and testing from the well indicated presences of flow but was ignored.
        
        No set parameters for allowable discrepancies during testing. No formalised process for handling discrepancies.
        No formalised shift takeover routine in the event of well control issues.
        
        Inadequate safety planning and risk management on behalf of both BP and subcontractors.
      - Schlumberger team did not complete cement bond log
        
        7 hours required to conduct cement bond log.
        
        BP Management decided that it would take to much time.
- - - - Conflicting Roles
        BP management overriding contractor expert decisions
        Safety policies and procedures absent
        Testing policies and procedures inadequate
        Money and profits given precedence over personal and environmental safety.
    - - No takeover procedures in the event of unusual circumstances
        
        Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 2018 recognises shift changeover times as a potential point of errors occurring and systems failing.
    - - Reports between Halliburton and BP not being provided in a timely manner.
        Breakdown in communication between BP and contractors
        Handover processes inadequate
  - - - Same people day in day out
        No escape from workplace environment
        Disabled alarm systems.
        Inadequate safety policies and procedures.
        Heat and noise.
    - - Disabled alarm systems
        Drill pipe could be raised while annular preventer is closed causing stripping
  - - - Long hour shift work Away from friends and family Coming to the completion of the job Constantly changing orders Processes being disrupted Experts from different companies competing for seniority. Wanted the tests to be fine so that they could finish the job and go home
    - - Expected tests to show the well was fine.